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ABSTRACT
Jacqueline M. Templeton
Public Administration in the Isle of Man
This thesis is a study of public administration in the Isle of Man and is therefore broad in scope. It covers the structures of the administrative machine and the personnel procedures within it. It closely analyses the values of the political, actors within the system and the various influences which have led to its develop­ment. In particular it concentrates upon the predominant feature of the system, that it is a hybrid form displaying characteristics of both British central and local government and explains this by reference to the value system of the Manx political elite. It considers the extent to which these values are the result ofimitation of British practice and explains why this imitation hasoccurred. In addition it examines the extent to which thispattern is analagous to that in the developing nations. Throughits examination of the concept of hybridity, the thesis contributes to the general body of theory relating to public administration.It considers the concept1s relevance to other systems and broadens the idea into a discussion of the relevance of eclecticism to other countries. This is found to be of general, broad significance in nations of any size or stage of development.
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GLOSSARY
Common Purse 
Deemster
Executive Council (Exco)
High Bailiff
House of Keys 
Legislative Council 
Lieutenant Governor 
Mann or Man 
Manx
MLP
MNP
Mec Vannin
MHK
MLC
Sheading
Tynwald
Tynwald Fair Day
Financial agreement with the UK.
Isle of Man’s equivalent of a British High Court Judge.
Small body of Tynwald members with overall responsibility for government in the Island.
Judge next lowest in court hierarchy to Deemsters.
The lower elected house of Tynwald.
The upper house of Tynwald.
The Queen’s representative in Mann.
Alternative terms for the Isle of Man.
Adjective for the people and things of the Isle of Man.
Manx Labour Party
Manx National Party
Manx Nationalist Party
Member of the House of Keys
Member of the Legislative Council
Ancient division of the Island now used with the towns as the basis for the constituencies for elections to the House of Keys.
The Manx parliament
Open air assembly and ceremony of the Manx parliament held annually on the 5th July at the Tynwald fairfield,St. John’s at which the laws are promulgated in Manx and English and petitions presented to the full sitting of Tynwald.
INTRODUCTION
The title of this thesis * Public Administration in the Isle of Man’ 
is broad and appropriate. In it the author describes and explains 
an entire system of public administration.in miniature. It will 
consider the structure of the system and the attitudes and 
behaviour of its actors and will, in addition, attempt to explain 
the influences which have led to the development of that system 
and those patterns of behaviour. The thesis is not an attempt 
to analyse policy-making which would be beyond the scope of this 
work and which must, in any case, follow a description of the 
system itself. It is a new approach in two senses. Firstly, 
it looks at public administration whereas previous writers have 
concentrated upon the relationship with the UK and the political 
culture of the Island. It is therefore original din that it 
reveals new data on the Manx political system and on small 
community politics generally. In addition it provides a new 
contribution to public administration theory through the concept 
of hybridity.
The major work previously completed and published on the 
contemporary political system in the Island is that by 
Dr. D.G. Kermode of Liverpool Polytechnic who concentrated upon 
the Island1s relationship with the UK and all its ramifications.
He did not, however, consider the administrative structures or 
culture of the Island. Some very relevant and interesting work, 
in an as yet unpublished PhD thesis was completed by Dr. J. Richards, 
who compared the political cultures of three small independent 
communities; Malta, Faroe and Mann and provided useful leaders
for the section in this thesis on the Manx administrative culture.
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The thesis of the work is that the Manx administrative system is 
a hybrid form displaying features of two other systems, namely 
British central and local government. This concept of hybridity, 
its relevance to the IOM, the reasons, why it has developed and 
the concept’s applicability in other countries, will be 
considered in Chapter Five, This forms the major theoretical 
section of the work.
Prior to the consideration of public administration in the IOM 
itself, it is necessary to explain the choice of the IOM.and, to 
Justify the study of the small communities in general. It is my 
conviction that the size of a political system has little to do 
with its importance as a subject for study. It is argued that 
small size means that the internal workings of a country are of 
little interest to outsiders and that its size will make 
comparison with larger nation-states difficult if not impossible. 
Alternatively, the actions of governments, however small and 
however few are the people it governs, can cause reactions in the 
outside world. The interest elsewhere is related far more to the 
actions of the government than to how many people they affect by 
those actions. Hence the British media’s interest in the 
almost dictatorial behaviour of Malta’s Dorn Mintoff, despite the 
fact that the population of the Maltese Islands is a mere 300,000.
That comparisons cannot be made between very small communities 
and larger nation-states can be countered by this argument. 
Following this view it would be equally useless to compare the 
system and behaviour of Britain with that of the USA, an 
activity which is*frequently undertaken by public administration 
writers.
The justification for studying the IOM in particular rather than 
small communities in general are many, not least the international 
implications of the Manx Government’s activities. These 
international implications are largely a result of three things. 
Firstly, the Island’s tax haven status is beginning to make a 
significant impact on the British economy since it has drawn 
much investment and has been a convenient, legal outlet for tax 
avoiders from Britain. Secondly, the Island’s relationship with 
the UK is of importance to Britain and elsewhere since the British 
government has certain duties and responsibilities with relation 
to the Island and must be constantly in contact with it as a result 
of its constitutional commitments. Thirdly, the internal 
activities of the Manx government are of interest to Britain’s 
partners in Europe. Significant examples are the .appearance of 
the UK government at the European Court of Human Rights on 
behalf of the IOM to hear their decision on the question of 
judicial corporal punishment in the Island. The issue of the 
birch is one which raises fierce emotions in more places than 
just the IOM. Another example is that of fishing rights in the 
Irish Sea to which the Island is making its claim despite EEC 
directives to the contrary.
Further, it is unfortunate that British social science largely 
ignores almost complete political systems right on its doorstep. 
This is true not only of the IOM but also of the Channel Islands, 
Eire and even Scotland. This in itself could be said to be 
adequate justification for the study of the IOM, in order to 
develop a better and fuller understanding of the political 
nature of this group of Islands.
- 3 -
Finally the very si^e of the IOM makes it a particularly easy 
system to study. The same functions as in any country must be 
performed and enshrined in some kind of institution or behaviour 
pattern. The very fact that these exist in miniature means that 
the relationships between bodies and the actual working of those 
bodies can be examined with considerable precision. Study may 
be complicated by the fact that in a small community a few 
institutions may carry out many functions but the numbers of 
people involved is still very small and the various relationships 
between people can be readily discovered.
In leading to its conclusions, the thesis will be presented in 
the following manner. Chapter One outlines some very important 
structures and values in British central and local government 
and places the emphasis upon the differences between them rather 
than their similarities. These include local and central 
governments* different approaches to co-ordination, professionalism, 
anonymity and impartiality, and efficiency.
In Chapter Two the focus changes to the IOM itself with a study 
of the Manx administrative culture i.e. the social, political 
and geographical factors which form the background to 
administrative form and action in the Island. It considers the 
perceptions Manx civil servants have of British public 
administration, the subsequent * imitation syndrome*, the impact 
of the smallness of the community and the political attitudes of 
Manx senior civil servants.
Chapter Three describes and explains the structure of the Manx 
administrative system looking, therefore at the supra-national 
tiers of government, the Island*s own political institutions, its 
civil service, its local government and finally the bodies and 
mechanisms, part of whose responsibilities it is to co-ordinate the-^  
whole machine. Chapter Four, the second of the descriptive 
chapters, is entitled *The Public Service* and deals in the main 
with the characteristics of the Manx Civil Service, recruitment 
to it, promotion and training within it and pay and conditions 
under which civil servants in the Island work.
As explained above Chapter Five puts the whole of this information 
into the context of the concept of hybridity. The major 
conclusion reached is that the IOM has a hybrid form of 
administration which has developed as a result of factors 
relating to its size, its relationship with and perception of 
the UK, and the necessity for an entirely autonomous reaction to 
needs and problems. The conclusion on the work explains more 
general points arising from this study and makes some tentative 
suggestions for improvement in the Manx administrative system to 
bring it to a position where it will be more able to cope with the 
pressure of a modern day existence as part of a complex and demanding 
world economy.
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CHAPTER ONE:
STRUCTURES AND VALUES IN BRITISH CENTRAL AND LOCAL ADMINISTRATION
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter it is intended to review existing, well-developed 
ideas and practices in British administration on a selective 
basis which relates best to the IOM. The resultant brief 
discussion will provide a useful backcloth for the analysis of 
methods and behaviour in the Manx administrative system. The 
chapter is not designed to debate theories at length, nor is' it 
meant to break new ground on the value of those theories for the 
study of public administration. Rather it is to be hoped that by 
selecting the most discussed and most obvious factors, a basis can 
be found for the study of the Manx system of public administration 
which has, as yet, been starved of academic analysis. The 
approach, therefore,will be to discuss certain values and structures 
in their organisational context in order that they may provide a 
background for the more descriptive elements of the work. The 
Chapter will not, therefore, discuss the features as they occur in 
the IOM.
That values and structures relating to organisation and methods 
in public administrative systems exist is obvious. They can be 
observed with ease by the most casual student of any system simply 
by the way the organisation deals with the outside world. The 
values it holds will become evident through the image it presents 
to public and press. On a deeper level, the internal workings 
of an organisation develop through a long process of precedence
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and change which results in an intricate system of beliefs, 
values and traditions.
Underlying the above is the assumption that particular trends can 
be associated closely with particular organisations or systems.
Is this a sound assumption? Inevitably, all bureaucracies have 
features in common which are an automatic result of their being 
bureaucracies and all public bureaucracies will be yet more likely 
to be similar given the requirement for accountability that being 
public implies. So, can we say that certain features are 
inextricably identified with certain organisations? There is 
considerable evidence to suggest that this is the case and that 
the system of traditions and values assists its members and those 
outside to recognise and make better sense of the organisation as 
a whole. As features become associated with an organisation they 
become absorbed into its character and persist by processes of 
socialization and image-presentation to the extent that they become 
so deeply embedded that they are almost impossible to dispel.
The importance of these factors in association with particular 
administrative systems must, therefore, be considered prior to any 
examination of those systems1 relevance to Manx administration.
In administrative systems no less than in the political system 
generally, British influence on Mann, both conscious and 
unconscious, has been imported on a major scale. This will 
become very evident in later descriptive chapters and will explain 
the choice of characteristics in this first section.
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Both central and local bureaucracies seem to conform quite 
closely to Weber’ s ideal type of pure bureaucracy in which the 
whole administrative staff under a supreme authority consists of 
individual officials who are.appointed and function under 
certain criteria. They are personally free and subject to 
authority only with respect to their impersonal official 
obligations. They are arranged in a hierarchy of officers and 
are appointed on the basis of technical qualifications to posts 
for which they are remunerated according to rank. The office is 
treated as the sole,or: at least primary, occupation of the incumbent 
and it constitutes a career within which promotion is dependent on 
the judgement of supervisors.'1’
Weber argued that,experience shows this monocratic form of
bureaucracy is, from a technical point of view,
,lcapable of the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means o£ carrying out imperative control over human beings.*1
The fact that it is an ideal type makes it practically impossible
to achieve. On the whole, however, central and local government
in Britain have adhered to these principles to a roughly similar
extent and the Manx system is also based upon them. However, as
later descriptive evidence shows, the influence of more traditional
conceptions of the appropriation of office are still strong and can
to some extent be explained through Weber’s ’traditional* type.
This describes a situation where the bases of order are precedent
and usage. The rights and expectations of various groups are
1. Max Weber, “The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation11 Oxford University Press, Inc. 1947. P. 33.
2. Ibid. P. 336.
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established in terms of taking as sacred what has always happened; 
the great arbiter of such a system is custom.
Weber?s third type of administrative organisation he describes 
as ’charismatic1 where an individual exercises authority on the 
basis of his personal qualities which set him apart from 
ordinary men.
In terms of Weber’s three types the Manx bureaucracy, though 
superficially comparing well with British central and local , 
systems in its adherance to the Weberian ideal type, displays 
features also of the traditional one but not to his charismatic 
model. This will become evident in later chapters on the 
Manx administrative culture, machinery of government and 
personnel practices.
Hence rather than concentrating upon the obvious similarities 
between systems, it is beneficial to consider features which 
are characteristic only of particular systems and this is what 
Chapter 1 intends to do.
The criteria for selection of factors for study in this backcloth 
have been the prevalence of material on the topic in the body of 
literature on public administration; the applicability of the 
topic for a small system of public administration; and the 
relevance of the characteristic to the central thesis of the work - 
that the Manx administrative system is a hybrid form of the 
municipal and central systems in Great Britain.
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A
The first criterion above may require some further explanation. 
Whilst it is important for new theoretical points to be made this 
is not the appropriate place in which to do it. The examination 
of the Manx system of administration has, to date been 
rudimentary, and it is first necessary to make up the time lost 
before a more original approach can begin.
The applicability of the topic to a small system of administration 
is equally important in that there is little relevance to the 
central thesis in looking at problems of excessively large 
hierarchies, long chains of command, excesses of specialization 
and so on. Any work must have its parameters and here they are 
imposed by the unusual restrictions of studying a small 
community.
In confining features studied to those which are relevant to the 
central thesis of the work it is to be hoped that better linkages 
can be made between one section and another and a fuller 
examination of the major idea can be effected.
The features which will be examined have been associated closely 
with either British local authorities, or British central 
government and in some cases both, though to different degrees 
and in different ways. This is not to deny that these features
may be present, and very significant in the administrative 
systems of other countries, but their interpretation in Britain 
has been chosen because of that country1s considerable influence 
on Mann over many centuries.
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The features will be considered under a series of headings though 
these are not intended to be absolutely exclusive categories.
The dangers of compartmentalisation are particularly evident in 
a project of this breadth and care must be taken to inter-relate 
the parts in a comprehensive manner. However, for ease of 
presentation the following subject headings have been chosen and 
they have been divided into structures and values (again 
overlapping but the distinction is of use). Under the headings 
’structures’ the aspects of ’committee/ministerial systems’; 
’co-ordinative structures’ and ’consultative structures’ will be 
considered. Under ’values* will come ’professionalism*, 
’anonymity and impartiality* and ’efficiency*.
These headings give no indication of the association with 
particular administrative systems and are not designed to 
restrain the material too specifically. They are merely 
intended to act as a means of grouping information in a 
manageable form. Each topic will be examined in turn and 
consideration given to the extent to which it exists and the way
9
it occurs in each organisation.
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VALUES
In speaking of values in this section the term will apply in a very 
broad sense and will include matters which could better be called 
beliefs or traditions. These terms, values, beliefs, traditions, 
have many meanings and have been the subject of lengthy academic 
a r g u m e n t I n  the following analysis the terms will be used in 
the following senses. By ’values* is meant a set of principles 
which the members of the organisation and those who interact 
closely with it, hold in high esteem. They may be of varying 
significance and may be conscious, unconscious or sub-conscious. 
They may be inherent in the personalities of the members or 
acquired after joining the organisation, but it will be assumed 
that the majority of members identify with the concepts and, 
through them, contribute to the overall value system of the 
organisation.
A ’belief1, according to the Chambers’ Twentieth Century 
Dictionary definition is a ’’persuasion of the truth” of something. 
It is ”an opinion or doctrine believed”. This concept is not 
unrelated to that of ’value’ and the two cannot be seen as mutually 
exclusive. A ’belief* does, however, imply a positive 
commitment to a particular concept whereas a value is almost 
instinctive and involuntary.
’Tradition* can be defined as”a tale, belief or practice handed 
down from generation to generation”. In the organisational
1. Amongst others see G. Vickers, ”Value systems and social processes” Tavistock. 1968.
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context it is anything bound up with, or continuing in the life 
of, an administrative system. In this sense traditions can be 
used as a generic term for all those factors to be examined 
later but the word implies a long-standing reliance which may 
not bd present and it is possible for newly-held ideas to be 
equally significant in an organisational context.
Professionalism
By professionalism is meant not only that groups of staff holding 
certain qualifications and sharing common ethics, training and 
experience exist but that these persons hold particular positions 
in the managerial levels in administrative organisations. In 
the British Civil Service the generalist administrators hold the 
most senior posts supported by professional advisers.'1' The
itgeneralist in the elite corps of the British Civil Service does 
not regard himself as a specialist in anything save his under­
standing of the machinery of government and his awareness of
. . "2ministerial responsibility
The reasons for the British Civil Service reliance upon the
generalist are primarily historical and are a: result of their
methods of recruitment. These have produced a disproportionately
. 3high number of public school, Oxbridge and arts degree recruits 
and more have origins in the upper and middle classes than is seen
1. Fulton Committee on "The Civil Service1*. H.M. S» 0, 1968.
2. P. Self, "Administrative Theories and Politics11.George Allen and Unwin. 1972.P. 163.
3. Peta Sherrif, "Career Patterns in the Higher Civil Service11H.M.S.O. 1976.
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in the population at large. This has produced a potent self- 
perpetuating tradition of common beliefs, attitudes and ethics.
The development of a powerful and permanent elite has 
significant consequences for civil service/ministerial relations, 
both in terms of the relative power they possess and the methods 
used to achieve their aims.
Conversely, it is a deep-rooted convention that departmental
heads din local government should be selected for their professional
1expertise rather than any managerial ability they may possess.
The historical reason for this is that local government has
developed as an amalgam of specialist services and for each
specialised task authorities have appointed (largely under
statutory compulsion) a professional specialist to advice on and 
2execute work. The administrator m  local government has 
typically worked as the subordinate of the specialist and advice 
on policy has been regarded as part and parcel of the 
professional advice provided by professional chief officers.
That certain types of degrees and social background are, perhaps 
falsely, identified in the British Civil Service with the ’best 
people to govern the country' is in direct contrast with local 
government’s encouragement of professionalism with all its 
consequences for efficiency, standards, divided loyalties
1. J. Stanyer, "Understanding Local Government” Fontana. 1976 P. 183.
2. K. P. Poole, "The Local Government Service" New Local Government Series. George Allen and Unwin. 1978. P.38.
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and so on. This marked difference in the evaluation of the role
bf specialists in administrative organisations is evidenced in
2many reports on both local and central government. The comparative 
advantages and disadvantages centre around the loyalties which. 
membership of a professional association requires. These cause 
an improvement in standards, an introduction of new ideas and 
applications and provide a planned career basis (through the 
qualifications themselves). They can simultaneously result in 
a division of loyalties between profession and employing 
organisation and can also cause inter-profession rivalry within 
the organisation. Though these are not the primary reasons for 
the non-emergence of professionalism at the central level, the 
problems can largely be avoided. The benefits, however, are 
also absent and central government style has been affected 
accordingly.^
Anonymity and Impartiality
By convention, the British Civil Service is expected to be an 
anonymous, impartial bureaucracy. The inextricable association 
of this concept with that of ministerial responsibility is not 
to be underestimated and, indeed, it underlies our whole under­
standing of legislative-executive relations. The conventional 
constitutional theory is that in British government the minister 
is responsible to parliament for every activity and decision made
1. For a fuller discussion of the value of the professional and the generalist/specialist debate see Stanyer, Op Cit P.120;Poole Op Cit, P.39; Stanyer and Smith, “Administering Britain11. Fontana.1976.P.252.M.J. Hill, “The Sociology of Public Administration” . Weidenfield & Nicholson. 1972.CH.4.
2. Bains ftThe New Local Authorities: Management &• Structure11HMSO 1972. Maud “Report on the Management of Local Government” HMSO 1967. Mallaby Report on “Staffing in Local Government11 HMSO 1967. Fulton Report. Op Cit. etc.
3. Fulton. Op Cit. * 16 -
in his department or ministry. Civil servants are not personally
responsible for their decisions and should therefore not be public
figures, known by name in the press or parliament. Impartiality,
an associated concept, is by convention again, said to be
complete. This has, however, been challenged by both academics
and politicians.'*’ Civil servants are certainly protected and
largely free from political intrusion and their lives are, to a
large extent untouched by the transcience of politics.
However, through their control of information they can
2influence decision-making. In practice, though civil servants
prepare programmes appropriate to the party in power, they have
significant control over them and can include in them elements
based on their departmental and ideological preferences.
Neither is the principle of ministerial responsibility strictly
adhered to, as seen in the Ferranti case when excessive profits
were made on the Bloodhound missile contract and in the Vehicle
3and General Insurance Case of 1972. These caused a reinter­
pretation of the whole concept and a tendency to hold civil 
servants more accountable in the management sense.
In local government the role of officers has not been so closely 
associated with the concepts of anonymity and impartiality 
primarily because the services it provides are seen as
1. B. Smith “Policy-Making In British Government11 Martin Robertson. 1976. Chapter 2.
2. Hall, Land, Parker and Webb “Change, Choice and Conflict in Social Policy“ Heinemann 1975, P. 69.
3. Gunn LA “Ministers and Civil Servants: Changes in WhitehallPublic Administration1lr (Sydney) 26,1,1967
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uncontentious, well-established and straightforward to implement. 
Chief officers are increasingly becoming foci for local press but on 
the whole, local government officers answer internally for their 
actions and councillors are responsible for the decisions made.
Throughout both local and central level systems, maintenance of
the elected body’s control of administration is a fundamental aim.
The advantages of an anonymous, apolitical, bureaucracy to advise
and implement are that expertise can be developed in a stable
environment, protected from the need to placate voters and civil
servants, and officers can do as they feel they should without
the prospect of criticism and scrutiny from outside. However,
the extensive, some say excessive, powers of the bureaucracy
can seriously undermine the effectiveness of a democratic form
of government. Without counter-staffs to provide an.
alternative source of information the politician can be swamped
by the tide of data and advice given resulting in ignorance of
exactly what is happening and lack of control over decision- 
2making. The complex relationship between civil servant and 
minister and between local government officers and councillors
3has been extensively documented and need not be repeated here.
It suffices to say that there is a significant difference 
between what is ideal constitutional theory and what is the 
reality of the situation at both central and local government 
levels.
1. L.J. Sharp ’’Theories and Values of Local Government11.Political Studies, Vol 18, 1968.
2. B. Guy Peters. ’’The Politics of Bureaucracy: A ComparativePerspective” Longman. 1978. p.192.
3. R. Crossman nThe Diaries of a Cabinet Minister” Hamilton and Cape 1975 - 18 -
Efficiency
This term is one which almost defies definition and certainly 
defies measurement but yet is considered generally desirable 
and is highly valued. A dictionary definition states that 
efficiency is **the power to produce the result intended1*. In 
terms of physics it is **the ratio of a machine’s output of energy 
to input**. Applying this to government one couud say it is 
**the maximum output for the least cost**, in other words the best 
use of available resources. This would distinguish efficiency 
from other related concepts such as effectiveness which has more 
to do with the quality of a government agency’s performance in 
meeting societal ’needs1. The achievement of objectives is, 
however, also part of efficiency and hence comes the problem 
of defining the word despite the fact that it is in common use.
Assuming, for our purposes that efficiency has both the element 
of achieving objectives and achieving the maximum output for the 
least cost, it would seem safe to assume that it is an aim of both 
central and local government. Thus, prescriptively, 
organisational structure and method should be designed to achieve 
maximum efficiency. Chester Barnard suggested that the way to 
do this was to break down the very general and imprecise goals 
of a large organisation into a series of sub-goals. These would 
then be met by an organisational pattern specialised at every
1level in those ways which will best realise a hieraxchy of goals. 
However, orderly goal-setting presents great difficulties in 
government since goals must reflect numerous, possibly conflicting
1. C. Barnard. trThe Functions of the Executive** Cambridge, .Mass.1964. Ch.10.
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pressures from both within and outside government itself. The 
achievement of organisational efficiency is, therefore, done in 
practice on far less rational grounds and even where attempts are 
made e.g. to allocate functions according to rationally identified 
criteria, often these criteria are the product of much adjustment 
and compromise.
In order to relate the discussion of efficiency to the concept 
of hybridity, it will be useful to consider the relationship of 
the optimum size of units for administration to the efficiency of 
the organisation. The relationship of size to efficiency is 
further discussed in Chapter 2 but it is appropriate here to 
consider what has been said on the subj'ect regarding local and 
central government in Britain.
The Redcliffe-Maud Report, 1969, examined the size of population
needed for the efficient provision of various public services at
the local level and combining these found that
uthe minimum size for all main services is, desirably a population of some 250,000*r
Despite the fact that they found that size did not have a greater
bearing on performance than the environmental characteristics of
3local authorities , their overall conclusion was that larger 
local authorities offer advantages of specialisation in staff and
1. P. Self Administrative Theories and Politics1* Op Cit pp 64-72
2. tlRoyal Commission on Local Government in England. 1966-69“Vol. 1 HMSO 1969. Cmnd 4040. p.28
3. Ibid. p.58
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institutions and a more rational distribution of resources. In 
addition a larger authority could “spread the administrative load 
more evenly and, therefore, it can draw on greater resources, it 
can offer a wider range of policy choices™. All these benefits 
can lead to greater efficiency, defined as above, and should, 
Redcliffe-Maud declared, be borne in mind in recommending a 
reorganisation of local government. Their proposals were duly 
formulated to balance the requirement for efficiency with that 
for local democracy. The subsequent debate on the report 
included the issue of the relationship between size and 
efficiency and it was later a factor in the re-organisation of 
local government into the form we see it today. This is 
evidenced by the fact that very many of the small authorities 
were combined to form larger district councils and the two tiers of 
the system were allocated functions on a generally less 
fragmented basis.
The units of organisation within central government are 
ministries and departments and the size of these bears an 
important relationship to efficiency. The problem of managerial 
control in very large departments must be balanced with the 
economies of scale which large size may bring. In addition, 
as P. Self says,
“The existence of a large number of departments may be managerially satisfactory for each department, but impedes central co-ordination and planning ...Managerial co-ordination requires, ideally, a systematic grouping of functions in roughly equal blocks, while functional considerations are ^ intrinsically resistant to such tidy patterns”
1. P. Self. Op Cit. p.83.
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If efficiency is the optimum use of resources then the right 
balance of all these factors must be found in order to achieve 
efficiency. If efficiency is the realisation of objectives it 
will be aided by having manageable units of organisation 
though this must be combined with a rational process of goal 
identification, planning, implementation and review.
The measurement of efficiency in government has always been 
problematic since there is such a wide range of outputs 
affecting a complex environment with the externalities and 
unexpected consequences all coming into play. Additionally, 
the relationship between inputs and outputs is difficult since 
the inputs are on the whole political and the outputs technical.
It is, therefore, impossible to say whether central or local 
government is the more efficient. Arguably, local government 
services can be compared, authority with authority, 
but this will not take into account the unique socio­
economic and geographic factors of each authority and the 
differing pressures at play. At both levels the design of 
suitable organisational structures and methods is plagued by 
the fact that what is optimum for one service may not be for 
another and the criteria used are inevitably arbitrary.
STRUCTURES
By the term structures in this context is meant the arrangements
and manner of organisation in central and local administration in
Britain. At both levels the development of these structures has
been piecemeal and incremental.^ The proliferation of new
government activities (for example economic and energy planning)
and the disappearance of old ones (for example India) resulted
in frequent addition and abolition of new ministries and
departments with a corresponding, though smaller development of
service departments. Similarly at local level functions have
changed and structures have altered accordingly, for example the
introduction of employment policy units to cope with increasingly
difficult problems of the local economy. By a continuous process
of fission, fusion and transfer the apparatus of government has
developed to its present state and is still in a ■ constant state 
2of flux. The development of new needs does not necessarily 
result in a new department as it could be grouped with existing 
departments or other government agencies already providing 
similar function. The criteria for development of a new 
department are far more likely to be that the function, or 
group of functions, has become of sufficient importance and 
complexity to require a new department with direct responsibility 
to Parliament, through a Minister or to Council through a 
committee.
1. This is not necessarily an indictment according to Lindblom’s prescriptive theory of incrementalism. D. Braybrooke &
C. Lindblom UA Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as aSocial Process*1. London Free Press. 1963.
2. Hanson and Walles “Governing Britain*1 Fontana. 1975. Ch.6.
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Coinmittee/Ministerial Patterns
At central level the greater and most important part of 
administration is covered by the Ministerial system whereby 
government is organised into departments each responsible to 
Parliament through its ministerial chief. The reasons for 
the development of this as opposed to a committee system are 
first, that it facilitates a focus for accountability to what 
is a large parliament (especially when compared with a local 
council) and to the cabinet where it was necessary to have 
truly responsible figures represented. Second, the relatively 
early development of parties at central level necessitated 
finding for the major party’s most senior members, posts 
commensurate with their ability and standing. In local, 
government (and indeed in the IOM at the present time) parties 
were relatively inactive when the committee system was 
established and this more consensual, approach to decision­
making required the sharing of power over particular functions 
in the larger body i.e. a committee. Since there was no small 
executive body performing in a similar manner to a cabinet, it 
was all that was required for the committee’s chairman to act 
as its spokesman to the full council.
At the local level horizontal proliferation of committees has 
characterised the development of local, elected government.
Local authority committees developed out of the boards that were 
established in a piecemeal fashion to tackle the problems of 
urban and industrial society during the nineteenth century.
The considerable development and extension of local authority
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committee structures was largely a result of central government’s 
imposition of new functions. Often, a professional trained officer 
was required under statute (for example to implement public health 
legislation) and it became a tradition for a committee to be 
established with a specialist officer heading the department 
beneath it. This vertical system of committees and departments 
facilitated the incorporation of new functions by the simple 
creation of a new committee and the introduction of a new 
profession and led Mr. John Maud’s Committee in 1967 to comment 
that there should be a considerable reduction in the number of 
committees in local government.^*
The influences acting upon the central and local systems in 
Britain were somewhat different and led to a different pattern 
of allocation of responsibility. It will later be seen that the 
influences applying to the IOM bore most resemblance, in this 
respect, to those applying to British municipal administration.
Quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations
The *ad hoc' or ’statutory authorities for special purposes' are
characterised by specialisation of function, varying degrees of
autonomy and whole or partial exemption from the normal processes
2of accountability to parliament, through Ministers. A body may 
need to be free from the accountability process for several, reasons.
1. Maud “Report on the Management of Local Government” Cmnd. 4040. 
HMSO 1967.
2. Hanson and Walles. Op Cit. Ch. 8.
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The most prominent are first that it is commercial in nature and 
hence requires considerable financial autonomy (as in the case of 
the nationalised industries). Second, it may have judicial or 
quasi-judicial functions requiring impartiality from the political 
process. Third it may provide a service of a personal or 
cultural kind which can be distorted by political influences. Or 
finally it may be best to regulate professions, such as medicine 
and law, by means of bodies subject only to slight political 
supervision.
THe agencies concerned form a sprawling mass of irregular 
administrative institutions which defy classification, and even 
description, and this has caused the structure of the administrative 
system to depart considerably from the principles set out by the 
Haldane Committee in 1918.^* The considerable dangers of the 
development of a series of quasi-autonomous, non-governmental 
organisations for the democratic process are comparable only 
to the dangers of the lack of co-ordination which results from 
their creation. Successive governments have, however, seen fit 
to create new ad hoc bodies and even following the present 
Government’s early-office purge, their numbers are considerable 
though not precisely known.
It is impractical to compare central and local practice in this 
section since the creation of quangos is primarily the responsibility 
of central government. Local authorities do, however have their
1. Haldane “Report of the Committee on the Machinery of Government”. Cmnd. 9230. 1918.
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connections with quangos through their membership of health 
service committees and connections with water, electricity and 
gas suppliers in their areas. They also create bodies of a 
similar kind to quangos; a recent example is the setting up of 
private companies limited by guarantee to aid local industrial 
development and these are partly funded and partly controlled 
by local authority members.
Co-ordinative Mechanisms
As a result of the proliferation of functions and departments at 
both local and national, levels, problems of the coherent develop­
ment of services and their overall co-ordination become 
increasingly severe. The attempt to overcome these problems 
by fusing departments, particularly after the Second World War, 
revealed considerable diseconomies. The benefits of 
concentrating related functions under one roof were outweighed 
by its disadvantages and a process of disaggregation followed.
The many subsequent turns of the tide were associated not only 
with the administrative advantages of large scale organisation 
but with the necessity for adequate responsibility to Cabinet 
and Parliament. Cabinet needs to balance its own size (for 
meaningful discussion and decision-making) with individual 
ministers* ability to deal with huge conglomerate departments.
The 1 super-ministries*, ’overlords*1 and other such similar 
mechanisms illustrate the dilemma,and the problem is as yet, 
effectively unresolved. Successive governments to the present
1. H. Morrison “Government and Parliament” Oxford U.P. 3rd. Ed. 1965.
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day have resorted to marginal change to suit political issues
and personalities,
“for it often happens that a ministry is created for a particular politician rather than^a politician being found for a particular ministry.“
In local government the solutions have been different though the
problem was substantially the same. In the larger authorities
especially, the size of certain departments, especially education
and social services, became unweildy and services in general,
unco-ordinated. During and before the reorganisation debate,
inter-departmental co-ordination had been seen as a considerable
problem as the number of functions and corresponding departments
2grew. Bains’ solution , both at the structural and the'o ret real.
levels was welcomed, though on the whole only the former has been
implemented. Many authorities have used the corporate
management principles embodied in Bains as a basis for the
development of their own unique systems of management (as indeed
3Bains encouraged them to do) . However, problems still remain 
and to date few authorities are entirely satisfied that their 
functions dovetail adequately. It has usually been found that 
departmental loyalties are too strong to allow positive 
co-ordination to develop.
The need to forge better links with local branches of ad hoc 
bodies providing local services, e.g. Electricity and Gas
1. Hanson and Walles /Op Cit. P.121.
2. Bains Report Op Cit.
3. Royston Greenwood,C.R. Hinings, Stewart Ronson and Kieren Walsh. “In Pursuit of Corporate Rationality: OrganisationalDevelopments in the Post-Reorganisation Period.”
Inlogov P.177.
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authorities, is an additional problem of co-ordination.
Internally the absence of a central management body of a 
reasonable size^(full council being too concerned with political 
debate and rubber-stamping to be able to cope with requirements 
for speed in decision-making) led Bains to recommend many changes 
to improve co-ordination. In order to concern itself with the 
“overall economic, cultural and physical well being of the 
community11 the traditional departmental attitudes had to give 
way to a wider-ranging corporate outlook. To achieve this -5it 
recommended the establishment of a corporate management 
structure and gave detailed suggestions as to its membership and 
the inter-relationship of its constituent parts. The following 
diagram summarises the structure and mentions the names of the 
new bodies it proposed should be set up.
Council
IPolicy and Resources Resources Sub­committee Committees
TProgramme Committees
Diagram 1 (a) Outline Committee Structure.
Chief ExecutiveiPrincipal Chief Officers Management Team, | ’___________Departments Departments
2Diagram 1 (b) Outline Departmental Structure.
1. R.S.B. Knowles Op Cit. P.37.
2. Bains Report Op Cit. Ch.9. P.99.- 29 -
iProgrammeCommittees
The above outline gives only a very brief picture of the Bains 
proposals as permitted by the restrictions of space, and any 
more complete understanding requires a much more detailed 
analysis of the report. The implementation of corporate 
management structures in British local authorities since 
re-organisation has been widespread though fragmented. Every 
authorityfs approach to corporate management is different and 
each lias had a different degree of success. The high ideals 
of the corporate approach are fading because local authorities 
are a confederation of competing interests. The main 
achievement (and this has been patchy to say the least) has been 
in getting people together to create a corporate, forward 
looking attitude. Practicality dictates that the ruling party 
in local governmeiit will lead whatever corporate approach 
develops.
In any administrative or policy-making system uncertainty will 
accrue about other areas of policy-making which impinge on the 
problem under consideration. It is precisely this uncertainty 
which leads to perpetual demands for co-ordination in government 
and a widespread belief in its value. The particular approach 
to co-ordination which is adopted will depend upon the nature of 
the current allocation of responsibilities but both central and 
local level administration in Britain have seen the need for a 
common approach and have made attempts to achieve it.
Consultative Arrangements
Up to now the themes and traditions considered have been 
concerned mainly with internal workings and relationships.
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It would be a serious omission not to point out that distinctive 
patterns of dealing with the outside world; pressure groups and 
public, exist and are identified with particular administrative 
systems.
In both British central and local government, political power is 
derived from a democratic system. Though those systems are not 
identical they resemble one another closely enough that we can 
say that the formal relationship between governor and governed 
is similar. Both administratively and politically local and 
national elections are fought in a similar manner'*' and do not, 
in the main, involve the bureaucracies connected with them.
The electoral system, however, provides only a limited means for
the public to influence policy and both individuals and groups
seek to put pressure not only on politicians but on the
bureaucracy itself. It has been said that where successful
pressure groups seek to influence government is often the
2place where the power lies within the system. The bulk of
activity in the British governmental system is directed not at
the political parties or parliament but at the administration
“and there is considerable institutionalisation of groups within the British governmental framework.”
This is illustrated by the plethora of advisory committees which
provide links between the government and the various producers1
groups and professional associations.
1. K. Newton “Second City Politics” Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1976. Ch.2.
2. S.E-. Finer “The Anonymous Empire” Pall Mall. 1966.
3. Hanson and Walles Op Cit. P.154.
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The symbiotic relationship between governments seeking
consultation and information for successful planning, and groups
seeking access to decision-making and decision-execution led
Blondel to say that
“the distinction between ’administrative decisions’ and ’decisions taken by prjvate individuals’ is more and more useless to make.”
At the local level pressure groups and voluntary bodies are
usually organised on a local authority basis, so recognising
the spatial as well as the functional distribution of power.
Delegation of decision-making powers to local government officers,
for example planning permissions, focuses the attention of
environmental and other pressure groups upon them. The local
activity is, however, different in one important respect from
central government pressure. In central government groups are
concerned fax more with general rules and the frameworks within
which the organisations live. Local groups are concerned fax
more with the specific, with individual cases and decisions
concerning a particular piece of land, an individual or an
2individual organisation. It could be argued that this results 
in greater pressure upon the administration as individual 
decisions are of relatively minor political importance.
However, the close involvement of councillors with the minutiae 
of day-to-day administration, which has been criticised for so 
long, may result in groups applying pressure on them, in the 
knowledge that they can, and do, take up individual cases.
1. J. Blondel “Voters, Parties and Leaders” Pelican. 1963.P.224.
2. J. Stanyer. Op Cit. P.84.
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Administrative systems are in contact not only with groups but 
with individuals primarily as the receivers of their services 
though not exclusively in that role. The weakness of the 
individual citizen in a modern democracy is compensated by
!lthe right and ability of all freely to organisj groups and associations for political action11.
It is most often in a situation of grievance that an individual
seeks to contact the administration and obtain redress. At
both central and local levels individuals have recourse to the
courts, administrative tribunals and to the ombudsmen. The
success of these is very difficult to measure but in terms of
the number of applications and number of decisions in favour
of applicants success is similar nationally to locally. This is
despite the fact that the civil service is seen as. a greatly more
monolithic organisation. Its relationship with individual
citizens bears a close similarity with that at the local
authority level.
1. B. Smith Op Cit. P.178.
CONCLUSION
This Chapter has raised some issues which must be borne in mind 
in the later consideration of the Manx system of public 
administration. It has looked at values, in particular those 
of professionalism and of anonymity and impartiality, and it has 
looked at certain significant structures which show marked 
differences between British central and local administration. 
Though the differences between the latter two systems are often a 
consequence of history and tradition, they may also be concerned 
with the relative sizes of the two organisations and the values 
held by their members. The similarities are indeed great, though 
and common principles do apply.
The Manx bureaucracy shows many marked similarities with both 
British central and local, government and this is illustrated by 
all three types adhering quite closely to Weber*s ideal type 
rational bureaucracy. However, in making any comparison, it is 
necessary to stress that particular organisations will develop 
characteristics which are peculiar only to them. It will be the 
task of this thesis to explain what these characteristics are in 
the Manx administrative system and why they have developed there. 
This will be illustrated in the following three chapters on the 
Manx Administrative Culture; Machinery of Government; and 
Public Service.
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE MANX ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE 
INTRODUCTION
This chapter will be concerned with those social, political 
and geographical features which form the background to 
administrative form and action in the Isle of Man. My inter­
pretation of the term 1 administrative culture1 is a broad one 
relating to the environment which shapes a bureaucracy and takes 
into account the many variables existing in a bureaucracy.
These are both cause and effect of the complexities of the services 
it provides, and the traditions and history which lie behind them. 
The chapter will, therefore, take a line different from some of 
the writers on administrative culture whose ideas will nevertheless 
be briefly described as they are in some senses defective and 
irrelevant to a consideration of the Manx situation. They tend 
not to raise the points most relevant there and have been used 
only as guides and stimuli to thought.
The administrative sub-culture has been described in a wider 
context by Peters^ who saw culture as existing at three distinct 
levels: societal, political and administrative. The shared
psychological orientations of citizens to both government and 
administration create the boundaries for their respective 
spheres of action. However, the "orientation of the society 
towards administration is a component not only of the general 
social culture but also of the political culture: that is some
1. B. Guy Peters. "The Politics of Bureaucracy: A Comparative Perspective" . Longman Inc. 1978. P«40.
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general social values either support or potentially undermine the 
effectiveness of administrative structures."^*
Professor F.F. Ridley groups these societal influences together
forming what he calls the 'external influences' which make up a
"generalised model of the influences on a bureaucratic system".
"The constitutional order, national history, the structure of
social power and the educational system, prevailing economic *
factors (and) the impact of current politics" make up the
external influences, whereas internal influences include
"organisational forms, formal rules and policy procedures".
Though this chapter will not rely on such a simple dichotomy to
classify the various influences on the bureaucratic culture in
Mann, it is a useful distinction to make because it illustrates
that pressures are exerted from many angles. The problem of
this approach is that the arbitrariness of a simple dichotomy
between internal and external factors can distort the analysis
as many factors can come under either heading.
"The primary distinction between external and internal forces is not easily maintained; thus, historical (external) influences gradually become part of (internal) public service rules".
This chapter will, therefore, take a more individual, line by
looking at elements in the administrative culture in Mann which
have emerged from discussions with participants in public
1. Peters. Op Cit. P.41.
2. F.F„ Ridley. "Preliminary Proposals for a European Consortium for Political Research Workshop on Comparative Administration." 1972.
3. G. Smith "A Model of the Bureaucratic Culture" Political Studies. March 1974. P.31.
4. Ibid. P.32.
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administration in Mann and from wider reading of the politics of 
small communities. Thus the unique and distinctive nature of 
the Manx administrative sub-culture can be highlighted and 
illustrated in later chapters.
The consequences of these cultural, influences are discussed in 
tandem with the influences themselves din order to make the 
linkages between them more evident. Though writers often 
concentrate on the degree of involvement of civil servants in 
politics when discussing the consequences of the administrative 
culture'1' their approach tends to be somewhat limited for a 
study of this kind. It is intended here to consider, in addition, 
other equally important consequences: in particular what may be
termed the ’imitation syndrome' and its consequences for 
bureaucratic form and structure; and secondly the consequences 
of smallness for the bureaucratic system. Other elements 
will become evident as the descriptive material unfolds and be 
put alongside (in importance) a careful analysis of the political 
attitudes of civil servants, their role in policy-making and 
their attitudes towards politicians. So, in conjunction with 
the first chapter this section provides a dual backcloth 
against which the administrative system can be displayed.
Demography
As a prelude to this analysis it may be useful to describe
1. (a) R.D. Putnam. "The Political Attitudes of Senior CivilServants in Britain. Germany and Italy" in Mattei Dogan "The Mandarins of Western Europe: the Political. Role ofTop Civil Servants". Wiley. 1975.(b) G. Smith. Op Cit.(c ) Rosamund Thomas “The British Philosophy of Administration". Longman. 1978.(d) B. Guy Peters Op Cit.
certain significant demographic features of the Isle of Man.
This will help to explain many of the attitudes discussed in
later sections and to further illustrate the very close links
with the U.K. The. population which is currently estimated to
be between 65,000 and 66,000 has risen considerably since the
mid-1960’s reflecting government success in attracting new
residents to the Island through a policy of low taxation. Of
the latest accurate figures for the total resident population
(60,496 in April 1976), 18,473, were new residents who had
arrived since 1966^. An unknown percentage of this figure were
Manx persons returning as economic conditions improved in the
Island. The majority (90%) of the total number of new residents
originated in the UK and the rest were fairly evenly split
2between British Commonwealth and other countries.
320.5% of the resident population are 65 or over and this heavily
skewed age distribution is often seen as problematic. During
the 1960*s the Island’s depressed economy resulted in the
emmigration of 11 those willing and able to take advantage of
Britain’s post-war boom” . However, ’’the economic boom of the
1970*s attracted young and talented individuals and the
information shows that the greatest proportion of new residents
4was in this group” .
1. See Appendix 1 p .(i ).
2. n p.(ii).
3. ” p.(iii).
4. Commentary on Population Section of the I.O.M. Digest of Economic and Social Statistics. 1980. P.33.
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During the year the population is considerably swelled by 
tourist arrivals for whom services and facilities have to be 
provided. . During the peak months of July and August the 
Island’s public services must cope with an additional population 
of between 150,OCX) and 165,000, ^ 86% of whom have travelled
2from the UK, 8% from Eire and 6% from other parts of the world.
As a result of recent promotional campaigns the proportion of 
visitors from Eire is increasing.
The effects of population growth and immigration have been ,
recognised as of considerable importance to such a small
community and this recently prompted Tynwald to set up a Select
3Committee to consider and report on the subject. Its 
recommendations concerned the monitoring of population change 
and its effects on the Island and recommended that ”a population 
ceiling of 75,000 be accepted as appropriate for present 
circumstances but should not be regarded as applicable in
4perpetuity.u
Many of the Island’s new residents are in the relatively high 
income brackets which benefit most from the policy of non­
progressive low taxation and there are certainly many very 
wealthy individuals in the community. However, the general level
of incomes received is below that of the UK and these great
differences in wealth have caused much resentment and calls for 
reduced immigration. In other respects the socio-economic
1. See Appendix 1 p(v )
2. « p (vi)
3. trReport of the Select Committee on Population Growth andImmigration** , printed (by authority) IOM Government Reprographic Department 25 March 1980.
4. Ibid. p.8. - 40 -
distribution of the Island^ population is comparable with that 
obtaining in the UK. Certain occupational groups do, however, 
show considerable differences, e.g. 13.2% of Manx employees 
are involved in the construction industry as compared with only 
5.2 % f± n the UK.'1’ This is presumably to cope with extensive 
house and office building programs as a result of the economic 
boom. The manufacturing industries employ a considerably lower 
proportion of workers than in England though the decline in 
employment in the traditional areas, agriculture and tourism, has 
been offset to some extent by some growth in manufacturing and 
the professions.
Although this chapter is intended to provide a viewpoint of 
civil servants’ attitudes it is vital to consider the political 
environment of administration and to examine the culture within 
which it proceeds. In other words, to use Peters’s terminology 
we must examine the societal culture which frames the boundaries 
for administrative decision-making.
Little attention has been paid to classifying the orientations 
of citizens to the institutions of government and therefore ourf
knowledge of popular conceptions of administration is even
weaker than our knowledge of people’s feelings concerning
legislatures, the political executive and perhaps even the 
2courts. Almond and Verba have analysed the perceptions of
1. See Appendix 1 p (lv)
2. B. Guy Peters. Op Cit P.46.
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administrative competence of citizens in five states including
Great Britain.'*' Others have produced conflicting evidence
concerning the levels of trust in members of the upper levels of
the government service. In general, though individual officials
are respected and highly regarded, the public administration
2system as a whole is seen in a negative manner. This is
3particularly the case in under-developed countries.
The conception of the administrative system which the public 
holds is, in many countries, at variance with its view of itself. 
This is no less true in the I.O.M, where the small size of the 
community appears not to have resulted in any greater congruence 
of attitude between public and official concerning his role.
In the Isle of Man the dynamic and complex constitutional 
relationship with the UK results in suggestions that the Manx 
civil service is powerless, along with the Manx Government, in 
having any significant:impact on the Manx way of life. This 
powerlessness, the public feels, is not confined to administrators, 
but is a consequence of the close political, economic and social 
involvement with the UK. The people recognise and virtually 
accept that considerable power rests in the hands of minor 
officials in the Home Office. Thus misconceptions develop 
concerning the role of Manx civil servants who are under-rated
1. G.A. Almond and S. Verba. t!The Civic Culture Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations.n Princeton University Press 1963.
2. M.Ko Jennings, F.P. Kilpatrick and M.C. Cummings. "Trusted Leaders: Perception and appointed federal officials11. Public Opinion Quarterly. 30 Fall 1966. Also S.J. Levy !tThe Public Image of Government Agencies" Public Administration Review23 March 1963.
3. Almond and Verba. Op Cit. On Mexico.
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as compared with British officials.
This popular conception of inefficacy amongst Manx civil servants 
is used by press and public alike as a justification for the 
claim that civil servants are overpaid, under-worked pen-pushers 
and, as elsewhere, pay increases are described as gigantic and 
unnecessary.^" Allegations of over-manning are accompanied by 
calls for greater speed and efficiency in the processing of 
applications and provision of services. Reduced expenditure and 
the elimination of work are demanded. High and rising inflation, 
extortionate fuel costs and the additional costs imposed by the 
necessity to import have resulted in calls for an I.O.M, 
allowance in salaries, for increased pensions and for lower 
fares to and from the Island. The public is unlikely, however, 
to encourage the extra staff that would be needed to tackle 
these problems.
The loss of many educated, ambitious young people of the Island
2is seen as an issue upon which the Manx Government should act 
but to take them into employment themselves would be seen as a 
superfluous empire-building exercise. Manx residents often 
charge that the civil service employs too high a percentage of 
non-Manx professionals in their senior ranks which would be 
better filled by persons with an intimate knowledge of the locality
1. For an example see:(a) uToo Many Civil Servants Plea*1 I.O.NJ. Courier 15.12.80(b) "Government pay bill up by £11 million” . I.O.M. Examiner. 20.3.81.(c) uPruning the Public Secror**. Scrutator. I.O.M. Examiner.9.4.80.(d ) nGross Extravagance by Government Claim**. I.O.M.Examiner17.4.81.
2. nMec Vannin Slam Civil Service Appointments11. Manx Star.25.1.80.- 43 -
and the distinctive characteristics of its people. Long-term 
planning, the forecasting of employment trends and the training 
of Manx people, would be necessary prerequisites to Manx persons 
acquiring such posts, but the inevitable need for staff in such 
planning exercises would to a large degree be unacceptable to 
both Tynwald and the Manx public.
The incompatability of public claims on government is no new 
phenomenon but in Mann it is complicated by an advanced 
inferiority complex, and subservience to UK pressure balancing 
precariously with a fierce sense of separate identity. In 
addition conservative and reactionary outlooks explain much of 
the Manx people1s attitude not only to public administration 
but to politics in general. This can be traced to the earliest 
English influence on Mann and even earlier as the philosophy of 
the Manx people has been conditioned by centuries of bowing to 
the wishes of invading nations.
One feature which is evident in Britain in the relationship of 
public to official and which is of less importance in Mann, is 
the anonymity of the civil service. The intimacy of the Manx 
community makes anonymity an impractical concept to apply, and as 
a result the Manx see senior civil servants as people just like 
themselves who happen to have done particularly well in their 
careers. The mystique and unapproachability of senior civil • 
servants complained of in Britain is incompatible with the size 
of the Manx civil service and its closeness to the community it 
serves.
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The next two sections of this chapter will examine the orientations 
of participants in public administration in Mann in order to 
illustrate that government actors are not necessarily in accord­
ance with the general public in their outlook. This will throw 
further light on the concept of administrative culture as a whole 
as it applies in Mann. Thus it will be concerned with those 
elements Peters has termed the political sub-culture and it will 
include both external and internal influences in approximate 
balance. The material will be divided into a discussion of what 
can be termed the *imitation syndrome* and an attempt to apply 
others * work on small communities to explain the Manx administrative 
culture.
The Imitation Syndrome
There exists amongst Manx civil servants (and in particular the 
more long-serving, less well-educated employees) a belief that 
*who says British says Best*. They claim that *the British 
civil service is the best in the world*^ and displays all the 
honesty and integrity that is to be expected of a service to 
politician and public alike. Though the Manx people will 
criticise British administration on the grounds that its size 
has become unmanageable resulting in inefficiency and 
inaccessibility they would never doubt its superiority over any 
other civil service the world over.
1. As declared by a senior civil servant in discussion with the author.
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The possible inaccuracy of this view is not considered. Though 
integrity and a genuine desire to serve are rarely questioned, the 
impartiality, competence and organisation of the British Civil 
Service has been subject to intensive scrutiny. International 
opinion formerly held the British diplomatic service in 
remarkably high esteem but today both it and the Home Service are 
accused of a lack of professional knowledge and an inability to 
implement their well-developed research findings.1
The Manx government has confined its attention in the perusal of
administrative systems to one only, the British Civil Service.
They have donned their blinkers and fixed their eyes, seemingly
permanently, on Whitehall and can see no justification for a
more open outlook and a more comparative approach. It is
impossible to say whether this blinkered outlook is the cause or
the result of the absence of any conscious study but the two are
inextricably linked. As Allbutt says:
"The man of affairs without science is like the physician who has fallen out of the anatomy and physiology he may once have known; within limits he may be a shrewder and abler practitioner than an academic professor; but this he will be at the cost of being stationary .... To principles, sooner or later, the subtlest craftsman has to bow his head; for, even while his hand is on his tools, by theory contingencies and complications are being detecte^and eliminated, the process shortened and economized.
In order to administer a body of people the administrator must
develop skills of administration:
1. Mr. G. Saunders. Former UN employee speaking at the Annual Conference of theManx Association of Scientists Artists and Writers (MASAW) 1980.
2. T.E. Allbutt "On professional education1* in R.A. Chapman and A. Dunsire (eds) "Style in Administration Readings in British Public Administration" Allen and Unwin 1971R P.21.
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"If is a practical art, and practice is essential to make it perfect - much practice. But practice wholly divorced from study is as likely to be limited in its results as study undisciplined by^practice is likely to prove sterile and misleading.,r
These long-held beliefs so ably described by analogy with the
medical profession seem obvious to any student of administration
but to the practioner and in particular to Manx administrators
they seem alien. Certainly the conceptual frameworks within
which administration is pursued and the principles on which it
is founded elsewhere are rarely examined by any Manx civil
servant and what knowledge they possess of how government wprks
in practice is derived solely from experience and socialisation.
There is a lack of knowledge concerning how the same functions
are performed elsewhere (except occasionally and on a superficial
level in the UK) and concerning the analysis of administration by
others (both practitioners and academics) about how administration
ought to be practiced. Even the ’gifted amateurs’ of the British
civil service are sent to be schooled at the civil service college
in the principles of government, to study some elements of the
political and economic environment of their work and to learn
something of decision-making theory. The resultant more
informed decision-making and general awareness of roles might
well increase certainty and improve effectiveness.
The absence of study is based upon the argument that the 
functions under Manx government control are not of a nature suited 
to study; what grand theories and concepts are needed to run a
1. L. Urwick. "The Elements of Administration" Pitman. 1943.
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harbour or railway line? It is the argument that was (and
occasionally still is) applied to British local government; why
theorise about sewers and street lighting?1 As W.J.M. Mackenzie
states, the subject of local government
"has seldom been treated with elegance and precision, and if you scan the textbooks of political thought you will find no accounts, or very shoddy accounts, of theories about local government. An odd thing, because there has certainly been in Britain in the last 150 years endless discussion about it; not theory perhaps, but certainly talk, certainly ideas."
This reinforces C.H. Wilson’s earlier comment:
"Although there is a great number of meritorious works on local government, and many extensive treatments of the functions and powers of authorities, and their history, a great majority of these works do indeed assume that the subject is worth writing about, and make no attempt themselves to inquire wherein that worth consists."
There is also this lack of attention to theory in the Isle of Man 
where the government has developed piecemeal from a very ancient 
parliament through a system of independent boards to its present 
form. Even incremental development, however, can be improved by 
rigorous study, and the attention to theory which has been 
virtually absent to date could have important effects on an 
administration which is at present without conceptual foundations 
Though this absence of conceptual foundations to administrative 
practice exists to some extent in the British Civil Service, 
there it is at least tempered by a common code of ethics and 
principles which are long-established and derived from the 
gradual development of the services. For example one very
1. L.J. Sharpe "Theories and Values of Local Government" Political Studies Vol xviii 1968 pp. 153-74.
2. W.J.M. MacKenzie. "Theories of Local Government" Greater London Papers No. 2 London School of Economics and Political Science 1961.
3. C.H. Wilson "The Foundations of Local Government" in’Essaysin Local Government" C.H. Wilson (ed) Basil Blackwell 1948.-  48 -
important quality of the British Civil Service, namely it s non­
political character, received its main imprint in the eighteenth 
century in the desire to prevent corruption by patronage followed
by the definition of the number of ministerial offices which
*could be held by MPs.
uAs the Civil Service got into its stride, there has built up in every Department a store of knowledge and experience in the subjects handled, something which eventually takes shape as a practical philosophy, 1 or may merit the title of a departmental point of view.1*
This common code of ethics and principles is relatively absent at
the local level.
The persistence of British ideas in Mann is hardly surprising
given its record as a large exporter of a particular form of
democracy. Political cultures the Commonwealth over have
absorbed a great deal of the British democratic tradition. Yet
differing social, economic and historical factors have caused
some countries to retain their individual characteristics better
than others. However, the close proximity of Mann to the UK
results in greater influence still and the relative homogeneity
of their two peoples and the duplication of societal influences
such as the media and language, cause yet further influence.
What Chubb says with relation to Ireland can be applied without
alteration to Mann:
“The British influence on Ireland arises from the small size of Ireland in the geographical context of nearness,the historical context of political dominion and socialand economic dominance and the intellectual context of similarity of language and cultural blanketing”
It has recently been argued that the IOM displays many of the
1. Sir Edward Bridges “Portrait of a Profession” Cambridge University Press. 1950.
2. B. Chubb “The Government and Politics of Ireland” Stanford University Press. 1971 2nd Edition, p. 313.- 49 -
features of the old style colonial administration which was so
common until the 1960's and is now very rare"1, and though it has
not undergone precisely the same processes and transitions seen
in the British Commonwealth, it shows many of the characteristics
of the neo-colonialist state. Jack Woddis explains the old
system and the reasons for the transition to neo-colonialism:
,tWhile colonialism meant the direct political and economic domination of one country by another, on the basis of state power being in the hands of the colonial power, it was never solely a question of foreign rule but rather that of foreign rule allied with certain economic and political strata of the indigenous people which had an interest in supporting colonialism. Thus colonialism was in reality an alliance - an alliance between the occupying power 2 and the internal forces of conservatism and tradition.1*
This old style of colonialism is vanishing as a result of the
coming together of three main forces on the international scene -
"the socialist countries, the national liberation movements themselves and the working class, democratic and peace movements in the metropolitan countries."
The colonial powers granted formal independence to more and more
of their former colonies, whilst ensuring their complete dependence
on them economically, financially and militarily. Thus the
characteristic of neo-colonialism became pressurisation by the
coloniser on the colonised in order to guide them into channels
constructive to Western ideological, economic, educational and
military aims. So an essential feature of neo-colonialism
becomes, the fostering and encouragement of capitalist forces to
4prevent a turn to the road of socialism. The neo-colonialism 
of former imperialist powers was imitated by new ones, the USA ,
1. G. Saunders MASAW Annual Conference 1980.
2. J. Woddis "Introduction to Neo-Colonialism: The New Imperialismin Asia, Africa arid Latin America" International Publishers,New York, 1967, p.24.
3. J. Woddis. Ibid. p.28.
4. Jo Woddis. Ibid. p.52. 50
W. Germany and Israel, and economic exploitation continued.
In the IOM can be seen some of the essential features of neo­
colonialism, the fostering of capitalist forces, the obtaining 
of allies in nationalist movements and the political, religious, 
ideological and cultural domination of the people in a subtle 
and highly acceptable manner. “Polite obstructionism11'1' in the 
Home Office prevents radical change in Mann and ensures that 
the general development of Mann is not a different direction 
that in Britain.
Taking the concept of alienation as evolved by Marx, Frantz Fanon
applies its arguments to the colonial situation and primarily
considers the phenomenon of alienation caused by racism. Though
the black/white relationship is of fundamental importance to
this thesis the point appropriate to Mann is that the colonised
turn towards the coloniser and emancipation cannot be achieved.
The psychology of dependence becomes so deeply engrained that it
2is welcomed and perpetuated. This is no less true in the 
economic field concentrated upon in neo-colonialism.
The colonial argument may not appear relevant in the geographical
context of Mann but even within the boundaries of one nation
3colonialism can occur as shown by Michael Hechter. He takes 
the examples of Ireland, Scotland and Wales to examine the
1. R. Watterson MHK MA.SAW Conference 1980.
2. Renate Zahar. “Frantz Fanon: Colonialism and Alienation*1 Monthly Review Press. 1974. Ch. 4.
3. M. Hechter. “Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe inBritish National Development, 1536-1966“ Routledge and Keegan Paul 1975.
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suggestion that ethnic attachments within a society become less 
important as industrialization and hence contact with the core 
society proceeds. Refuting this, Hechter comes to the conclusion 
that contact with other groups may actually heighten ethnic conflict 
as the peripheral groups become exploitees. Their land and 
resources are used for the good of the core and their people for 
the wars in which the core becomes involved. Hence a form of 
internal colonialism develops which is not inapplicable to the 
semi-independent community in Mann.
If this neo-colonial pattern can be said to be the true one with 
relation to Mann then it will do much to explain the attitudes of 
Manx government officials. Its most important result in the 
field of public administration is what may be termed the ’imitation 
syndrome*. There is a literal imitation of m a n y statutes passed 
by Parliament in Westminster which can then proceed through 
Tynwald virtually unchanged. Indeed considerable quantities of 
-tJK legislation and subordinate legislation apply directly to Mann. 
This applies also to methods and attitudes as much as to issues and 
legislation.
Imitation is, almost unfailingly, of British central administration. 
There is a definite ’civil service mentality* despite the many 
similarities with local government. In interviews with senior 
civil servants and politicians'1' comparisons were never made with
1. Board Secretaries and Members of Tynwald were interviewed over a period of a year from November 1979.
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local government though continual references to British Civil 
Service practices were made e.g. the specialist/generalist debate.
This attitude ties in closely to the royalist/loyalist attitudes
prevalent in both government and public in the Island. In keeping
with Civil Service tradition, Manx public servants see themselves
as servants of Queen and country. This is a product in senior
civil servants of national service in the British armed forces
1being their only period of absence from the Island.
The neo-colonial system of Manx government has produced what
Michael Manley sees in Jamaica as a "psychology of dependence"
"If man is denied both responsibility and power long enough he will lose the ability to respond to the challenge of thej first and to grasp the opportunity of the second".
The psychological dependence can otherwise be seen as an
inferiority complex which manifests itself particularly strongly
in relations with the UK. Nationalists now argue that the low
level of contact between the Manx government and the UK Home Office
illustrates the whole perception of political position which the two
participants have. A second result of the inferiority complex is
the importation of professional staffs to the Departmental
Classes of the Manx Civil Service at the most senior levels.
Some argue that Manx people should be trained to perform the
3tasks at present performed by outsiders.
1. Survey of the career patterns of senior civil servants by the author. 1980.
2. M. Manley "The Politics of Change: A Jamaican Testament"Andre Deutsch 1974 p.21.
3. Dominic Delaney MHK in personal conversation with the author 2/4/1980.
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However, the most important effect of the Manx inferiority 
complex is to produce imitation of UK policies and methods, often 
without adequate consideration of local needs. Despite 
considerable similarities of socio-economic make-up, it is not 
necessarily the case that that which suits Britain suits the IOM. 
It is an integral part of the complex of beliefs relating to Manx 
government that what Britain does today, Mann does tomorrow.
This is, however, a myth perpetuated by the political elite to 
Justify policies based on other more controversial reasoning, in 
particular right-wing ideological views. If we analyse this 
claim of imitation only a little more closely it soon becomes 
evident that far from imitation being blind and complete it is, 
in reality, highly selective. Even on major legislative issues, 
especially those relating to social reform, imitation has been 
incomplete e.g. Equal Pay and Sex Discrimination Acts, Abortion 
Law, Breathyliser Testing and certain factories legislation have 
not been followed. Though general reciprocity is the case with 
most social benefits, the IOM sets its own rates for certain 
services and charges its own level of fees for others e.g. issue 
of personal records, agricultural services, issue of licences etc. 
In addition,of course, the Manx Government levies its own type 
and levels of taxation;and rates and has abolished many taxes in 
accordance with its low taxation policy e.g. death duties, 
corporation tax etc. So the government uses imitation as a 
Justification for reactionary changes and the apathy and ignorance 
of the population ensures that questions rarely occur concerning 
those policies that have not been adopted.
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In the field of methods of public administration imitation too 
has been selective. Take, for example, attitudes to profess­
ionalism. As will be described later, the dominance of the 
generalist administrators is in direct imitation of British Civil 
Service practice but in isolated pockets of the service profess­
ionalism is creeping in a manner not unlike its beginnings in 
British local government. Training methods have not followed 
British Civil Service or local government practice on the 
grounds that the service is too small to support the long absence 
required to give training to senior staff. Recruitment patterns, 
too, imitate only in the sense that generalists are favoured.
There has not been imitation of the socio-cultural and 
educational backgrounds of the senior officials. These points 
will be picked up later in the section on the public service.
These brief illustrations of selective imitation.will be borne out 
in later discussions of methods and organisation in the Manx 
administrative system. It is sufficient here to say that 
though Manx administrators (and politicians) claim to practice 
imitation, asserting that it is a means of learning by others1 
mistakes, it remains selective imitation in accordance with 
preconceived political, values and also remains confined to only one 
country and one level, the centre, in that one country. No 
attempts are made to imitate possibly longer-running and more 
appropriate experiments in other countries of the world.
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The Small Community
J. Richards in examining those features of small communities
which, he contends enable them to constitute "a specific form of
polity” has elucidated several factors which are of relevance to
the administrative culture in Mann. The very fact of smallness
results in more homogeneity in society and this is not accidental;
”it follows from the economic circumstances of small independent
communities and is then accentuated by their social characteristics.”
This, he says, has two important consequences; firstly it produces
a close relationship between state and society with linkages
taking place "through individuals and personalities rather than
through impersonal organisational bureaucracies representing the 
2state.” This leads to greater feelings of identity and
community, less feeling of alienation than is usual'
for citizens of the average sized polity and hence a greater
comprehension of the state. This does not, however, lead to
greater participation as this may involve dissent: ”pressures
3and imperatives for homogeneity and solidarity” and 1getting along 
well with others r are fierce so that when divisions do occur they are 
correspondingly deeper.
Secondly, the outside world looms larger to a small polity than 
to the larger sized nation state because it threatens traditional 
ways and local identity by introducing 1alien* values and concepts. 
The problem becomes how to retain a distinctive self-conscious 
identity and political independence whilst at the same time
1. J. Richards ”Politics in small independent communities” Unpublished PhD thesis, Leicester University, 1980.Contains three case studies, IOM, Malta and the Faroes.
2. Ibid Part 3.
3. Ibid Part 3. - 56 -
making the necessary accommodation with the outside world. 
Ferdinand Tonnies1 typology of societies into Gemeinschaft 
(essentially small scale communal society based on family and 
traditional ties) and Gesellschaft (modernised, non-communal 
society based on contractual ties, in large scale, impersonal 
relationships) Richards argues is particularly relevant.
How do these factors relate to the administrative culture in Mann? 
In a chapter on political style and institutional development 
in small independent communities Richards suggests that
“Formal constitutional guidelines may well not operate always in practice in societies where great importance is placed upon informal relationships and traditional ties.“
This point is the key to the recognition and understanding of 
administrative as much as political behaviour in general. If we 
apply the idea that small states are inevitably more homogeneous, 
we can see this very clearly in Mann. There is less division of 
labour in the economy, a reduced variety of occupations and 
interests and consequently a reduced variety of opinions and 
attitudes. Shared beliefs and values are reinforced by a 
consensus approach to government (the lack of a well-developed 
party system illustrates this) which abhors dramatic change and 
encourages its abhorrence in the community. Conservatism and 
dedication to the status quo are not features only of the 
bureaucracy (as in larger states) but of the whole society. 
Resistance to change has, however, to be accommodated with the
1. Richards Op Cit Part 3.
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universalistic principles imposed by the outside world and in a 
quasi-colonial set-up the small community will be expected to 
make concessions to those principles. Thus when, in 1956, the 
British Home Secretary authorised the Lieutenant Governor by 
letter to appoint an Executive Council of seven members of 
Tynwald in an attempt to promote Cabinet government, this was 
done. It failed, however, due to the absence of a viable 
political party system.
The very close state/society relationship in small communities 
presents some problems for government staff. They must balance 
universalistic and bureaucratic norms intended by constitution 
makers (and occasionally learned in training abroad) with the 
particularistic norms of the society .*** This makes impartiality 
difficult. Overlapping of roles and repeated personal 
encounters on un-related issues lead to difficulties in 
implementing policies. Anonymity is virtually unattainable 
and, therefore it is almost impossible to maintain an impersonal 
and impartial civil service.
Amongst the general public also this close state/society 
relationship has important consequences. Waiting for acceptable 
behaviour to be established on issues is a common cause of apathy 
and it takes much for a member of the public to speak out in 
opposition to a particular measure. Certain areas of politics 
have established credibility as subjects for criticism. These 
are mainly concerned with freedom of action and right wing
1 . C. Perrow, “Complex Organisations. A Critical Essay”Scott Foresman. 1972. p .8 .
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policies e.g. judicial corporal punishment. To illustrate the 
point certain recent issues can be described upon which feelings 
were particularly strong. First, in July 1980, it was decided 
by the Island’s Treasurer that overpaid sums on one form of tax 
could be offset against tax which was unpaid on another form e.g. 
instead of refunding overpayments on company tax the Treasury 
would simply credit the amount to income tax. This caused 
considerable unrest and was soon tempered by the assurance that 
it would not be forced but requested. Secondly, there was 
opposition to a call for the introduction of a register of Manx 
residents primarily for statistical purposes. Though the facts 
to be recorded on the register were already in existence in 
other government departments, the Manx people accused the 
government of ’big brother’ tactics and duplication of records.
The register was not immediately compiled.
These issues are, however, exceptions to a common rule of ’keep
your head down and you’11 be alright’. The Manx public, though
generally very enthusiastic ’joiners’ of clubs and societies'1’, .
rarely aggregate to put pressure on government and as one civil
servant pointed out, this makes things very much easier for them
and increases the importance of what is called the ’bluff factor *;
“without pressure groups to argue, civil servants are the only
experts involved in the decision-making environment and their
2influence is correspondingly increased” .
1. See IOM Examiner Annual for a list of Associations and Clubs. Evidence of their extensive activity can be seen in any issue of any Island paper.
2. Interview with senior civil servant July 1980.
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However, where pressure groups have formed, for example in 
farming, this has changed the whole complexion of that area of 
government decision-making. Though agricultural, interests 
complain of civil service bias against them and in favour of 
UK importers, their pressure group activity has brought them 
considerable subsidies to compensate for high land prices and 
costs of fuel and imported feedstuffs and machinery.1
The smallness of the bureaucracy itself has important consequences
for organisation and behaviour. Having said this, we must .
question whether the Manx bureaucracy is a small one relative to
the population it serves. A considerable proportion of the
national income of small states is taken up by administrative
costs and it has been calculated that in the IOM 25% of the
population is involved in government in either an elected or an
2appointed capacity. The ubiquity of government and the 
combination of what would be termed local and central government 
activities in England in the Manx Government ;(with only a 
residual local government system) makes the bureaucracy appear 
over-sized. In fact the Manx administrative system is not 
smaller because it deals with a small population. On the 
contrary, it needs a larger bureaucracy to cope with the range 
and intricacy of the functions it performs. However, in 
relative terms to the civil services of large nation states it 
is obviously on a minute scale.
1. IOM Examiner 28th December 1980 p.7.
2. “An Economic Appreciation For the Government of the IOM”P.A. International Management Consultants Ltd. 1971.
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The way in which smallness will affect efficiency will be 
illustrated thoroughly in later chapters. Assuming that the 
comments made in the Redcliffe-Maud Report and quoted in 
Chapter 1 are equally relevant here, it could be argued that the 
balance between democracy and efficiency in the IOM is somewhat 
weighed in favour of the first and at the expense of the second: 
Redcliffe-Maud proposed that the minimum s i z e at which an authority 
could adequately perform all its functions was at a population 
of 250,000. Since the Manx Government provides central and 
local government functions to a population of only 64,000 there 
may well be serious consequences of reduced specialisation, 
shortage of resources suid low training levels. However, the 
benefits of a small size in terms of speed of communication 
within and between departments may partially outweigh this.
The allocation of functions specifically within the Manx Government 
may also mililate against efficiency if the comments of P. Self 
are to be accepted. As will be described later the Manx Civil 
Service consists of a large number of very small departments 
which Self argues, whilst facilitating effective management 
within departments, damages comprehensive co-ordination and 
planning of the organisation as a whole.
The degree of efficiency in a small community is no easier to 
measure than in a large one but its measurement is probably 
hampered by the fact that this particular organisation has not, 
generally, set goals against which performance could even attempt 
to be compared.
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Political Attitudes of Senior Manx Civil Servants
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the degree of 
political involvement of senior civil servants has occupied 
the minds of political scientists and is considered the most 
important consequence of the various cultural influences in play. 
It is important therefore to consider and apply these debates on 
the political attitudes of civil servants to the Manx case and 
isolate some of the influences working there.
Rosamund Thomas discusses British and American doctrines 
concerning whether administration is a science or an art based on 
certain ethics and used this as the basis for the way in which 
civil servants act in policy-making. She lists the traditional 
American doctrines as follows:
’’Development 1
1. Government consists of two separate processes; namely politics and administration.2. Administration can be made into a science.Indeed, the science of administration necessitates its independence from politics.3. The scientific study of administration leads to the discovery of principles analogous to the principles or' laws of the physical sciences.4. The principles of administration determine the way in which the goals of economy and efficiency can be realised.
Development 2
5. The human element in administration is as ^ important as the science of administration"
On the other hand she sees the alternative British doctrines in
the following way :
"1. In the process of government,the two functions of politics and administration are fused rather than independent.
1. Rosamund Thomas "The British Philosophy of Administration: A Comparison of British and American ideas. 1900-1939" Longman 1978. p.6 . - 62 -
2. Administration cannot be reduced to a sciencealone. It is based on science and ethics andthis combination constitutes a philosophy of administration,3. The philosophical study of administration leads to the discovery not only of scientific principles but also of ethical ideals’,4. Being a matter of both science and ethics, thegoal of efficiency assumes a.^  qualitative rather 
than a quantitative nature,"
Whether or not this dichotomy still exists in practice is not
proven but it does represent two extreme alternatives which
can help to explain reality, Richard Chapman's more applied
approach helps our understanding of the political attitudes of
the British Civil Servant, He describes him as a person not
actively engaged in party politics without seeing this as a
constraint on his private life. He is adept and sensitive to
the game of internal politics and prefers to concentrate his
attention on this rather than to engage in the party political
wrangling of his elected colleagues.
"However favourable to one party a civil servant is in his early years, because he works so closely with politicians, he soon becomes aware of the ineptitude of any party. After a time, it seems, he learns to think more in terms of policies and their workability, he focuses his political interests on the merits and demerits of particular policies, and since all political parties tend to have a mixture of policies, the parties as such are seen in a distinctly neutral 
light."2
To apply this to Mann and to suggest that there is a philosophy 
of administration of Manx civil servants is to assume they have 
even contemplated the issue. Whether or not they have, they have 
certainly not expressed it and this must now be attempted here.
We inevitably expect the British pattern to be most pertinent to 
the Manx situation and this would not be an erroneous assumption.
1. Thomas Ibid. P.22.
2. R . Chapman. "The Higher Civil Service in Britain**Constable 1970. P.120. _ 53 _
Here again, however imitation is selective'and the relative 
absence of parties and complete absence of government and 
opposition in the British sense makes a direct comparison difficult.
Chapman describes the British civil servants* considerable adapt­
ability in the preparation of programmes prior to a general 
election and points out that their enthusiasm for the opposition 
policy may be equal to that of the programmes in the development 
of which they have played a part. Chapman remarks that this is 
a phenomenon which is not to be found in most comparable * Western* 
countries and this is true also of Mann where issue by issue 
choices are made by both politicians and civil servants. There 
too, civil servants are concerned with the internal politics of 
the Civil Service rather then the declared politics of the 
politicians but perhaps politicians too are drawn into this in 
Mann since they do not have the backing of a well-developed, 
economically based package of views provided and enforced by a 
political party.
The absence of study, as mentioned earlier, leads once more to 
a close similarity with the British reliance on ethics. In Mann, 
however, this is not combined with the study and application of 
scientific principles. This is changing with the increased 
importance of specialists in the Manx bureaucracy. Professional 
groups and more especially, individuals, are increasing their 
influence, and the introduction of professional methods in fields 
related to administrative science e.g. management services, 
economics, computing may spread to other areas in the future.
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Their knowledge of the detailed requirements in each subject area 
is rudimentary and civil servants see their function as advisory 
whilst maintaining democratic responsibility for decision-making.
Gordon Smith*s model of the bureaucratic culture relies oti the
interaction of two major dimensions affecting the ’political
prospensity’ of civil servants.'1' The first is the dimension
of bureaucratic distinctiveness - the degree to which the elite
element of the bureaucracy constitutes a separate group in
society and not j'ust a separate category. In other words the
2degree of ’sub-system autonomy* is a factor determining the 
level of control over the decision-making environment and this 
they called the *capability function*. The emergence of a 
distinctive sub-culture depends upon the place of the bureaucracy 
in the society: chiefly links with the educational system and
any social bias of recruitment. Internal and external social­
isation may result in a ’special bureaucratic ethos*. Smith 
places this at one end of the spectrum of bureaucratic 
distinctiveness and places the ’class-related ethos* at the 
other recognising that inter-mixing will occur between them.
Their significance is that they have policical relevance "and
even if a bureaucracy lacks special qualities, their absence
3wrll still be of importance for political expression**.
1. G. Smith "A Model of the Bureaucratic Culture" in Mattei Dogan (Ed) Op Cit.
2. As Almond and Powell called it in "Comparative Politics:A Developmental Approach" Little Brown 1966. P.310.
3. G. Smith Op Cit. P.35.
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Secondly, Smith considers the level of political involvement; 
constituting both subjective perspectives - the bureaucrat’s own 
view of his part in the political process, and objective pers­
pectives - the actual chances of political decision-making. In 
order to decide the relevance of this theory to the Manx bureau­
cracy it is useful to try to understand the behaviour of the civil 
servants (though it is extremely difficult to guage). The range 
of variables involved and the individual variation in their 
importance makes comparative analysis difficult. Although Manx 
civil servants pay lip service to the concept of impartiality and 
they are almost exclusively unassociated with political parties, 
they will nevertheless hold views on policies which sire not 
solely related to their implementation. These views may be 
conditioned by class-related socialisation. Indeed fhis 
constitutes an almost classic case of the ’class-related ethos’. 
Other factors forming bureaucrats’ political views are the 
psychology of dependence upon the UK, and feelings that in small 
communities most issues are apolitical. As Smith says there is 
a "possibility of divergence between attitudes and behaviour"1 
which may explain occasional overt anti-system sentiments. On 
the whole, however, Manx civil servants do not see the initiation 
of policy as their role and therefore the politicisation level 
of the Manx bureaucrat is very low, though his power to make 
political decisions can be very great. High levels of trust 
and mutual confidence between the Boards and the Civil Service 
results in unquestioned decision-making on both sides. This is 
one of the concomitants of small community consensus politics.
1. G. Smith Op Cit. P.36.
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To develop this point; it is argued that
"in the presence of a weak political sector, one in which the decision-making process is stalemated as the result of sharply divergent interest group conflicts, the publij bureaucracy will govern the country by default."
Presumably the converse is also true, that where consensus
politics is the general pattern, the public bureaucracy will
play a relatively less active political role. This generally can
be discerned in Mann itfiere any actual involvement in policy-making
is not overtly partisan and there exist formal and informal
barriers to active participation in politics. Diament talks of
a ’weak political sector’ but this may not only be the product
of excessive interest group conflict. In the Manx case the
political sector is weak in the sense that it does not provide
effective party political leadership and this may result in a
further increase in the political power of the bureaucracy.
Significantly, (to develop the consensus/conflict argument)
there are instances where civil servants have taken the initiative
to quash issues before they can be decided upon, especially if
they are highly controversial. As Richards says, in small
communities where conflicts are relatively rare, they are
correspondingly deeper. In these cases the Civil Service often
takes action to solve or postpone the problem. To use Diament’s
words they "govern the country by default".
To what extent this occurs should be easy to discover because of 
the controversiality of the decisions in question and their
1. A. Diament "Tradition and Innovation in French Administration" Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 1 (2) July 1968.
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consequent reporting in the press. Often the decision is 
annulled by civil servants by referring to regulations 
directives, and so on; in other words, matters beyond the 
official’s control. For example, there was a request recently 
to place advertising material on the seaside of a prominent 
miniature castle on an island in Douglas Bay, the Tower of Refuge1 
This created much opposition from environmentalists. The Harbour 
Board simply defused the controversy by ruling that it was against 
shipping regulations as illuminations in that position would 
conflict with the standard lights showing the entrance to Douglas 
Harbour. Thus the controversy was deflated without the Civil 
Service appearing to take a line on the issue. They treated it 
as a purely administrative, non-political matter.
This attitude is probably most closely allied to Putnam’s concept 
of the ’classical bureaucrat’. Though questions put in interviews 
with Manx civil servants were geared only to certain elements 
in Putnam’s work, the general leaning towards that end of his 
classical/political spectrum of attitudes is discemable. The 
’classical bureaucrat' operates on the assumption that problems 
can be solved purely objectively without reference to socio­
political considerations.
1. IOM Examiner 4/4/1981.
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,rThis presumption leads naturally to the belief that, because the bureaucrat himself is ’non-partisan *, his judgement is ’impartial1 and ’objective’.Consequently, the classical bureaucrat distrusts or rejects the institutions of politics, such as parliaments, parties and pressure groups. To the classical bureaucrat the noisy, incompetent, partisan practices of politicians seem at best senseless, at worst positively inimical to the permanent interests of the state.”
’’The opposite polar type consists of what we can call the political bureaucrat. He is ... both more aware of the ’political realities * and more willing to treat political influences on policy-making as legitimate .... He is ’problem-oriented* or ’program- oriented’ ... The political bureaucrat understands and accepts the role jf such institutions as parties and pressure groups."
Between these two extremes lie an infinite number of middle points
displaying certain of the characteristics of both extremes. The
Manx bureaucrats* attitudes are unlikely to include an overtly
antagonistic approach to politics and he would certainly not
consider them dangerous. He may, however, regard them as an
irritant to the smooth-running simplicity of administration. He
can therefore be placed near to the classical end of Putnam’s
spectrum. The lack of bureaucratic distinctiveness does not
mililate against this, as Smith would suggest, as the consensus
politics mirrors the consensus administration. The bureaucrats
come to see the politicians role as duplicating or simply
legitimising their decisions. Politicians become very involved
in day-to-day administration so that the difference between
politician and senior administrator becomes very blurred. In a
consensus situation they really are much nearer to becoming one
and the same thing. Conflict and its resolution are the stuff of
politics and where it is relatively absent decision-making becomes
much more a matter of practicality than it would otherwise be.
1. R.D. Putnam Op Cit. P.89.
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The- Manx bureaucrat will, therefore, tend towards the classical
end of the spectrum but for rather different reasons than is the
case in Putnam's major example of this, Italy. There, the
instability of the political system has caused the emergence of a
stable genocracy displaying all the features of the classical
bureaucrat. In the IOM, however, the stable political system
produces the same effects without the conflict of elites. Social
backgrounds, education and experience are similar in both
politicians and bureaucrats and therefore bureaucratic distinctive
ness is not evident.^ The civil servant can still, however,
consider himself non-partisan, apolitical, objective and so on
and “turn all problems of politics into problems of 
2administration" in the true classical fashion.
1. See Chapter 3.
2. Karl Manheim "Ideology and Utopia" Harcourt Brace 1946. P.105.
Conclusion
To summarise the points that have been made in this chapter, we 
began with a general introduction to the administrative culture 
of the Island and proceeded to explain it in terms of the 
influences upon it of British attitudes and practice in the 
context of the quasi-colonial relationship; the unwillingness 
to examine its own behaviour in any academic or rational manner; 
the tradition of selective imitation and its conscious 
continuance; , the inferiority complex which underpins this; the 
consequences for smallness for administrative culture which at 
first appear the most obvious to the observer; and finally, the 
political attitudes of senior civil servants.
The combination of all these factors creates what can only be 
described as a unique administrative culture. This is not to 
say that uniqueness is a quality confined to administration in 
Mann as every system has different influences and values. It 
does, however, show interesting traits of small communities which 
are in perpetual conflict and contrast with the more general 
features of larger states. The balancing act invoked to ensure 
the continuance of these values is reinforced by a homogeneous, 
conservative society whose remarkable capacity for coping with 
these conflicting values has resulted in a very stable environment 
for administrative action.
These first two chapters are intended to provide a backcloth for
the following descriptive passages which will be divided as 
follows. The first part will concern the machinery of government
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and will examine the allocation of functions to central government, 
local government and state-sponsored bodies. This will be 
followed by a description of the Public Service itself.
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE MACHINERY OP GOVERNMENT 
INTRODUCTION
The next two chapters are a description of the formal institutions 
and personnel of the Manx administrative system. This formal 
approach will provide only the skeleton of the subject in the same 
way that a diagram cannot illustrate organisational behaviour 
without an adequate discoursive text. The descriptive approach 
has, however, never been attempted for the Manx system and is 
essential as a prerequisite to further analysis.
Chapter 3 explains the machinery of Manx public administration in 
terms of the allocation of functions to the different levels and 
bodies and will also describe the various offices and institutions 
which are intended to co-ordinate the activity. It will begin 
with a,brief explanation of the UK/IOM relationship concentrating 
particularly on the requirements imposed by UK central government 
departments on Manx civil servants. This will be followed by a 
description of the Manx administrative system at the ’central* 
level - Tynwald, the Board system and the Civil Service.
Secondly state sponsored bodies will be explained and finally, 
government at the local level will be examined.
Certain aspects of the Manx administrative system have undergone 
a process of dramatic change during the 1960’s and 1970*s as the 
gradual devolution of power to the Island has continued. The most 
recent example is the transfer of the administration of customs
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and excise from the British to the Manx Civil Service. However 
in other respects there appears to be no evidence of a willingness 
to change and to incorporate ideas implemented in Britain, 
especially those changes seen in British local authority management 
structures«
The diagram below shows the basic pattern of central government 
in the Island and can be used as reference throughout this chapter.
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SUPRA-NATIONAL TIERS OF GOVERNMENT
The tiers of government can best be described in descending order
of size. As is the case with the UK, the IOM has membership of
and affiliations with several supra-national bodies including the
Commonwealth and the United Nations though on the whole foreign
affairs and defence are handled by the UK Government on the
Island*s behalf. This includes representations to supra-national
institutions and, indeed, legal action, e.g. the UK Government
was charged in the European Court of Human Rights on the question$
of Judicial corporal punishment in the IOM.^
The relationship with the EEC is governed by Protocol 3 of the
Treaty of Rome as agreed prior to UK entry in 1971. Under these
terms both the Channel Islands and the IOM are
**included in the EEC only for the purpose of free movement of industrial and agricultural products and to that end are required to apply the common external tarrif, the agricultural levies on imports from third countries and certain parts of the Common Agricultural Policy. Other provisions of the Treaty of Rome do not apply to the Islands**
Controversial issues have arisen concerning this very favourable
position and problems have occurred concerning the “potential
incompatibility between the Island*s formal constitutional status
3and the forces of European integration.K Monetary Compensation 
Amounts, standardization of indirect taxation levels and now the 
movement towards a common fisheries policy have all caused 
conflicts of interest on a scale which may endanger the IOM*s 
vital economic relationship with both the UK and the EEC.
1. For a detailed description of the case see D.GvKermode.Op. Cit. P.lll.
2. Ibid. P.9.
3. Ibid. P.163.
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In a more direct administrative sense the impact of the association 
with the EEC has been considerable. A '•Common Market Officer5 
has been appointed in Government Office and serves as Secretary 
to the Common Market Committee which now has the function of 
scruitinizing
"legislation emanating from the European Communities to determine what should be applied to the Island, and its general effects, until^the end of the life of the present House of Keys51
The huge mass of directives and regulations emanating from the
Eurocracy have required handling within the service and the
compliance with EEC directives has caused much debate in Tynwald.
The extra work involved for officials has not, in general
resulted in the appointment of new staff but has increased the
general work load of some Boards quite considerably e.g. the
Board of Agriculture and Fisheries and Government Office (part of
whose responsibilities it is to deal with foreign affairs). .
Reactions of officials to EEC information have been mixed though
some have taken the classic fdroit administratif5 line of filing
directives and politely omitting to implement them. On the whole
Tynwald has tried, where possible, to negotiate a special position
for the Island where an EEC policy particularly affects them
e.g. in the present attempts to introduce a fisheries policy.
The IOM*S relationship with the UK has been much documented and 
is the subject of one of the few contemporary politics books on 
the Island: "Devolution at Work - A Case Study in the IOM" by
D.G. Kermode. To put the relationship concisely is difficult
1. The Tynwald Companion. 1980. P.24.
- 79 -
as it is a complex and dynamic one and relies to a considerable 
extent upon convention. However this will be attempted with 
reference to Kermode*s much more extensive work.
The Island is neither a part of the UK nor an overseas dominion.
It is a Crown Dependency which enjoys a special relationship 
with the UK. This relationship assumed its modern constitutional 
form in 1866 with the passage by the UK parliament of the IOM 
Customs, Harbours and Public Purposes Act which separated Manx 
revenues from those of the UK and gave Tynwald a limited measure 
of control over insular expenditure. Since 1866 the degree of 
control has been relaxed to a relationship of almost complete 
freedom over purely domestic matters.
The UK parliament retains the power to legislate for the IOM in 
any sphere but in practice there has been an increasing tendency 
for the Island to be allowed to legislate for itself. It is 
normally only in the spheres of defence and international 
relations that Parliament has used its powers to legislate for 
the Island and then only with consultation and (usually) the 
consent of the Manx Government.'*' All measures passed by 
Tynwald require the Royal Assent and, while this is usually forth­
coming, it is not a mere formality, occasionally being refused 
on grounds of incompatibility with 'good government* or because
1. D.G. Kermode “Devolution at Work: A Case Study of theIsle of Man*1 Saxon House 1979. P. 108. Kermode discusses the exceptions to this pattern at length. A major example, however, is the Marine etc. Broadcasting (Offences) Act which was the consequence of an international treaty signed by the UK on the Island's behalf.
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the legislation concerns matters which 5transcend the frontiers 
of the Isle of Man5.'1' A recent example is the Wireless Tele­
graphy (IOM) Act, 1962 concerning commercial broadcasting to which 
Royal Assent was refused on the grounds of incompatibility with 
international broadcasting obligations made by the UK. Another 
was the considerable delay of Royal Assent for the Usuary (Arndt) 
Act 1974 which was designed to raise the Manx interest rate 
ceiling to 12^%. Kermode concludes that l,it would be wrong to
2attach too much weight to these cases as they were exceptional11.
The influence of the UK central government departments on a day-
to-day basis is important. The requirement to submit statistics
similar to those received from the local authorities in England
and Wales is one example. This affects educational, institutions,
agricultural production, industry and catering as well as the
Manx government departments themselves. Two examples of central
government departments in the UK having an influence over Manx
affairs were reported in the press. One concerns the arrival of
telegraphy inspectors to investigate the use of citizens band
radio sets in the Island. Though the Government Secretary was
said to know nothing of the visit, protesters said that the
officials had claimed they were
“authorised to come to the Island as tjjjey were working under the auspices of a UK Ministry."
Citizen Band radio is a volatile issue in the Island at the moment
and local residents claimed that the investigators intimidated
1. Kermode. Op Cit. P. 142.
2. Ibid. P.146.
3. “Protests over Home Office raids" IOM Examiner.12/12/80.
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them without even knowing that Manx laws on the matter were
different.
The second example is the accusation by R.Watterson MHK of phone 
tapping by UK tax authorities without the knowledge of Manx 
officials. The Lieutenant Governor, clarifying the position 
stated that
“The authority for the interception of telephone communications to or from or within the Isle of Man resides with the Secretary of State ....It has been the practice of successive Secretaries of State not to answer questions about the detailed operation- of these procedures or atjout the occasions on which they might be used. "
Contact with low level Whitehall staff is frequent even in
political negotiation. As former MHK Mr. Peter Craine said,
Government representatives were "fobbed off with civil servants,
2and did not see anyone at the head." Roger Watterson (also a 
former MHK) and members of the Manx National Paxty argue that too 
much power rests with minor officials in the Home Office and the 
politicians of Mann should speak with their equivalents din 
Britain. This situation has led to calls for a Manx Foreign 
Office and Department of Trade which would ensure the effective
3representation of the Island^ interests at an international level.
1. "MHK warns on UK phone-tapping". IOM Examiner. 21/3/80.
2. "Time to set up a Manx Foreign Office". IOM Examiner. 29/8/80.
3. Ibid.
- 82 -
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
The Lieutenant Governor
The position of the Lieutenant Governor in the IOM constitutes 
the link with the British Crown by whom he is appointed for what 
is normally a five year term of office.1 In practice there has 
been little interference by the Home Office in his authority 
though officially he is subject to the directions of the Home 
Secretary in his capacity as Privy Councillor. Under the terms 
of the Constitution (Legislative Council) (Arndt) Act 1980 the 
Governor ceases to be Chairman of the Legislative Council or to 
attend its meetings. The Council now elects a chairman from 
amongst its number, who is then known as the President of the 
Council. Since this occurred the Lieutenant Governor’s role in 
the legislative process has been reduced to that of giving his 
signature to legislation and recommending it for Royal Assent, 
presiding over meetings of Tynwald and chairing meetings of the 
Executive Council.
In 1976 the main financial powers of the Governor were transfered 
to the Finance Board and his concurrence on the introduction of 
proposals involving public expenditure is no longer required. 
Thus, though executive authority is formally vested in the 
Governor, the practice in recent years has been to gradually 
withdraw functions from him in favour of other elements of Manx
1. This was extended in the case of the last Governor,Sir John Warburton Paul in order to take in the Millennium celebrations in 1979. The present Governor is Sir Oswald Nigel Cecil appointed in September 1980.The Governors have usually had backgrounds in the British armed forces and then governorships in the former colonies.
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Government. He now acts increasingly on the advice of the 
Executive Council, the Finance Board and other bodies responsible 
to Tynwald. Thus, his is not purely a ceremonial role (though 
he does perform that function as the representative of the 
Lord of Mann, the Queen) but it is increasingly becoming less 
influential as the principle of self-determination by the Manx 
Legislature becomes established and as power is redistributed 
within the internal structures.
Tynwald
Tynwald consists of the Lieutenant Governor, an upper house or 
Legislative Council and the lower house or House of Keys. Two 
of the ten members of the Council are ex-officio, the Lord Bishop 
of Sodar and Mann and the Attorney-General. The latter has no 
vote. The Keys appoint all eight other members normally 
promoting members from their own house though they have power 
to select whomsoever they please. This position has been 
reached through a gradual purge of the ex-officio element over a 
period of approximately sixty years.1
The House of Keys consists of twenty-four popularly elected 
members on an electoral base of thirteen one, two and three seat 
constituencies with a simple-plurality system of voting. The 
members do not in general identify with political parties and 
those who stand on party tickets at election time behave as 
independents once they take up their position in the House.
1. J. Templeton and J. Richards "Elections in a &aall Community; The Isle of Man" Parliamentary Affairs. Vol. xxxiv No.3 Summer 1981 p.324.
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There are three political parties active in electoral terms in the 
Island though only two have representatives in Tynwald. The Manx . 
Labour Party (MLP) has three MHK*s and the Manx National Party (MNP), 
a nationalist group formed in 1978, has one. The latter member 
was elected on the party ticket of an older nationalist grouping 
Mec Vannin (meaning Sons of Mann) and he Joined the newer party 
(a faction from Mec Vannin) at its formation.
Though the Labour Party members have been elected on a common 
platform, the general practice is for them to vote according to 
their own conscience in Tynwald and they frequently cancel out 
each others votes. The other members, all elected on an 
Independent ticket, behave in practice as a conservative majority 
though without the formal organisation of a political party or 
whip system to force their choice.
The prime function of the House of Keys and Legislative Council 
when sitting separately is the consideration of primary legislation. 
At the drafting stage the bills are submitted to the Home Office 
for observations and bills requiring public expenditure must gain 
the approval of Tynwald!s Finance Board before they can be intro­
duced. The Governor decides in which Branch of Tynwald a Bill 
shall first be proceeded with and from there it must complete -three 
readings in both the House of Keys and the Legislative Council.
The House of Keys has the ultimate right to over-ride the Council 
where there is disagreement and since 1978 the Legislative Council 
has been able to delay the passage of a bill by one session only, 
in practice six months.
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Council and Ifeys sitting together under the presidency of the 
Lieutenant Governor constitute the Tynwald Court whose legislative 
function is confined to consenting to,amending or rejecting bills 
passed separately by the two Branches, Council and Keys. Tynwald 
has, however, more diverse functions than the passing of legislation. 
It makes policy decisions within the framework of existing law 
particularly with regard to finance; it ratifies subordinate 
legislation; and it scrutinises government business. The voting 
procedure is designed to ensure a number of checks on the process 
of policy with the Branches voting separately and together on 
different occasions.'1' Where the two Branches disagree provision 
is made for them to meet and confer.
The formal initiation of policy can come from Executive Council, 
Tynwald Committees, Boards of Tynwald or individual members.
The role of each body or group of bodies will be examined in turn 
along with an outline of their structure, selection processes, etc.
Executive Council
Executive Council (or Exco as it has become known) was set.up in
1946 in an attempt to
"combine in one body the responsibility for good order and government, the responsibility for initiating taxation and expenditure, the control of the executive and the police services and eng the current duality of interest and responsibility"
3It was reconstituted and put on a statutory footing in 1961, 
though since then certain changes in its membership have occurred.
1. Kermode. Op Cit. P. 147.
2. Ibid. P.46.
3. IOM Constitution Act. 1961
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It now consists of five members nominated from the Keys and two 
from the Council, which nominations are ratified by Tynwald 
voting as a body. The Chairman of the Finance Board remains 
an ex-officio member, but constitutes one of the representatives
of the branch of which he is a member.1
The role of Exco in the initiation of policy is a significant one 
in that much legislation first arises there and is then 
introduced to Tynwald. It is therefore a major though not the
only source of policy. As Kermode says it
"remains the Island1s most important executive committee" 
but his argument that it is equivalent to the British Cabinet is 
true in only the most superficial sense. The Haldane Committee 
set up in 1918 to review the machinery of government in Britain 
officially described the functions of the Cabinet as:
1. The final determination of policy to be submitted 
to Parliament.
2. The supreme control of the national executive in 
accordance with the policy prescribed by Parliament.
3. The continuous co-ordination and delimitation of the
2activities of the several Departments of State.
In no sense can the IOM*s Executive Council be said to have 
supreme control in practice though it may have been intended for 
this to develop. The important decisions of government though 
often begun there are rarely entirely made there and the degree
1. IOM Constitution Act. 1968.
2. Haldane Report of the Machinery of Government Committee". Cmnd. 9230.1918.
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of secrecy surrounding the British Cabinet does not apply.
There is a convention that Exco members should be the chairman 
of the principal Boards and, in the absence of party discipline, 
departmental loyalties have proved too strong to enable the 
development of effective cabinet government«»
The success of Exco in the initiation of policy is greater than : 
that of individual members in that much legislation originates there. 
In that sense it provides the kind of direction associated with 
executive government but its effectiveness as a central 
co-ordinating committee is limited by its unrepresentative 
nature in the sense that only the most senior members of Tynwald 
with major Board responsibilities are members.
Tynwald Committees
Tynwald Committees are created on an ad hoc basis to investigate
particular problems and controversies. This often produces
reports of an influential nature. Their number and diversity is
considerable and these bodies have certain important powers in
many fields. Committees of Tynwald include Standing Committees
which remain in being notwithstanding a dissolution of the House
of Keys and Select Committees appointed "to enquire into matters
2specifically referred to them." Joint Committees are
3"Committees of the Council and Keys when sitting separately" (of 
which there are at present three). The numbers and titles of
1. Members of Tynwald are circularised with the minutes of Exco meetings and often debate them in private.
2. Standing Order 173 Section 2.
3. Ibid.
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Tynwald Committees are shown in Appendix 2 along with the 
position of the Speaker of the House of Keys regarding them.
The total number of Committees of the Legislature which 
functioned during the life of the 1976-1981 House of Keys is 
forty-one and each contains between three and nine members, the 
average being five members.
The membership of these Committees is drawn almost exclusively 
from Tynwald though the Government Secretary is present at the 
Tynwald Ceremony Arrangements C o m m i t t e e a  standing committee 
of Tynwald. The Speaker of the House of Keys plays a very 
important role in this committee system, being a chairman of 
eleven and a member of a further six. The present holder of 
the post has acquired such authority because of his well 
developed political abilities and statesmanship though it is also 
a result of the fact that the Speaker is barred from membership 
of the Boards and is therefore relatively free to take up places 
on committees. As a result of his many positions on Tynwald 
Committees, the Speaker has quite an important role in the 
initiation of legislation though again his opinion is respected 
largely because of his lengthy experience and personal qualities, 
rather than because of his formal positions.
The Committees are set up to investigate and report on matters of 
particular controversy or interest and standing committees deal 
with matters of long term interest or requiring management e.g.
1. The Tynwald Ceremony is an annual open air meeting of Tynwald on (or near) 5th July designed to perpetuate the traditions and to promulgate the laws in Manx and English to the people.
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Standing Orders Committee, Tynwald Ceremony Arrangements Committee, 
Population Control and Immigration, the Selection Committee etc. 
Their power to influence policy making is important in that 
recommendations are considered seriously as policy initiatives 
though they do not formally initiate legislation. Reports 
presented to Tynwald by the Committees provide the basis for 
major debates and for legislation. Often, policy decisions flow 
from assumptions and perceptions developed during the debates of 
committee recommendations. In other words their comments add to 
the stock of knowledge, impressions and values of members.
The Board System
"The Boards of Tynwald are established by Acts which have previously been passed by the branches and they are instruments of political control over the policy and administration of the various public services."
Boards of Tynwald can initiate policy either by dealing with 
issues in their own meetings or by raising them in Tynwald.
Their success in this is significant as they have major responsi­
bility for decisions made in their own fields. Their control 
over large areas of decision-making is therefore considerable. 
Decisions of the Board need not be ratified by Tynwald unless it 
involves expenditure over a certain amount or involves the making 
of by-laws or subordinate legislation. This autonomy is the 
result of the development of the system which had its beginnings 
in 1734 when it was enacted that
"harbour dues should be imposed on shipping and applied for the repair and maintenance of the harbours and that with-the permission of the Lord, the anchorage dues should also be applied to the same purpose."
1. A.W. Moore "A History of the IOM" T. Fisher Unwin 1900. Reprinted Manx Museum and National Trust. 1979.
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Supervisors of the Harbours were appointed, who were chosen 
annually by the Governor, Council and Keys. Hence the Harbour 
Board was the first Board of Tynwald though it was first known 
as the Harbour Commissioners.
The Highway Board (now the IOM Highway and Transport Board) was 
in its early life also a committee of five persons, being set up 
in 1776 to supervise and inspect the roads. The Boards created 
next were the Asylums Committee, the Board of Trade and the Local 
Government Commissioners, all formed between the middle and the 
end of the nineteenth century. The next bulge in the expansion 
of the system came in the post Second World War period when there 
was some rationalisation and amalgamation of the Board system.
This belatedly followed the report of the *Committee appointed 
to consider the Question of the Establishment and Pay of Members 
of the Civil Service1 1920 which recommended certain changes in 
the organisation and the amalgamation of certain boards.
Tn the late 1960*s and early 1970*s some new bodies were created 
such as the Broadcasting Commission in 1965, the Consumer Council 
in 1972 and the Industrial Advisory Council in 1961. Further 
expansion and consolidation is still proceeding.
The policy-making made within the framework of existing law is 
largely the responsibility of the Boards acting in their own 
functional area. Considerable amounts of subordinate legislation 
emanate from the Boards in the form of regulations, by-laws and 
rules and these are usually laid on the table before Tynwald for 
ratification.
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Board Chairmen represent figures of considerable influence in 
Tynwald but due to the small size of the legislature almost all 
members have a chairmanship of one sort or another. In the 
hierarchy of positions, members are accorded varying degrees of 
power and prestige according to their experience and ability by 
being selected for important positions or important Boards.
The selection of Board members lies in the hands of the Selection 
Committee of Tynwald which is appointed by Tynwald immediately 
after the General Election every five years and consists of five 
members of the House of Keys and three of the Legislative Council. 
After considerable internal deliberation and discussion with 
other members the Committee recommends members and chairmen of 
Boards and other executive agencies to the December sitting of 
Tynwald after the November election. It also proposes new 
appointments when vacancies occur due to by-elections, promotions 
to the Council etc. All members except the Speaker and the 
Attorney General are provided with executive roles on at least 
one Board for a period of three years after which changes are 
often made by the Committee (with the approval of Tynwald), to last 
until the following General Election.'1' The importance of the 
fact that all members of Tynwald are members, in effect, of the 
*Government’ cannot be underestimated as it results in the virtual 
absence of an effective institutional opposition. Though the 
Speaker could be said to constitute a one-man opposition he is 
but one man and cannot, therefore be completely effective in the 
role. Moreover, by virtue of the present incumbents considerable 
political ability and experience he has been appointed to many
1. For a discussion of the powers of the Selection Committee see D.G. Kermode. Op Cit. PP.95-97.- 92 -
Tynwald Committees1 and is thus never far from the arena of 
policy-making. 9
Certain of the Boards also have members co-opted onto them on the 
grounds of specific expertise and of special business acumen.
This practice appears to exist very much on an ad hoc basis and 
is dependent upon the interest shown by the prospective members 
and the existence of appropriate individuals in the community,
(or the Board's awareness of them). Often co-opted members 
are appointed for life and their value is variable though rarely 
questioned.
Some examples of Boards containing co-opted members and the 
relevant knowledge and experience of these members are as follows. 
Firstly, the IOM Forestry, Mines and Lands Board contains four 
non-Tynwald members one of whom is an arborist, two are farmers, 
and another in commerce. Secondly, the Gaming Board of Control 
has an ex-.superintendent of police, and two ex-bankers co-opted 
onto it with an additional adviser from a private firm of 
accountants. The Airports Board has a former Flight-Lieutenant 
in the Royal Air Force co-opted onto it.
In the case of ad-hoc advisory bodies which have few executive 
powers, co-option arrangements are often made to provide a wide 
range of representatives from different community organisations. 
For example the Consumer Council (soon to be transformed into a 
Board with two Tynwald members and four non-Tynwald) contains
1. See Appendix 2.
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representatives of agricultural interests, hotel and guest house 
associations, the industrial advisory council, etc. Similarly 
the IOM Sports Council contains persons having connections with 
athletics, football, golf, rugby and yachting.
The IOM Board of Education has twenty-four directly elected 
members, the constituency base being the same as that for the 
Keys. In addition five Members of Tynwald sit on the Board of 
Education and are the means of accountability to Tynwald which 
votes the Board's finance.
The Board system has its roots in the entirely autonomous
individual bodies created in a piecemeal manner to meet new need
and responsibilities of government in the Island and was only
rationalised at a recent date with the unification of the Civil
Service in 1962.1 Though it has many disadvantages it has been
retained in its present form for partly political and partly
administrative reasons. The MacDermott Commission on the IOM
Constitution in 1959 listed its disadvantages as follows:
"It tends to hinder responsible central government by creating competing loyalties in Tynwald; it immerses too many of the legislature in the detailed work of administration on a narrow front; it makes heavy demands on the time of members; and it impedes the ^ formation of a unified civil service for the Island11.
It declared, however, that its popularity and advantages ,
(including sharing power very widely in Tynwald) overcame all
this and hence, recommended its retention.
1. IOM Civil Service Act 1962.
2. "Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution".Printed (by authority) Norris Modern Press. March 1959. Vol. 1. P.34.
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For the purpose of the Payment of Members Expenses Act 1975, 
executive bodies axe divided into 'Boards of Tynwald* correspond­
ing to UK Ministries, and ’Statutory Boards’ corresponding to 
the various forms of public ownership in the UK. Diagram 1 at 
the beginning of this chapter lists the Boards under their 
respective headings.
Quasi-autonomous Non-governmental Organisations 
The list of government bodies includes many functions which are 
the responsibility of state-sponsored bodies in Britain and this 
begs the question do these exist in Manx life?
Statutory • The Wild The Laxey Flour Mill Boards Life Park and Manx NationalTransport
Manx PrivateRadio Companies
Financed by Tynwald Independentfrom Tynwald
Diagram 2.
The above diagram displays all the bodies which have some 
independence from Tynwald and yet provide services partially 
financed and controlled by them. They are ranged on a continuum 
according to their degree of independence from Tynwald.
The distinction between commercial and other Boards has long been 
recognised but the concept of state-sponsored bodies goes further 
than this. A small number of agencies play a similar role to 
that of a nationalised industry. In particular there is IOM 
National Transport whose position with relation to government 
control has changed repeatedly in recent years to its present one
1. Tynwald Companion 1980. P.49. Payment of Members Expenses Act. 1975. _ 95 _
as a limited company owned by the government with its Board of 
Directors consisting entirely of Tynwald members. This is also 
the position for Laxey Flour Mills and there are various sub­
committees running semi-commercial concerns such as a Wild Life 
Park run by a committee of the Board of Agriculture. In addition 
the situation regarding broadcasting is an interesting one that 
has been the subject Of much change in the 1960’s and 1970’s.
Its present position is that Manx Radio (a commercial station) 
is a limited company owned by government and operated by a 
private Board of Directors. They must submit estimates to the 
Finance Board in the normal way. The Broadcasting Commission - 
a statutory board consisting of two Tynwald and three non-Tynwald 
members is responsible for the overall supervision of broadcasting 
and the negotiation of frequencies and so on with the UK Home 
Office
So although the state-sponsored bodies, with differing degrees 
of autonomy from government do exist, they are small in number. 
Many of the functions allocated to different agencies in Britain 
are vested in various forms of Board in the IOM. The commercial 
Boards are assured greater autonomy over decision-making provided 
they remain self-financing to an extent which is acceptable 
to the Manx government. Similarly, the limited companies owned 
by the government are generally free to operate as they wish 
though with the final sanction of government through their 
financial subsidies.
1. The Broadcasting Commission has, for example attempted to establish with the Home Office an entitlement to a reduction in licence fees for Manx residents as Manx Radio is not financed through the licence. (IOM Examiner,Leader. (9/1/1981). A second example is that the Commission has also been involved in the controversy over the importation 
and use of citizen’s band radio. (IOM Examiner. 23/1/1981).- 96 -
Central Government Finance
There are three sources of finance available to Tynwald in order 
that it may carry out its statutory, voted'1' and miscellaneous 
services. These are direct taxation, customs and excise and 
general receipts. The table below shows the revenue receipts 
and payments over the period 1970-1980. Sources of finance from 
direct taxation include resident and non-resident Income Tax, 
Company Registration Tax and Land Speculation Tax. The rates 
of these taxes are decided entirely by Tynwald through the 
Finance Board and hence Tynwald has control over a considerable 
proportion of its revenue. (See diagram 3).
Customs and excise, until recently, was much less under Tynwald’s 
control since they were subject -fed an almost total customs union 
(the Common Purse Agreement) with the UK in which the Island 
received a share of net customs and value added tax revenue 
(paid into the UK). The Island share was apportioned to them 
on the basis of the consumption patterns of the resident population 
plus a fiscal equivalent for the tourist population. With the 
increase in VAT to 15% in the UK budget there has been a very 
considerable increase in yield from that source and from inflation. 
From the 1 st April 1980 the Manx Government took over the 
running of the Customs and Excise service and the staff now 
employed locally are employees of the IOM Government instead of 
the UK Government as hitherto. The Manx Government still 
maintains a customs agreement with the UK which requires them to 
keep in line with the majority of the rates of indirect taxation.
1. Meaning services provided with money voted annually by Tynwald.
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It may, however, give three months notice that it wishes to 
change duties and subject to the agreement of both territories 
this could be done. Either party may also give six months 
notice to terminate the agreement, hence creating a customs 
barrier between the two territories.
The third source of revenue is ?general receipts* including fees 
and charges, National Insurance contributions, fines, interest on 
investments, betting duties, philatellic revenues and the proceeds 
of the Continental Shelf Agreement.1
\
Hence although the Island.has great arid increasing autonomy
concerning the raising of revenue, it is still constrained by
its own agreements with the UK Treasury. Their relative
freedom from control is a considerable boon since until the
development of the Common Purse Agreement beginning in 1890 and
to some extent up until 1957 when the agreement was widened to
become almost total, the Island struggled for want of finances
and suffered at the hand of the UK Treasury's ‘'penny-pinching 
2 ‘control”'.
As to the expenditure side of the financial account the Island 
has almost total control of itsspending subject only to the 
agreement that it will make an annual contribution of its share
1. This is an agreement regarding the distribution of revenue derived from oil and gas exploitation in UK waters. The Island receives a share determined by its resident population, of the licence fees and royalties collected by the UK in respect of this exploitation.
2. D.G. Kermode. Op Cit. P. 113.
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of the Common Purse to the UK exchequer for defence and other 
common services. There are some spheres in which the Island 
keeps in line, through voluntary agreement with the UK including 
social services expenditure, and part of the expenditure on 
agriculture, the police, airports and civil defence. These 
items, with the annual contribution, account for 60% of Manx 
expenditure. The minority portion has, of course increased 
considerably in real terms and the Island is free to decide how 
all these services shall be administered and to make variations 
that are possible without endangering reciprocal arrangements.
The size of the overall Manx budget has increased enormously 
during the last decade and the scale of government activities 
continues to increase with it though a large proportion of the 
increase is a direct result of inflation and UK Government 
policy. The Finance Board is the body responsible, since 1961, 
for the collection and allocation of resources and though the 
Lieutenant Governor has still, formally, a veto on expenditure, 
it would be a brave Governor who would exercise it.
The Civil Service
The Civil Service in the Island began as a small number of 
privileged officers appointed through the Crown to the Governor. 
Earlier the Lord of Man’s minions had performed similar functions. 
In 1826 the service consisted of a handful of court positions,
1. A. W. Moore KA History of the IOM” . Op Cit.
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1 2 e.g. the High Bailiff’s , a gaoler and turnkey of Castle Rushen
and the Chief Constables with only the very rudiments of a clerical
staff. There were no clerical staff attached to most of these
offices and there was much duplication of tasks for each person.
As the numbers of Boards increased some were appropriated clerical
staff. There was considerable expansion as a result of this
during the middle and towards the end of the nineteenth century.
The increase in legislation concerning weights and measures and
building standards boosted this further. The next bulge in the
expansion of the service came in the post-war period when there
was some reorganisation of staff and a boost in the number of
Boards. Over the 1960’s and 1970’s the numbers have again
rapidly increased. This time it is a result of the rapidly
growing population and the ramifications of the policy of low
taxation.
The Boards of Tynwald now form the core of the Civil Service in 
the IOM. Each has its own permanent executive staff of officers 
and technical experts and in most instances they are said to work 
for the Board rather than the Service as a whole. Although the 
connection between the Boards and -the Service for organisational 
purposes is very strong, there are some departments which have no 
Board directly controlling them. These have been established for 
various reasons but are often the residue of old Crown appoint­
ments e.g. Clerk of Tynwald Office staff, public analyst’s and
1. Equivalent today of an English Crown Court judge.
2. A Norman castle in the former capital, Castletown.
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weights and measures department and clerical staff for legal 
appointments e.g. the High Bailiff, Magistrates, and the Attorney 
General. A small number of very senior officials remain outside 
the purview of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the 
Lieutenant Governor is responsible for their appointment. This 
applies to both the Treasurer and the Government Secretary.
Other posts e.g. the Attorney General, the Deemsters and the 
Lieutenant Governor are appointed to the Crown.
The central department of the Civil Service is^Government OfficeA,
which is headed by the Government Secretary (the head of the 
Civil Service) and is divided according to several types of 
function. In this body were vested many of the miscellaneous 
functions which were not the responsibility of the early Boards 
and these functions have been gradually decentralised .as new 
Boards were created. Government Office officially administers 
all government functions but in practice it is now concerned only 
with ’External Affairs* (treaties, conventions, nationality, 
immigration,etc.) which is the responsibility of ’C ’ Division, 
miscellaneous aspects of ’Internal Affairs’ (’A* Division) and 
Economic and Social Affairs (*B* Division). Appendix 3 shows 
the functions for which Government Office is officially responsible, 
many of which are effectively administered by other Boards.
The large number and often irrational organisation of Boards has 
long been the object of criticism. In 1920 a Committee ^ 
recommended:
1. Report of the Committee appointed to consider the questionof the Establishment and Pay of Members of the Civil Service 
1920.
’’that the clerical staffs of various Boards of Tynwald should as occasion arises be amalgamated as follows
(a) the Harbour Commissioners and the Highway Board;
(b) the Local Government Board (LGB) and the Asylums 
and Assessment Board;
(c) the Board of Agriculture, the Tree Planting Board 
and the Fisheries Board;
(d) the Labour Exchange and the Old Age Pension and 
National Insurance Board.*’
Some of the changes were implemented, especially (d) but still 
today the allocation of functions seems random and piecemeal 
e.g. criticism is often levelled at the fact that the Health 
Services Board, the LGB, the Board of Social Security and some 
of the local authorities all run old people’s homes of various 
kinds and occupancy depends on the degree of care required. This 
makes administration difficult and leads to considerable confusion 
for clients.
Changes are at present being made in the Board system and hence in 
Civil Service organisation. As mentioned earlier the IOM Civil 
Service has taken over the responsibility for Customs and Excise 
administration from the British Civil Service. Secondly, legisla­
tion is being enacted to make the IOM Consumer Council and the 
Industrial Advisory Council into statutory Boards.'*' As part of 
this process the Weights and Measures and Public Analyst’s 
Departments will be incorporated under the new Board of Consumer 
Affairs. Two new advisory panels are in the process of creation; 
firstly in the Tourist Board to act as a ’think-tank® to boost the 
declining tourist industry, and secondly an advisory group
la ’’Consumer Council to become a Board** IOM Examiner 29/11/80.
b **Council into Board” IOM Examiner 19/12/80.- 103 -
containing representatives of conservation groups to comment on 
planning matters to the LGB’s Planning Committee. A merger of 
all the transport boards is also being planned along with a take­
over of the responsibility for roads in the urban areas from 
appropriate local authorities. A Home Affairs Board Bill has 
been introduced to Tynwald which is intended to take some of the 
functions of the Governor, the Civil Defence Commission, the Police 
Board, Broadcasting Commission and the LGB and combine them in the 
new body."*-
These changes are preceeding a wider move to rationalise the
whole structure and in accordance with this a Select Committee
has been set up to report on the responsibilities of all Govern- 
2ment Boards with a view to reallocating some of their functions. 
This was prompted by one member’s desire to dismantle the LGB 
which is relatively large and muli-functional. This was widened 
to include all Boards after comments such as that the public were
Many thought that the Board system should exploit the advantages 
of ’small is beautiful’ rather than build up multi-functional 
and relatively large scale departments. Since the process of 
change continues unabated as evidenced by the above examples, the 
formation of a committee to enquire into this may be a delaying 
tactic which may not produce the reform which is its ostensible 
purpose.
1. ’’Political Control of police goes ahead1* IOM Examiner 5/6/81.
2. ’’Probe into Government Boards’1 IOM Examiner 21/11/80.
3. Mr. T.E. Kermeen. MHK Tynwald Debates. 19/11/80.
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The Manx administrative system is a result of the piecemeal
allocation of functions over two and a half centuries and it is
not surprising that anomalies remain when there has been no
radical review of the system as a whole since its instigation.
Several reports have dealt with the administrative elements of
government in several aspects and their recommendations have often
been implemented. For instance both the MacDermott Commission^"
2and the Marshall Report recommended the creation of a Finance
Board and the separation of the treasury function from Government
Office into a new department. These changes were implemented
in 1961. The MacDermott Report also recommended the unification
of the Civil Service and the establishment of a parmanent Civil
Service Commission to be responsible for
Recruitment, appointments and promotions and all the questions arising from time to time aftgr the present establishment needs have been settled".
A Civil Service Commission was appointed in 1962 under the IOM
Civil Service Act which also unified the Civil Service.
"The Civil Service shall comprise all persons appointed by the Governor for whole-time service with any depart­ment of the Government or any Board, which service is wholly or mainly administrative, professional, technical or clerical."
On the whole the recommendations of the Marshall Report were also
implemented but those that were not constituted very important
reforms and those which were implemented do not constitute what
5could be called radical change.
1. MacDermott "Report of the Commission on the IOM Constitution",Printed (by authority) Norris Modern Press . 1959.Vol. 1 ,P.44.
2. Marshall "Report on Administrative Organisation of the IOM Government". Printed (by authority) Norris Modern Press. 1959.
3. MacDermott Report. Op Cit. P.45.
4. Statutes Vol. XIX. PP.66-74.
5. See Appendix 4.
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The Ombudsman
There is at present no Commissioner for Administration operating 
in the IOM but as its introduction was at one time under considera­
tion it seems appropriate to consider its relevance to the Manx 
administrative system. The proposal embodied in the Tynwald 
Commissioner for Administration Bill, 1981, had a mixed response 
and the local authorities in general opposed it. Some misunder­
standings appear to exist as to the precise operation of the 
Parliamentary Commissioner in Britain. For example one member 
of Castletown Commissioners who opposed the idea said
"that there was one ombudsman for 50 million people in Britain, while tje Island was considering one 
for 60,000 people."
Most objections were on the grounds of cost or the classic objection
given by another Castletown Commissioner who
"wondered why suddenly we should need an ombudsman when the Island had managed previously without one."
Others have claimed that the 24 Keys provided 24 ombudsmen in
effect and that a separate appointment was simply an empire-
building exercise. Presumably the arguments offered in favour of
ombudsmen in Britain apply equally to Mann thus the suggestion of
reference through MHK’s. It is unlikely that the arguments in
detail were familiar te-the MHK*s. In Britain it was decided
that the institution was worth trying despite its practical
limitations and Gregory and Hut chess on-..concluded that
"on the evidence of the first six years or so, what the work of the Commissioner and his associated Select Committee has demonstrated is that -properly used - the Parliamentary Commissioner scheme is capable of making parliamentary control over administrative action very nearly as effective ^s its inherent limitations will ever allow it tobe."
1. "Town supports ombudsman plan". IOM Examiner 9/1/81.
2. Ibid.
3. R. Gregory and P. Hut chess on "The Parliamentary Ombudsman:A Study in the Control of Administrative Action" G.Allen and Unwin.1975. ,
In the IOM the measure was unsuccessful due more to lack of under­
standing and absence of informed debate than any real objection 
to its value.
- 107 -
CO-ORDINATION
There are several bodies part of whose role it is to assist the 
co-ordination of government services, either at political or 
Civil Service level. The most obvious example is Tynwald itself 
which has overall control of policy in the long term through 
legislation and the ratification of financial decisions. This 
is despite the fact that in the short term the Boards have a 
considerable degree of autonomy from Tynwald. In addition, it 
contains the chairmen of all the Boards and indeed all the 
elected members of the Boards (with the exception of the directly 
elected members of the Board of Education).
The Executive Council was also created originally with the 
intention of providing an overall co-ordinating body with responsi ­
bility to Tynwald and there is some possibility of gradually 
acquiring a more important role. In no way, however, can it be 
said to make decisions in every field of policy and instead it 
tends to be a place where decisions are made which are not 
thought to be the responsibility of any Board. As an initiator 
of legislation it is important, but it has little influence upon 
the other Boards or, for that matter, on Tynwald. It does not, 
however, have a specific remit for long-term co-ordination and 
planning though it is perhaps the most appropriate body to take 
that role.
One very vital and increasingly influential co-ordinating body is 
the Finance Board whose power to reject and amend estimates of all
- 108 -
other Boards and Departments is considerable. Though its 
decisions in this field are ratified by Tynwald, final conclusions 
are rarely outvoted. The presentation of estimates to Tynwald 
is seen more .as a chance to debate the priorities established 
and to express departmental loyalties than as an opportunity to 
overturn their decisions. Similarly the budget as a whole as 
prepared by Finance Board and presented by its Chairman is usually 
unchanged after its passage through Tynwald. This kind of 
financial control provides an obvious means to keep Government 
spending in the various departments in line with overall economic 
and political priorities. The members of the Finance Board 
cannot serve on any other Board (unlike all other members who 
serve on at least two) and do not therefore have particular Board 
loyalties though they may have personal axes to grind.
The Civil Service Commission could be seen as a co-ordinating 
body in that it controls the common resource of staff, therefore 
affecting all Boards and Departments. In this sense it aims to 
ensure that staffing levels are sufficient for requirements and 
in accordance with the policy on the size of the public sector.
The unification of the Civil Service and the creation of the 
Civil Service Commission did much to improve co-operation between 
the departments and the inter-change of personnel has aided the 
inter-change of ideas.
At the officer level several departments play a part in assisting 
co-ordination. The Clerk of Tynwald’s Department tries to
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co-ordinate the legislative program of activities and keep members 
informed of the decisions of other Boards etc. On the executive 
side the Government Secretary is the overall co-ordinator as head 
of the Civil Service. He and his department are nominally in 
control of virtually all government activity and often receive 
enquiries in all fields which are then redirected to the appropriate 
Board or Department. Since the centralisation of departments in 
one building and the development of a centralised postal service, 
this has been less true. The Government Secretary is still, 
however, seen as the overall co-ordinator and is an ex-officio 
attender at all Board meetings, either to give advice or simply 
to observe.
Despite the fact that these co-ordinative mechanisms do exist,
the vast majority of co-ordination is achieved through purely
informal, means. As one civil servant said
"the politicians tend to set up a committee to deal with matters relating to several Boards but there is no real need. I just pick up the ’phone and I achieve much more that way. TJey would rather use a sledge-hammer to crack a nut".
Another said:
"it is just a question of knowing who deals with what. In a small community our colleagues on the same level are personal friends; people we went to school with. There is often no need for a formal meeting."
This informality is accepted by many as adequate but there are
others who suggest that the degree of real co-ordination is low
and is very ’patchy* simply because it relies on personalities.
1. This quotation perhaps tells as much about civil servants attitudes to politicians as it does about informal communication channels. Interview with the author. 9 April 1980.
2 . Interview with the author. 1 April 1980.
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Others suggest it is a dangerous pattern which reinforces narrow 
cliques in policy-making.
In discussion with politicians and civil servants it was noted 
that on the whole feelings were mixed as to whether co-ordination 
was good or poor though on the whole civil servants were more 
satisfied than politicians with the present system. This is 
presumably a factor of their permanence and their full-time 
involvement. Of those who felt changes should be made, many 
confined their proposals to amalgamation of certain Boards 
(though some expected problems of size with this), centralisation 
of equipment and more frequent inter-departmental or joint Board 
meetings. In general, advocates of change prefer it to be slow 
and piecemeal. This is connected with a primary aim of the 
Manx government which is to present an image of stability to the 
outside world.. This affects not only economic policies and law 
and order, but also attitudes towards constitutional and 
administrative reform. It has gradually become ingrained that 
it is better to retain existing methods than to suffer the 
unwelcome upheaval of change. It is not considered that the 
possible benefits of a radical review of the allocation of 
functions along with the introduction of effective co-ordinative 
structures and methods, may enhance rather than damage stability.
In interviews certain civil servants were prepared to consider 
the concept of corporate management as practiced in many British 
local authorities and thought that the matter should be examined 
to determine its relevance to the Manx administrative system.
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"I would personally support the implementation of corporate management. It should exist as thereare certainly gaps in co-ordination. It hasn’t happened because strong departmental loyalties and a lack of political will have prevented a thorough consideration of the idea.”
In a system of Boards which shows considerable similarity to
local authority committee systems but with, if anything greater
autonomy for its constituent parts, the application of corporate
planning techniques would appear particularly appropriate. The
Bains recommendations are directly appropriate to'the Manx case.
Corporate management involves a restructuring of internal
organisation both at member and officer level in order that a
more rational process of decision-making with comprehensive
review of progress could take place. Bains recommended new
structures which aid the overall development of the Island in
accordance with prearranged policies rather than the present
3pxecemeal, incremental system.
1. Interview with the author. 7/4/80.
2. See Chapter 5.
3. M.A. Bains. ’’The New Local Authorities: Management andStructure” HMSO 1972.
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT
a) Description
There are at present twenty-six local authorities in the Island; 
they are of varying size, power and effectiveness. There are 
four town districts, five village districts and seventeen parish 
districts.'*' These form one tier below central government level 
though they do not and cannot perform equivalent functions to 
one another as they are of unequal size and resources. Many are 
so small that their functions are either performed jointly with 
other authorities or have been taken over by central government in
the shape of the Local Government Board (LGB). This system
*compares closely with that obtaining in England and Wales toward
the end of the last century, prior to the formation of the Rural
District Councils, Urban District Councils, County Boroughs and
County Councils in 1894. In other words when the British
authorities were small, separate, minimally active and without
. . .  2inter-locking responsibilities. Towards the end of the nine­
teenth century there was some central financing of local govern­
ment and that at present is the position in the IOM.
Each authority has existed in its present form for at least sixty
years, the towns being constituted by separate acts - Douglas in
31860, Ramsey in 1865 and Castletown and Peel in 1883. The 
position of the village and parish districts was formalised with
1. See Appendix 6 for the population and names of districts.
2. P.G. Richards, “The Reformed Local Government System”George Allen and Unwin Revised 3rd Edition. 1978.
3. The Douglas Town Act 1860 created the Douglas Town Commissioners and this was created a Municipal Borough under the Municipal Corporation Act 1895. The Ramsey Town Act 1865, the Castletown Act 1883 and the Peel Town Act 1883 created the other three.
Diagram 4 The Functions of the Local Authorities
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In addition to the services indicated, Douglas Corporation also administers the cemetaries, markets and electricity services.
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Bride X X X
German X X X X X
Jurby X X X
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Mao: own X X X X X
Maughold X X X X
Michael X X X
Onchan X X X
Patrick X X X X
Rushen X X X X
Santon X X X X
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the Local Government Consolidation Act in 1916 which is still 
the principal Act dealing with Local Government in the IOM«
The functions of the various authorities are in practice very 
complex and for ease of presentation they are displayed in 
Diagram 4. Diagram 5 shows the local government-like functions 
that are performed by central government bodies. Only one 
function is performed by all the local authorities and that is 
street lighting. Others such as building bye-law inspection, 
environmental health, refuse collection, public conveniences, 
amenities and attractions, decorative lighting and highways are 
provided by the larger authorities only (though the latter is in 
the process of centralisation to the Highway and Transport 
Boards1 ). Others are provided by Douglas Corporation only, the 
LGB and other central bodies serving the rest of the Island 
e.g. cemetaries, public health inspectors, seasonal entertainment, 
rodent disinfestation, electricity and transport. Joint Boards 
are in operation to provide swimming pools with the assistance 
of the LGB. The latter also assist with old peoplefs homes.
In the case of housing, the LGB is the supervising authority for 
the whole Island and the functioning authority in areas other than 
Douglas, Ramsey, Castletown, Peel, Port Erin, Port St. Mary,
Qnchan Village and Braddan Parish. In addition the Board deals 
with drainage, public health and safety, cleanliness of water and 
milk supplies; it hears and determines applications for 
finance by local authorities. It is the fire authority for
1. “Better roads after Tynwald take-over?™ IOM Examiner. 30/1/81.The take over is enshrined in the Highways (Transfer) Act1981.
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the Island, though a fire rate is levied at present this is to 
be abolished.^
The increasing centralisation of power and resources has led to 
considerable disillusionment with the service as a whole and has 
discouraged possible candidates from standing for election as the 
Commissioners in their area. There is often no contest at 
elections and sometimes there are not enough nominations to fill 
vacancies-
!tTown and parish commissioners * jobs are not worth having any more due to the relentless march of centralisation and the taking away of more and ^more of their duties, rights, powers and functions.**
Controversy abounds as to how the problem can be rectified whilst
in the mean time finances and functions of local authorities are
gradually eroded- A radical change is required but unlikely.
This leads to an examination of the financing of local. authorities
for without adequate funds their future is extremely uncertain.
b) Finance
Appendix 6 gives some statistical details on local government 
finance.
Not only do the local, authorities themselves rai.se rates in the 
IOM but the Government also levies them for the traditional local, 
government services it provides e.g. fire and water. The rate 
demands received by householders will vary according to the
1. Local Government (Fire Services) Bill. uFire rate to go**IOM Examiner. 7/11/80. See Appendix 5 for a summary of the functions of the LGB.
2. nJobs are not worth havinglt IOM Examiner. 7/11/80.Referring to a comment made by R. MacDonald MLC 4/11/80.
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district in which they live not only because each authority fixes 
a different rate poundage and rateable values but also because 
they provide different services and therefore levy different rates. 
Central government levies a fire services rate and highways rate 
(though these are now being abolished), a water rate, burial 
ground rate and agriculture rate, and Special Drainage rate.1 
These are all collected by the IOM Assessment Board which is also 
responsible for the determination and review of rateable values.
A separate demand is received from the local authority itself.
No rate rebate system exists at present in the Island.
Central Government (through the LGB) provides rate support grants 
to local authorities to the value of £1,048,161 in 1978/79 which 
is about 5 0 %  of the total monies raised by way of rates by the 
various local authorities for the same period. This is made up 
of deficiency payments for road maintenance and housing, grants 
for various development schemes and various other forms of rate 
support. In addition local authorities must petition the LGB 
for permission to borrow sums up to £20,000 for purchase of land 
or to sell land or premises up to that value. For items over 
£20,000 the Board sits as a Committee of Tynwald to hear petitions 
and report to Tynwald. Local authorities have a small amount of 
income from fees and charges to supplement their grants and their 
own rates.
1. There are 32 Special Drainage Districts which are used by the LGB for determination of the level of this rate.
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c ) The System^ Problems
There are several major problems with this system of finance which 
have led to calls for its abolition and reform.1 These problems 
can be grouped as follows into those concerned with disparity, 
complexity, inefficiency, revaluation and the division between 
the payment and provision of services. These will be examined in 
turn.
There is a wide disparity between local authority general rates.
For instance, the Douglas rate in 1978/79 was 88 pence in the 
pound and that of Santon 5 pence in the pound. Of the total 
rate levied (local authority and government combined) the Douglas 
ratepayers contribute 50% (£1,576,934) the next largest sum being 
that of Ramsey (£327,776). The lowest total is Santon (£5,440).
The disparity between most local authorities and Douglas is 
considerable. This results in important problems for the larger 
towns. They provide services which are of benefit to the Island 
as a whole and in such a small area this is even more marked.
Those areas immediately adjoining Douglas pay considerably lower 
rates with relatively easy access to the services provided there. 
Douglas and to some extent the other towns provide tourist 
facilities which are not primarily of benefit to the towns residents 
though the costs are borne by them.
The second problem is that of complexity. The confusion at rate 
collection times is great especially as householders receive two 
separate rate demands - one from their local authority and one from
1. “Ability to Pay - New Rates Plan.tr IOM Courier 29/2/80.Also “A Decision Now on Rates Abolition” IOM Examiner Leader. 6/6/80. _ 119
the Assessment Board corresponding to the local authority and the 
central government rates respectively. In addition the local 
authorities themselves are caught up in a complex system of 
reallocation of monies not collected by them. They are involved 
in a competition for rate support grants with which they are not 
equipped to cope. Staffing levels are very low in the vast 
majority of authorities and inevitably the larger authorities will 
win in this competitive process. The sheer number of authorities 
and the considerable variation in the services they provide can 
prove perplexing for the client. Standards vary considerably 
throughout the Island e.g. in Douglas collections of refuse are 
weekly whereas in some country districts collection is rather less 
frequent. This is the inevitable result of any unevenness of 
development anywhere, but in the IOM it is compounded by the 
inefficient nature of the local authorities involved.
This problem is related to the fact that the local government units 
are of such small size as to suffer from diseconomies of scale.
The value of the essentially local outlook is lost when 
authorities have not the resources to cater for the needs of the 
area. As central government takes up the functions in default, 
the value of local representation is weakened. It is said that 
Michael parish district is the smallest local authority in Europe, 
having a population of only 437 people (in 1976). Its staff is 
part-time and shared with other authorities in the area. It 
employs no professional staff and services of a specialised nature 
are provided by the LGB. All twenty-six authorities have the same
powers as Douglas Corporation but they often do not know this and 
have not the technical ability to employ them anyway. The small
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size of the units makes it virtually impossible to obtain 
suitably qualified staff to carry out the increasingly complex 
tasks of modern administration. Authorities even share staff 
e.g. Patrick and German Commissioners share a clerk as do 
Andreas, Ballaugh and Jurby. The arguments for retaining these 
small authorities are the same as those in Britain in the nine­
teenth century where, as C.H.Wilson pointed out,
**it was anticipated by enthusiasts that the vital force would beat most strongly in the smallest !cell* of democracy. But the small parish was powerless^to support any important functions of government.1*
A further problems is that the larger local authorities (again
in particular the Douglas Corporation) undertake services in
their distiicts which are provided wholly or partly by government
in other districts. In these instances the residents of the *
former districts are paying twice for such services, firstly by way 
of rates and secondly as taxpayers. Included in this category 
are environmental health, building bye-law inspections and other 
technical work and in Douglas, rodent disinfestation. It will be 
noted that in 1978/79, the Douglas Corporation received a 1 pence 
in the £ rate grant (£14,300) in respect of their environmental 
health services which cost approximately £50,000. Similarly, 
the Highway authorities (of which there are seven including the 
Highway and Transport Board) have claimed in the past that the 
exercise of these functions in their respective districts costs 
more than the 2 pence rate levied by the Government for highways 
administered by the Highway and Transport Board.
1. C.H. Wilson. trThe Foundations of Local Government** in C.H. Wilson (ed) ,rEssays in Local Government**Basil Blackwell 1948. P.22.
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There are several examples of local government providing services 
where central government pays and vice versa. The LCB provides 
a refuse disposal service throughout the Island for which local 
authorities contribute to the cost on a ration basis. An example 
of the reverse is that local authorities provide specific road 
improvement schemes which axe paid for by specific grants from 
the LGB. Some see this situation of one authority performing a 
function and another picking up the bill* as intolerable and as an 
irresponsible expenditure of resources.'*'
There have been calls for a total revaluation of properties in
the Island. It is known that there are significant variations
in some existing valuations for similar properties throughout the
Island. There is a need for property valuations to correspond
otherwise a basic unfairness is perpetuated. At present the rating
assessments do not reflect the distances persons have to travel
to centres of employment, shops etc. The Interim Report of the
Select Committee on Rating of Domestic Property, November 1979,
pointed out that
“inequalities in valuation .... have inevitably arisen in the piecemeal valuations carried out over nearly a century, such as the lower valuation applied to agricultural dwelling houses.*1
A problem which can be said to apply to the IOM as much as
Britain is that the method of assessing rates is unfair in that
3it takes no account of ability to pay. Householders are assessed 
and not the individuals within them resulting, some argue, in
1. “Local Government Finance** Talking about Tynwald. IOM Examiner29/2/80.
2. First Interim Report of the Select Committee on the Rating of Domestic Property. Printed (by authority) IOM Government Reprographic Department. November 1979.
3. “Ability to Pay - New Rates Plan** The Manx National Party proposed a change to a local income tax in Feb. 1980. Also “Step towards de-rating**. Talking about Tynwald. IOM Examiner. 17/10/80. _ 122 -
“a totally outdated .... and unfair system which all too ^ often hurts the weakest and lowest paid of our community".
Finally a problem associated with the present rating system and to
large extent the result of it is the size and complexity■of the
LGB. Its functions are numerous and very mixed. It has grown as
the ability of the local authorities to perform their functions
adequately has fallen. Its.committee structure is complex in order
to decentralise significant power in certain fields which are
normally the responsibility of local authorities (e.g. the Fire
Committee, Planning Committee and Housing Advisory Committee).
The LGB is certainly large in comparison with most other Boards
though both the Board of Social Security and Treasury are larger.
An important question is whether the multi-functional nature of 
the LGB has made it so large as to be unweildy. Compared with 
local authorities in Britain the LGB is small but it does have a 
role different frowthese bodies. Grounds for redistribution of 
some of their functions to other Boards and (in the event of a 
reorganisation of local government) to local authorities are evident.
d) Reform Attempts
The tendency towards centralisation in Manx Government affairs can, 
on the evidence above,be said to be a result of small size, 
inertia and general inefficiency on the part of local authorities. 
Though attempts have been made to change this, as yet the system 
remains fundamentally unaltered.
1. Peter Craine MHK. "Ability to Pay" Op Cit.
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There has been a long series of unsuccessful attempts to reform 
Manx local government during the post-war period. There were 
four different reports, set up by the Manx government through 
ad hoc Tynwald Committees, recommending changes in the allocation 
of functions between 1949 and 1966. On each occasion recommenda­
tions for a reduction in the number of local authorities were 
rejected in Tynwald on the grounds that it was an erosion of 
local democracy.
The most concerted effort to date on the matter was the Committee 
on Rating and taxation which reported in 1967.^ They concluded
that:
"The present system of local government finance in the Island is highly defective and in urgent need of drastic reform. A complete breakdown has been prevented only by a series of expedients which have merely papered over the cracks without remedying the underlying defects. We are convinced that the time has come when radical change must be introduced without delay if local government in the Island is to survive, to be revitalised in terms of its democratic spirit, and to be transformed into an effective instrument^for providing a wide range of municipal services."
The Report recommended drastic reform of the local government 
system with the creation of a new single local authority and the 
consequent relinquishment of many functions from the central 
government level. Amendments to the system of assessing and 
collecting rates and the introduction of rate rebates were also 
proposed. The Committee considered very carefully, proposals 
for retention of the existing local government system, total 
centralisation, a two-tier system and either four or five district 
authorities but came to the conclusion that:
1. See Appendix 7.
2. "Report of the Gbmmission on Rating and Taxation1*. Printed(by authority) Norris Modern Press 9/3/1957. para.203.
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"none of them would provide ag adequate solution to the problems facing the Island."
They claimed the change to a single local authority was
"perhaps the only solution which will provide the Island with a system of local government likely to endure for many decades."
Since then very few of their recommendations have been implemented. 
Changes have been confined to the method of collecting rates - 
instalment payments, partial rating of properties vacant for more 
than six months etc. but twenty-six local authorities remain, a 
rate rebate scheme has not been introduced and few changes have 
been made in the assessment of rates. Local authority opposition 
to change was fierce. The Report commented on this saying:
"There is, no doubt, much complacency and resistance to new ideas among many of the witnesses with whom we discussed the problems involved in our inquiry. .This did not surprise us. It is, indeed, a universally observed fact that the urge for local government reform invariably comes from agove, never from the local authorities themselves."
This resistance was encountered also in later attempts at reform -
not least from rural MHKTs who see change as either a loss of
local autonomy or an increase in rates for their constituents
(e.g. if rate equalisation proposals were to be implemented).
A Private Members Bill introduced in the Legislative Council for
the purpose of constituting an independent local government
commission
"to do for the IOM what the Redcliffe-Maud and J^heatley Commissions had been asked to do for Britain."
This was rejected in 1969. Just over two years later a LGB motion
to replace the Island*s twenty-six local authorities with five
1. Ibid. Para. 155.
2. Ibid. Para. 203.
3. D.G. Kermode. Op Cit. P. 137.
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new authorities was decisively rejected by both branches of
Tynwald, while an attempt in 1976 to have a commission of inquiry
established was similarly rejected by both branches of Tynwald.
‘*1 n matters relating to local government, members of both chambers are clearly concerned lest they upset the local communities on whose support they depend or formerly depended for election.11
Recently, new attempts at reform have been made with the establish­
ment of the Select Committee on the Rating of Domestic Property in 
December 1978. Its First Interim Report in 1979 was a compromise 
view between members of the committee who favoured total abolition 
of domestic rates and those concerned to protect the interests of 
rural constituents. Newspaper comment suggested that the report 
was
2"a bland compromise of extreme views"
It recommended minor changes in the rating system e.g. removal of 
certain rating exemptions; a comprehensive revaluation and the 
abolition of the fire and highway rates. Its Chairman,
Victor Kneale MLC, immediately tabled a motion recommending a 
straightforward abolition of domestic rates in his capacity not as 
Chairman of the Committee but as an individual member. Though 
Tynwald accepted the motion it then referred the matter back to 
the Committee.. Hence action was again averted.
Meanwhile the furore in the local authorities was building up as
they saw the move as a
"major erosion of their authority and probably ^he first step towards doing away with them altogether."
They argued that small authorities preserved community spirit, that
1 . Ibid. P.138.
2. "Steps towards de-rating" Tynwald Commentator.IOM Examiner 17/10/80.
3. "Authorities oppose rates abolition" IOM Examiner 18/7/80.
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central financing would dispose of the incentive to keep 
spending down and that larger authorities would not necessarily 
mean greater efficiency.
As one senior civil servant explained,
**It is utopian to suggest radical change because of the political:.reaction. There is however an unquestionable need for local authority reform and the present trend o£ gradual attrition is useless and haphazard.**
1 . Interview with the author. 23/5/80.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter the object has been to provide a description of the 
various tiers and aspects of the Manx administrative system from 
the level of supra-national bodies to that of local government.
In the discussion, problems, attempts to solve them and the 
implementation of the solutions have been described.
The system is the product of a gradual evolution over a period of 
centuries and no radical review has really been made of it. The 
process of change in the system has, however, quickened during the 
past twenty years and is still continuing. These changes have 
mainly been on the side of expansion though calls are beginning 
to be made for reductions in the staffing levels and committees.
The weaknesses of the Manx administrative system are arguable but 
can perhaps be summarised as follows. First, it is resistant to 
radical change which could be said to mean that it is stagnant and 
antiquated, though some may say it is stable and enduring.
Secondly, some would argue it is in need of better co-ordination 
but others say it is better to rely on the close and informal 
relationships in the small community. Thirdly, its size creates 
problems of its own in that it cannot cope with large research or 
specialist units (thiswLll be further examined in Chapter 4) and 
it does not present itself to the outside world as a viable, 
national system of government.
Despite all these competing features the system has succeeded in 
its own terms as it has retained its precious stability. The reasons
for its development are less easily ascertained and these will be
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considered in the chapter on hybridity (Chapter 5). There it will 
be shown which features are closest to British local government 
and which to central government along with some analysis of why 
this is the case.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
THE PUBLIC SERVICE
INTRODUCTION
This chapter is concerned with the public servants of the IOM.
It will include reference to the characteristics of the public 
service; its career structure; pay and conditions of service; 
and the constraints on public servants for example, secrecy.
The term public service tends not to be in common use in the 
analysis of British public administration since it implies homo­
geneity throughout the administrative system. There, the almost 
discreet entities of the civil service, the local government 
service, the health service and other public sector organisations, 
are considered separately.^- In the IOM the large proportion of 
government services and functions are combined at one level and 
in one organisation - the Manx Government and the functions are 
implemented through an integrated body of cfficials - the Civil 
Service- The term the 'public service1 is hence a more appro­
priate term to use since the homogeneity it implies does in fact 
exist in Mann. Thus the focus will be primarily upon the personnel 
of the Manx Civil Service. This means the:
"persons appointed by the Civil Service Commission on behalf of the Government for wholetime service with any Department or any Board which service is wholly or mainly administrative, professional, technical or clerical"
1. Stanyer and Smith Op Cit. P.176.
2. IOM Civil Service Regulations. Introduction.
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It therefore includes the employees of the following Boards:
Agriculture and Fisheries
Airports
Assessment
Civil Defence
Education
Electricity
Forestry Mines and Lands 
Harbour
Health Services 
and Departments,
Government Office 
Treasury
Industrial Office 
General Registry 
Attorney General 
High Bailiff
Highway and Transport 
Local Government 
Museum 
Police
Social Security 
Tourist 
War Pensions 
Water and Gas
Clerk to the Justices 
Income Tax 
Public Analyst 
Clerk of Tynwald 
Probation and After Care 
Consumer Council
Thus bodies such as local authorities, certain of the commercial 
boards, the postal authority and private companies financed 
partly by Tynwald will not be considered in the main body of this 
chapter. They will, however, be discussed in a separate section 
at the end. The position of those in the direct employment of 
the Boards or government departments i.e manual workers and some 
professional employees such as teachers will also be explained. 
The information in this and the other early chapters will then 
provide the base for the analysis of the extent of hybridity of 
the Manx system in Chapter Five.
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THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SERVICE 
Size
In 1979 the IOM Civil Service employed 756 people in its administra­
tive, technical and clerical grades as listed in the introduction 
to this chapter. This does not include the employees of specific 
Boards or other public servants, for example, medical staff, local 
government officers etc. It is constantly asserted that all 
efforts must be concentrated into containing the size of the 
Civil Service. This is the stated aim of both politicians and
civil servants. The Civil Service Commission Annual Report1 for
1978 stated that
"before agreeing to any increase in staff, the Commission satisfies itself that the extra work generated by the adoption of new measures or by a growth in the duties of a Board or DepartmenJ, is incapable of being absorbed by the existing staff."
Despite efforts in this direction spurred on by the desire to
control public expenditure, the greater participation of
government in the affairs of a growing community has exercised,
and will continue to exercise, an influence on the numbers of
officers employed.
The growth of the service since its inception on the 11th April,1962 
has indeed been considerable. From 419 listed in the establishment 
of the Civil Service in the 1963 Report of the Commission there 
has been a rise to the figure in 1979 of 756 - quite a considerable 
increase.
1. Sixteenth Annual Report of the IOM Civil Service Commission for the year ended 31st December 1978.
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Structure
The nature of the Service has also changed markedly since its 
unification in 1962 with the development of professionalism and 
the increasing specialisation of functions as the years have passed.
The members of the Service are divided into those employed in the 
'General Service Classes', that is, administrative and clerical 
posts, and those in the 'Departmental Classes' with technical or 
specialist tasks to perform. Some examples of the latter are 
engineers, architects,veterinary officers and educational advisers. 
Though these are often senior positions, this is not exclusively the 
case and such positions as telephonists, a proof reader and store 
keepers are included amongst the Departmental Classes. They range 
throughout all Boards and Departments and all levels in the Service. 
Indeed the most senior generalist post in the ‘Service, that of 
Government Secretary, is a Departmental Class post. This enables 
the salary constraints of the General Service Class posts to be 
avoided in the case of the most senior officers.
Grading in the General Service Classes is as follows:
PrincipalAdministrative Officer, Grade 1 Administrative Officer, Grade 2 Executive Officer, Grade 1 Executive Officer, Grade 2 Senior Personal Secretaries Female Officer, Grade 1 Clerical Officer Personal Assistants Shorthand Typists Clerical Assistants Unestablished Officer
A restructuring of the salary scales relating to these posts has
recently been agreed and the changes will eliminate overlapping
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scales and the Female Officer, Grade 1 scale (which is a remnant 
from a former structure and of which there are only two 
individuals in the Service).
The Administrative Class, consisting of the Principal, Administra­
tive Officer 1 and Administrative Officer 2 grades is seen as the 
elite of the Service. It is
"mainly responsible for advising Boards of Tynwald on policy, i.e. on problems which arise in deciding the general lines on which governmental decisions are to be taken; on .new proposals which need to be put before Tynwald on how best to give effect to Tynwald's wishes.It is responsible also for dealing with difficulties which arise in carrying out existing policy and for forecasting the probable effects of new measures.In addition it has to assist Members of Tynwald in their parliamentary duties by the preparation of briefs and answers to parliamentary questions"
One person who is often, though not necessarily, a General Service
Class Officer, is designated Chief Executive Officer for each Board
or Department. He is also considered the Head of that Department.
The Executive Class Officers have primarily supervisory functions
and often head small sections and are the person to whom front-line
administrators, the Clerical Officers and Clerical Assistants, are
responsible.
Grading in the Departmental Classes is much less structured, each 
Board having different requirements and wishing to remunerate staff 
in accordance with their qualifications, experience and responsi” 
bilities. Thus there is not necessarily any similarity between, 
for example the engineers in the Water and Gas Authority and 
those in the Harbour Board.
1. IOM Civil Service Regulations.
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Certain individual officers at Ihevery most senior levels have 
similarities with officers in central and local government in 
Britain. The Government Treasurer, for example, is similar in 
function, status and pay to the local government Treasurers from 
whose ranks he is usually recruited. Similarly the Government 
Secretary as Head of the paid Civil Service and with important 
influence on senior appointments is in a position comparable with 
that of the Head of the Civil Service in Britain. Since the 
Government Secretary is not the major legal advisor nor head of a 
corporate planning team he cannot reasonably be compared with either 
the old-style local authority town clerk or the newer chief 
executive role.
These posts exist outside the normal grading structure partly in 
order to free them from the salary restraints of the grades and 
partly in order to attribute status commensurate with the responsi­
bilities of the positions.
The body centrally responsible for the operation of the public 
service and the general personnel activities is the IOM Civil 
Service Commission (CSC). This was constituted by the IOM Civil 
Service Act 1962 which also unified the Civil Service. The Act 
authorises the Civil Service Commission to make appointments, 
transfers and promotions in consultation with the Boards and 
Departments concerned. The CSC consists of a Chairman who is a 
Member of Tynwald and elected by Tynwald; two members of Tynwald, 
elected by Tynwald; one person appointed by the Governor; and the 
Government Secretary.
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The duties of the Commission are recruitment, training, the setting 
of establishment levels, consultation with Boards and with the 
Governor on personnel matters and anything else which Tynwald 
may direct. The Commission employs a secretariat of seven people 
including two Organisations and Methods Officers and persons 
responsible for pensions administration.
People in the Service
The sex distribution in the various grades of the Service is seen 
in the table below (as at January, 1981).
Males Females
Principal 7 0Administrative Officer 1 9 0Administrative Officer 2 18 0Executive Officer 1 37 5Executive Officer 2 60 12Senior Personal Secretaries 0 5Female Officer, 1 0 2Clerical Officer 88 108Personal Assistant 0 6Shorthand Typist 0 50Clerical Assistant 11 40Unestablished Officer 1
231
4
232
The upper tiers of the Service are, therefore dominated by males 
and the lower tiers fairly evenly divided with traditional women's 
jobs such as shorthand/typist posts being solely filled by women. 
There are at present no women in post above Executive Officer level 
in the General Service Classes and in the Departmental Classes 
none of the senior posts is held by a woman. Since the Administra­
tive Class is entirely male and given the definition of the functions 
of the Administrative Class described above, it follows that there 
are no female officers influencing policy in the Manx central 
government machinery.
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A second, and probably more important division is between the 
professional and technical personnel of the service. Professional 
individuals (rather than groups of people in the same profession) 
are now becoming increasingly evident in the Service and are 
playing an increasingly important part in its operation. The 
extent to which professionalism exists has grown and there are now 
members of the Departmental Classes in virtually every department. 
Their numbers vary from Board to Board e.g. the Board of Social 
Security (BOSS) which has functions in social work, employs no 
qualified social workers and has only one member of the Departmental 
Classes, a recently appointed *Training Officer1. In the Airports 
Board on the other hand there are forty-nine members of the 
Departmental Classes ranging from Air Traffic Controllers to 
Weather Forecasters. The differences in the extent of professio­
nalism in Boards is due not only to the degree of technicality 
of the services provided but to the perception the Department has 
of its work, the prestige of the relevant professions and the 
extent to which pressure is applied for qualified staff to be 
appointed. In the BOSS for example one senior civil servant said 
that their
nsocial workers would*t do a better ^ob than they do now just because they were trained11
At the other end of the scale there are some Departments where the
Chief Executive Officer and therefore Head of Department has been
the most senior Departmental Class officer e.g. the Director of the
Airports Board, the Water Engineer at the Water and Gas Authority
etc. It is still, however, the usual practice to designate the
1. Interview with senior civil servant 27th May 1980.
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most senior General Service Class officer as the Chief Executive 
Officer and this is usually the Board Secretary. He is then 
advised by and works in partnership with specialists who are often 
more highly paid than he is.
The generalist domination seen in the British Civil Service is 
reflected here, therefore, though the backgrounds and education of 
the generalists is markedly different. The Public School,
Oxbridge classics or history degree backgrounds of -the British 
stereo-type, challengeable though this may be, is in stark contrast 
to the educational backgrounds of Manx civil servants. Of the 
seventeen Administrative Class Officers questioned'*’, three had no 
qualifications whatsoever, eight had GCE *0* Levels in five or
/more subjects, one had a degree and four had completed some form 
of professional qualification. They had usually entered the 
service young and often straight from school. The average age 
of entry to the General Service Classes of the seventeen respondents 
was twenty years old. This figure is slightly higher than would 
be expected as it includes some who entered in the Departmental 
Classes and had transferred to the General Service later in their 
careers. The Administrative Class personnel have usually been 
b o m  in the Island (fourteen out of the seventeen in the sample 
had been) and have usually .lived there most of their lives perhaps 
with a short period of national service being their only time away.
Senior Departmental Class officers on the other hand show much 
more variable characteristics.. Some respondents had transferred
1. In a questionnaire sent by the author to 50 senior civilservants in both General Service and Departmental Classes.
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to the Departmental Classes from the General Service sector as 
a result of promotion to very senior generalist posts such as 
Direcror of Tourism. Excluding these twenty-eight senior 
Departmental Class officers were questioned. Their qualifications 
were as follows:
Degree plus professional qualifications 8
Degree 3
CCBs plus professional qualifications 10
GCE ’0* Levels only 2
No qualifications 1
Departmental Class personnel generally entered the service older 
(on average thirty-one years of age) after either some years in 
full-time education or in employment in the UK or both.
Though some Departmental Class officers were born in the Island, 
the majority are recruited from outside (nineteen out of twenty- 
eight questioned).
The difference between the backgrounds and education of General 
Service and Departmental Class officers appears not to have 
caused severe problems to the Service in terms of inter-personal 
relations. There are enough exceptions to the general pattern, 
e.g. transfer cases, for there to be an understanding of the role 
of each group.
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THE CIVIL SERVICE AS A CAREER
The factors acting as an incentive for people to join the Civil
Service are variable according to personality and the aims of
taking up such employment. It provides a stable and well-
remunerated working environment and compared with other fields of
employment in the IOM, it provides a relatively well-developed
career structure with opportunities, though restricted, for 
1advancement. The Civil Service provides these incentives to all 
recruits but to the Departmental Classes there are further 
attractions. A professional officer working, for example, in 
local government in the UK may be attracted to the IOM for its low 
taxation and pleasant social and physical environment and to the
IOM Civil Service for the chance to make an impression on a small
organisation. They are likely, in other words, to be big fish in 
a small pond. Other employees have a simple desire to remain in 
or return to the Island as their home and are prepared to accept
the reduced career opportunities this may imply.
It is asserted that the attractions for women are somewhat different,
which perhaps explains their different treatment for promotion
purposes. The majority of them, it is argued,
uare not looking for a career but for a means to supplement their husband*s earnings.1*
If this is the case it may explain their absence from the senior
grades as they do not see their employment as a career. This has
not been proved, however, and indeed no work has been done to
1. Interviews with 15 senior civil servants between January and October 1980.
2. Interview with senior civil servant. 8th April 1980.
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ascertain the motives of either sex in taking up employment in the 
service.
Work on the employment of women in the British Civil Service shows a 
similarly low level of promotion though efforts are being slowly 
made to develop the potential of women employees to the full.
This work does show, however, that married women’s perceptions 
of their role at work balanced with their role at home creates 
considerable pressures not faced by married men or single men , and 
women. It is impossible to prove either in the British or the 
Manx Civil Service whether the relative absence of women in the 
senior grades is due to the smaller number of women applicants 
but it is very evident that neither service is making the optimal 
use of the talents and services of their women members.^
The climate in which the individual civil servant works varies 
from Department to Department according to the size, leadership, 
degree of professionalism and nature of the work being performed. 
Each Department appears to develop a personality and since the 
Boards are still relatively autonomous, these characteristics are 
perpetuated e.g. the BOSS has a reputation as an unpleasant place 
to work being housed in cramped offices, requiring work with 
unpleasant aspects of government duties e.g. sickness and invalidity 
benefits, being restrained by rules and the requirement to treat
1. (a) M. Foggarty, A.J. Allen, Isobel Allen and Patricia WaltersuWomen in Top Jobs: Four Studies in Achievement11 Part II -Women in the Administrative Class in the Civil Service. Heinemann Educational Books. London 1981.(b) See also Elizabeth Brimelow - f,Women in the Civil Service1’. Public Administration. Autumn 1981. Vol. 59. P.313.
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members of the public equally under often difficult circumstances. 
The Department has, as a result, an austere and restrained 
atmosphere. The Treasury, on the other hand gives the impression 
of being dynamic with the rapid development of computer usage, 
large numbers of professional personnel and an aura of being central 
to the decision-making process.
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RECRUITMENT
Recruitment to the General. Service Glasses is to the Clerical 
grades only. No provision is made for entry to the higher 
classes irrespective of the qualifications of the candidate.
For appointment to an Established post a male or female candidate 
must
11 (a) be between 16 and 29 years of age (both ages inclusive) 
on the day of appointment;
(b) have passed the GCE examination in English Language and 
four other acceptable subjects at the *0’ (or *A*) level 
in not more than two examinations.
(c) be a natural born or naturalised British subject;
(d) must pass a medical examination.
There is an additional requirement for recruits to be either in 
possession of a work permit or to be exempt from needing one in
accordance with the Control of Employment Acts.
The requirement to be under twenty-nine causes problems for those 
who leave the service and wish to return after the age of twenty- 
nine. The rule, strictly applied, means they may only be 
recruited into the Clerical Assistant Class from which they may not 
then be promoted. It was argued that this discriminated against 
women who left the service to have a family and wished to return 
at the same grade and continue their careers. The regulations 
have been recently amended to permit this at the Commission*s 
direction:
"Provided that the age limit of 29 years shall not apply to a former female officer who voluntarily resigned from the service for family or domestic ^reasons acceptable to the Civil Service Commission.**
1. IOM Civil Service Regulations. Section B1.
2. IOM Civil Service Regulations Amendment to S.B1.
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The qualifications for entry to the Clerical Assistant Class are 
to be between 16 and 59 years of age plus GCE *0* (or 'A*) level 
in English Language. For Unestablished Officers no qualifications 
are required. These people have no real security in the organisa­
tion and are often taken on for temporary work. Some, however, 
join as an Unestablished Officer and progress by examination into 
the Established grades.
The policy of recruiting only to the clerical grades prevents 
older and better qualified candidates from applying. Thus the 
inability to enter at more senior levels deters graduates from 
entering at all since they feel their education to have been 
wasted. They could in fact have achieved more rapid promotion 
by joining at 16 years of age with 5 *0* level passes. The 
rationale behind the policy is to protect the promotion prospects 
of the staff recruited straight from school and to ensure that - 
there is an incentive for those people to join. In addition, 
over-qualification for posts is undesirable and can lead to dis­
content: graduates employed on work which makes insufficient
demands on them and gives no prospect for rapid advancement may 
soon look for employment elsewhere. In a small service with 
only 435 General Service Class posts, it is generally felt that 
the organisation cannot *carry* graduates in senior grades. In 
fact, senior officers are often worried at being challenged by 
young graduates for promotion.
Recruitment to the Departmental Classes is by public advertisement 
to specific posts. Those appointed can only serve in one Board 
or Department and cannot move within the Service unless they
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transfer to the General Service Classes. Where transfers do
occur, decisions are made as to their allowability on a purely
ad hoc basis and no conditions govern the moves. By advertising
in the UK the Commission has generally found no problem in
recruiting to its Departmental Class posts.
"No problems arose in the appointment of professional and technical officers, indeed the response to advertisements has been greater than in recent years ^ which has resulted in the exercise of a wider choice."
The recruitment of staff to the Departmental Classes from outside 
the Island has unpopular political connotations but the qualifica­
tions and training of those available for work in the IOM is not 
adequate to meet the inccreasingly complex needs of government.
The CSC has responsibility for all recruitment of civil servants 
whether clerical or professional though the Boards and Departments 
advise the Commission of their requirements in some detail. A 
Recruitment Sub-Committee consisting of the Chairman; the person 
appointed by the Governor and the Government Secretary, is 
responsible for interviewing and (subject to confirmation by the 
Commission) approving appointments to minor clerical, secretarial 
and technical posts. Other staff who are not members of the Civil 
Service are recruited by the Boards or Departments in question j 
though with written permission from the Commission.
The trends in recruitment over the years since the creation of the 
CSC have varied according to the economic fortunes of the Island.
In the early 1960*s some difficulties were experienced in recruit­
ing young people to the basic grades as the opportunities for 
further education in the UK grew and as the diversification of the
1. Sixteenth Annual Report of the IOM Civil Service Commission for the year ended 31 December 1978.
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Manx economy provided opportunities for jobs in other fields.
Later in the 60’s these difficulties were mainly confined to 
problems in recruiting qualified shorthand typists. Today there 
are always fewer vacancies than there are qualified applicants 
in all types of post.
The recruitment policies of the Manx Civil Service are based upon 
the necessity to ensure that Boards and Departments are adequately 
staffed in numbers and in grades. They try also to ensure that 
the opportunities for promotion in the service are not so bleak as 
to deter applicants. They are therefore practical and pragmatic 
policies. In the early 60*s when there were problems in 
recruitment, consideration was given to lowering the qualifications 
needed to apply and in 1971 a restructuring of the basic grades 
was made to ensure that shorthand typists could be recruited 
without their having to be qualified for the clerical classes, 
and to in addition ensure that
"men and women who possess the same academic standards and who are employed in the same kind of work should enjoy the same^rates of pay and the same opportunities for promotion"
There is in theory a policy of non-discrimination in recruitment 
between male and female candidates although in practice it is rare 
for males to be recruited to shorthand typist posts or for females 
to be recruited to technical posts. All such sex differences 
are a result as much of women’s perceptions of their role in 
society as of the Commission’s recruitment policies.
1. Ninth Annual Report of the IOM CSC for the year ended 31st December 1971. Para. 4.
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TRAINING
The history of training in the Manx Civil Service is simple to 
relate as it is and has always been minimal. Naturally, some 
members of the Departmental Classes are professionally trained but 
the vast majority acquired their qualifications prior to entry.
The main procedure is for a new recruit or individual transferred 
to a new post, to receive ’on the job* training or ’sitting next 
to Nellie* and its advocates believe that the only way to learn 
how to do civil service work is by doing it. This is also, to a 
large extent, the pattern in both British central and local^govern- 
ment. In the IOM it is still unquestioned as an efficient means 
of imparting the skills and information appropriate to the post.
It is also an efficient way of socialising the individual into 
the behaviour expected of a civil servant.
There was some training activity during the mid-60*s but since 
then even that has been discontinued. The first training 
through the CSC was in 1966 when courses were arranged in conjunc­
tion with UK professional bodies to run at the IOM College of 
Further Education leading to an ONC in engineering. This has 
continued virtually unbroken since that date. In 1967 mention 
was made in the CSC’s report that
"Through interviewing applicants the Commission is conscious that young people generally have only slight knowledge of the Island’s system of Government and how it operates, and that informa­tion on the subject js not imparted through the educational system."
1. Fourth Annual Report of the IOM Civil Service Commission for the year ended 31st December 1967. Para. 3.
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That year the Organisation and Methods Officer employed by the
CSC was designated the Civil Service Training Officer with a
view to organising suitable courses for new recruits and more
senior officers. As a result, three-day induction courses for
newly recruited staff were begun and were continued in the
following two years. They were
"directed towards explaining the constitution of the IOM, the function of Government as a whole and the responsibilities of the various Boards anijl Depart­ments and the role of the Civil Service."
These courses were
"deemed to serve a useful purpose and to^show promise for development in the future."
Since 1969, however, no induction courses have been held and
courses have not been introduced for more senior officers. A
pilot scheme was discussed for decision-making courses for
Executive Officers but these never came to fruition.
The present position is that officers can go to the UK on short 
courses e.g. for architectural technicians, Organisations and 
Methods Officers, superannuation administrators etc. In addition 
special leave can be granted for revision before examinations 
and grants and subsistence can be provided for certain approved 
courses. The onus is, however, very much upon the individual 
officer to request leave of absence, day release etc. for study. 
This is especially the case in the General Service Classes.
Two General Service Class Officers have now gained permission to
1. Fifth Annual Report of the IOM CSC for the year ended 31st December 1968 Para.8.
2. Fourth Annual Report. 1967.
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take block release for study in the UK. These were for courses 
leading to the qualifications of the Institute of Chartered 
Secretaries and Administrators.
In the lower General Service grades there exist several qualifying 
examinations for progression on a scale, for transfer from 
Unestablished to Established posts and for progression from Clerical 
Assistant to Clerical Officer classes. These consist of a 
written examination set by the UK Civil Service Commission and an 
interview with the IOM CSC. This gives opportunities for those 
entering without any qualifications to progress through the ranks. 
Clerical Officers must pass the Executive Officers examination 
in order to become eligible for the Executive Class. This exam­
ination is also in two parts as for the qualifying examinations 
in the lower grades. Certain qualifications are regarded as the 
equivalent to this and therefore their holders are exempts
Association of Chartered Accountants Corporation of SecretariesInstitute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators Institute of Chartered Accountants Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants Degree of a British University Diploma in Public Administration of a British University or University College Institute of Travel Agents
The numbers of officers taking the Executive Officer examination
each year averages at approximately thirty-one with roughly even
numbers of male and female candidates. The following table shows
pass rates. The pass mark was raised from 50% to 55% prior to
the 1976 examination which may partly account for the reduced
numbers of successful candidates. Officers may resit the
examination twice provided they obtain at least 40%.
- 150 -
Executive Class Examination
Year Male Female Total Male Female Totalcandidates candidates candidates passes passes passes
1969 26 4 30 13 3 16
1970 28 2 30 15 2 17
1971 20 4 24 11 2 13
1972 17 8 25 10 1 11
1973 18 11 29 13 4 17
1974 21 23 44 8 9 17
1975 19 16 35 33 9 22
1976 16 14 30 1 4 5
1977 17 16 33 5 3 8
1978 16 16 32 1 2 3
TOTAL 198 114 312 90 39 130
Averageper year 19.8 11.4 31.2 9.0 3.9 13.0
Source: IOM CSC Annual Reports 1963-1978.
The qualifying examination has changed (in 1980) to a test of 
psychological aptitude and capability.
As yet the CSC has not seen its role as being very much to do with 
training and has seen fit to place other items higher on their 
priority list. This is despite their claim that
uThe Commission is satisfied that their policy in encouraging civil servants to improve their educational and professional qualifications brings benefit not only to^the individual concerned but to the service as a whole.1*
With the present small staff of seven the Commission would have
difficulty in expanding this activity without an increase in
their own establishment. Hence the onus remains very much upon
the individual to campaign for the opportunity to study for further
1. Seventeenth Annual Report of the IOM CSC for the year ended 31st December 1979.
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examinations and indeed for their recognition within the service.
The feeling amongst politicians and civil servants on the question 
of training is that at present it is generally inadequate and 
further attention should be paid to teaching basic accounting 
language and procedure in the lower grades and an awareness of 
management practices in the senior grades. One civil servant 
argued that seminars attended by middle and senior level officials 
would help morale and boost the officers1 sense of identity with 
the organisation. Most do not feel that there should be a bias 
towards the study of the Manx system of government since
‘'clerical work is the same the world over and everyone in the IOM is so near the seat of Government that they^ know what is going on far more than in a big country.*'
There is a general feeling, however that training is of importance
and that higher standards of education help to broaden minds and
develop better understanding of the system's ramifications.
The present widely prevalent method of ‘desk training* could be 
improved with a wider use of full job descriptions explaining 
the responsibilities commensurate with the post. This, combined 
with an appreciation of the value of high educational standards 
and due regard for reaching those standards, would make the Civil 
Service both more attractive to well-qualified people and a more 
efficient organisation in itself. In the present economic climate 
Manx graduates are often forced to accept low grade posts whether 
or not they return to their home. They may therefore be more 
willing to return, as they have little to lose, in terms of career 
prospects by doing so.
1. Mr. Kewley. Isle of Man Government Officers Association.
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On the other hand a small organisation such as this has not the 
capacity to facilitate the absence from work of too many staff at 
one time and feels also that it cannot ‘carry* graduates with no 
work experience in senior positions. A compromise must be 
achieved to a problem which has faced many of the smaller local 
authorities in Britain for many years. Without the professional 
impetus for change, any development is likely to be slow and 
piecemeal. A reflectim of the inadequacy of the present system 
is the fact that the CSC holds no complete record of the qualifica­
tions held by its staff. Presumably it cannot, therefore, ;fully 
utilise their capabilities nor build upon them for future training.
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PROMOTION
“Nothing makes for staff unhappiness more than incompetence and unfairness in making promotions".
In addition to this equity aspect, an organisation should try to
ensure that the most appropriate personnel are appointed to each
level and this is in accord with the aims of the CSC to ensure that
Boards and Departments are adequately staffed in numbers and in
grades.
The basic criteria for promotion in the Manx Civil Service are 
said to be 'efficiency with seniority1. In an attempt to assess 
the first of these elements, the CSC on its creation, instigated 
a system of Annual Reports. These were to be called for from 
all Secretaries of Boards on all officers in the Civil Service 
under their authority. These were to be written on a pt^s- 
cribed form by officers immediately superior to those with whom 
the report was concerned. Any adverse report was to be communicated 
to the person concerned who would have an opportunity to comment upon 
it. The reports would be used in connection with promotion 
interviews along with a list of officers whom Secretaries of 
Boards and other Heads of Department recommended for early 
promotion.
The annual report system provides the only opportunity for review 
of performance which is in any way formalised. It is heavily 
reliant upon personal and subjective views though this may be 
unavoidable whatever the criteria for promotion used.
1. K.P. Poole “The Local Government Service in England and Wales". New Local Government Series. Allen and Unwin. 1978. P.61.
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The reports are not the only factor in the promotion 'game', 
however, and seniority does have a part to play. Credit is 
given to those who have many years service and obvious staying 
power. Young, disillusioned cynics in the Service often 
suggest that promotion is a reward for waiting for your turn in 
the queue and many keep their own records of the staff they know 
on the same level and their years of service and then predict the 
outcome of particular interviews. They are often successful in 
their predictions. This is perhaps particularly true of the 
promotion from Clerical to Executive Classes. Here the average 
time an ambitious Clerical Officer can expect to wait for an 
EO 2 post is approximately nine years. After this grade the 
length of stay in a particular grade shortens and promotion can 
come in just two or three years. The same criteria for promotion 
are employed in these senior grades though since these officers 
are better known to the Service, personality may become a more 
significant factor.
The degree of importance attached to seniority is almost impossible 
to assess. Some argue that it only becomes important when all 
other factors are equal, and others deny that it has anything like 
this degree of importance. The status accruing from long service 
is considered appropriate by many and in a good officer it will 
have led to a better understanding of the system itself.
A more sensitive suggestion is that criteria such as merit and 
seniority may take second place to personal relationships and 
family ties. As Poole.says;
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"Equity in promoting staff is difficult to achieve: those whose work brings them into contact with, and are attentive to, influential members and senior officers may find themselves at an advantage by comparison with colleagues who are reticenj or whose work does not bring them into prominence."
In addition to prominence at work, there is the factor, exacerbated 
by the intimacy of small communities, of personal and family 
relationships outside the organisation. Should the parents of a 
candidate be recognised as well-known 'pillars of the community* 
that candidate's acceptability to a panel may be increased.
Family background can also work to a candidate's disadvantage. 
Allegations still occur that candidates from certain areas of 
Douglas are discriminated against whilst others with more 
salubrious addresses are more keenly favoured. In a small 
community, particularistic norms are more likely to prevail than 
in a large one where ignorance of the family backgrounds of 
candidates for promotion protects against bias. Obviously, the 
comment 'it's not what you know but who you know* is not irrele­
vant in the British context but its comparative importance in 
Mann is inevitably greater due to isolation and smallness. This 
must apply also to the politicians' choices in promotion in the 
civil service. The extent to which this is akin to the pattern 
in, for example, Italy where politicians seek to build up support 
in the bureaucracy by appointing persons sharing their political 
beliefs or likely to work toward them, is very uncertain. Since 
the party system is undeveloped in the Island, and politics works 
on an issue by issue basis, it is difficult to predict the view of 
either politician or bureaucrat. Hence, it is more likely that
1. K.P. Poole Op Cit. P.61.
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politicians on the committee will promote those fitting closest 
to their stereotype of a good senior civil servant, rather than 
those with specific political views. In making these points on 
the criteria of promotion it may seem to be implied that merit 
and ability is not the primary one. It may partly be the case 
that the 'Peter Principle', to do with the promotion of an 
individual to the level of his own incompetence has a part to 
play here.^
Having considered the criteria for promotions we should look next 
at the actual process by which promotion procedure is conducted. 
The process is centralised in the Civil Service Commission for a 
very large proportion of the promotion decisions in the Service. 
The Commission has complete responsibility for first appointments 
but the appropriate Board or Department is invited to send a 
representative or information as to their requirements. In the 
case of Departmental Class promotions the relevant Board has 
slightly more autonomy, particularly at the highest levels where 
professional competence must be assessed.
There is some question over the process of promotion by interview 
at the CSC. Some argue that the latter is aquiring too much 
power on these lines and that Boards should retain effective 
responsibility for their own staff appointments. This may, of 
course be prompted by feelings of departmental loyalty. On the 
other hand the obvious importance of ensuring that a Board can 
assess the candidates' suitability must not be undermined. The 
centralisation of promotions provides uniformity and protects
1. L.J. Peter and R.Hull “The Pet:er Principle" Souvenir Press. 1969.
2. A view expressed by, amongst others, former MHK Peter Craine.
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against unfair or unequal treatment by different Boards but it 
must be balanced with a Board's desire to meet its own needs.
The Commission's consciousness of the doubt surrounding their 
role is perhaps reflected in their frequent acknowledgement of 
the co-operation of the Boards who still see the personnel function 
as their own responsibility.
The characteristics of the Service which result from the promotions 
policy can be said to be the following. The senior grades are 
dominated by reliable steady males who have completed lengthy 
service without causing embarrassment or concern to the organisa­
tion and who generally have middle-class backgrounds and no record 
of political or 'unacceptable'rpersonal behaviour.
The total absence of women in the senior grades could be due to 
many reasons such as their unwillingness to apply for the posts, 
their unsuitability for them in particualr cases, or their shorter 
service due to breaks during the child-bearing years. This 
relates also, however,to the policy of not promoting persons who 
entered or re-entered the service after the age of twenty-nine.
This inevitably affects women who leave to have children. and may 
not return until their early thirties. It does not, however 
explain why from a picture of Clerical Officer posts divided into 
88 held by men and 108 held by women there is such a dramatic 
change to one of 60 men to 12 women at the next more senior grade. 
Nor does it explain the absence of women in the Administrative 
Class. This is obviously more to do with attitudes of both men 
and women in the Service to women's role at work, in the family and 
in society. The intricacies of this issue could, however,
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constitute a whole book and it is, perhaps, best to leave it here.
Finally, the point must be made that movement does not only take 
place from one grade to another higher one but also on the same 
level. This sideways transfer is not discouraged in the Service 
and the Commission tries to consider the wishes of individuals 
who indicate a desire*to serve on the staff of a particular Board 
or Department. Despite accusations that this is simply a means 
of avoiding the more tedious aspects of government work, it does 
provide opportunities for variety for the staff involved. ,Thus 
by ensuring that the staff are in j o b s to which they are well 
suited, greater efficiency may be attained.
On the whole the method of promoting staff within the IOM Civil 
Service is considered a satisfactory one by the members of the 
organisation. Many are convinced that the system af annual reports 
ensures that merit is the most important criterion for advancement. 
Professional administration qualifications may come to play a more 
important part in this process as time goes by but as pointed out 
in the section on training the initiation to do this remains in 
the hands of the officers concerned.
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PAY AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE
The system of negotiation of pay and conditions of service in the 
IOM aims to achieve harmony through the Whitley process - 
centralised collective bargaining between representatives of 
employers and employees. The 'Official* or Employers Side of 
the IOM Whitley Council for the Public Services is made up of
1) A Chairman being a Member of Tynwald, appointed by the 
Governor
2) One MLC elected by Tynwald
3) Three MHK's elected by Tynwald
4) Two members without voting power: The Government Secretary 
and the Government Treasurer.
The Chairman and Secretary of the Official Side of the Whitley 
Council are common with those of the CSC with whom there is much 
overlap of functions.
The 'Staff* or Employees Side of the Whitley Council is entirely 
nominated by the IOM Government Officers Association (IOMGOA) 
which is the sole union for non-industrial civil servants and the 
Chairman and three Vice-Chairman always sit at Whitley Council 
meetings. In addition IOMGOA appoints two further members from 
its Executive according to the nature of the work in hand. The
Whitley Council deals with all matters concerning pay and
conditions in existing posts and the regrading of posts.
The IOMGDA was formed, under a different name, in 1920 and has
remained in existence in some form till today. It is the 
recognised trade union for all members of the Civil Service in 
both General Service and Departmental Classes. It has a broad
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Executive of seventeen members drawn from its total membership of 
approximately 600 people. It is the only recognised negotiating 
union for the members of the Civil Service though some professional 
employees retain links with their appropriate unions and 
professional bodies in the UK.
The IOMGDA is not affiliated to any particular union in the UK 
but maintains connections with many. There is no formal state­
ment of IOMGOA*s policy but it is broadly to achieve and maintain 
equivailent pay and conditions with British civil servants.
Hence, the substance of pay and conditions is largely the same as 
in the British Civil Service. For example, pension arrangements 
are exactly equivalent.
There must, however, be a conscious decision to implement UK 
agreements e.g. on pay increases and this is not a foregone 
conclusion. In practice, however, the Whitley Council always 
agrees to increases in pay and have never seen fit to set higher 
or lower pay increases. They prefer to follow the lead taken 
by the UK.
This linkage to British practices is embodied in terms a t pay in 
the system of analogues tying IOM Civil Service grades to 
equivalent posts in Briain for pay purposes.i
“The Official and Staff Sides of the Whitley Council have agreed in principle the desirability of equating 9°^cs: in the IOM Civil Service with posts jf comparable responsibility and scope in the UK."
1. IOM Civil Service Regulations. Part 9.
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Joint National Council for the Administrative, Professional, 
Technical and Clerical grades are adopted* Similarly in the case 
of persons employed outside the Civil Service or local government 
in Britain e.g. Air Traffic Controllers, the Whitley Council 
adopts the scales used by the appropriate negotiating body 
e.g. in that case the Civil Aviation Authority. Again these 
are negotiable and the point on the scale or scales depends on 
the responsibilities of the post. In general, though, they are 
adopted without much question.
In the case of new posts the CSC decides upon the appropriate 
grades and analogue for the position and need not consult with 
the Whitley Council or the IOMGOA who are concerned only with 
existing posts and existing personnel respectively.
The Whitley Council also has a role in the amendment of the Civil 
Service Regulations. These are only changed in accordance with 
agreements reached in Whitley Council. The Civil Service 
Regulations were consolidated in 1968 from a mass of circulars 
relating to the structure and conditions operating in the Civil 
Service. They apply only to members of the Civil Service itself 
and not to any staff employed by the Boards themselves or any other 
public servants. They cover such matters as the structure of 
the Civil Service and the functions of the grades; recruitment; 
training; behaviour of civil servants; negotiation of pay and 
conditions etc.
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The negotiations between the two sides of the Whitley Council aim 
to ensure that these items are broadly acceptable to the employees 
of the organisation and to incorporate suggestions for modification 
from either side. There are also occasional general discussions 
between the IOMGOA and the CSC e.g. in 1973
,rA very useful meeting was held with Staff Side representatives at which was discussed such matters as promotion prospects, in service training, recruitment, circularisation of vacancies, appointments to vacant posts and early retirement.1*
In conclusion, it can be said that the system of negotiating pay
and conditions of service is fairly simple and straightforward
and this is reflected in the speed of decision-making. This is
of course aided by the wholesale adoption of British salary
levels, a considerably simpler exercise than the negotiation of
entirely separate scales.
1. Eleventh Annual Report of the IOM CSC for the year ended 31st December 1973 Para. 9.- 164 -
CONSTRAINTS ON CIVIL SERVANTS
There are certain constraints acting upon civil servants in both 
their public and private lives as a result of employment in the 
government Service. There are three aspects to this, the first 
being that civil servants are required to sign a declaration to 
abide by the Official Secrets Acts.'1' The effect of this is that 
all information learned by civil servants in the course of their 
jobs cannot be discussed in any circumstance outside their job.
This is exactly the position obtaining in the British Civil 
Service and indeed it is the British Official Secrets legislation 
which applies to the IOM since it is a matter which is considered 
to * transcend the frontiers of the IOM*.
The impacts of secrecy are manifold including having implications 
for the anonymity of the Service. Manx civil servants are unlikely 
to be accused in the press of particular actions since anonymity is 
preserved to some extent by secrecy but if any criticism is made, 
a civil servant is unable by the same token to defend his or. her 
actions.
A second aspect of the constraints imposed on civil servants is 
embodied in the Civil Service Regulations. This is the require­
ment to be of general good behaviour in both public and private 
2life. In addition there are strict rules concerning interests 
in contracts with Government Departments and taking up part-time 
employment or other profitable ventures.
1 . Appendix 8 for both the declaration and the relevant section of the Official Secrets Acts 1911 and 1920.
2. See Appendix 9.
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A further constraint also imposed by the Civil Service Regulations 
is that upon political activity.'1' Civil servants may take part 
only in local and not national political activity and may not 
therefore, be involved in or stand for elections to the House of 
Keys but only for local commissioners.
The constraints are therefore quite considerable and the disciplinary 
action open to the authorities is likewise severe. The official 
position with relation to discipline is laid down in the rules of 
the CSC as follows:
"Any action requiring in the opinion of the Board or Officer in charge of the Department stronger discipli­nary action than reprimand, shall be reported to the Commission gho shall take such action as they deem 
necessary.”
The Commission’s scope for action is broad and includes the following: 
(a) Interviewing officers after an unsatisfactory annual report 
in order to request better performance in the future,
(b
(c
(d
(e
(f
(g
forfeiture of an increment,
reverting an officer to a lower grade on grounds of 
inefficiency,
suspension whilst accused of a criminal charge,
dismissal for conviction of criminal charges whether connected
or unconnected with work for the Service,
non-continuance of probationary posts,
*premature retirement in the public interest1.
1 . For details see Appendix 10.
2. First Annual Report of the IOM CSC for the year ended 31st December 1963.
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Examples of all these types of disciplinary action have been 
reported (without names) in the Commissions Annual Reports but 
they are, on the whole, isolated cases. The Reports do, however 
show that the Commission has the power (and uses it) to dismiss 
or take similar action where it considers this to be appropriate.
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OTHER ORGANISATIONS
There are approximately 4,000 public servants in the IOM the vast 
majority of whom agree to pay and conditions obtaining in their 
equivalent organisations in the UK. This is the case, for 
example, with police officers, firemen, nurses and many more.
There are slight variations in the methods of negotiation within 
the Island depending upon their degree of autonomy from government, 
the history of the service and the degree of unionisation amongst 
the employees.
Some organisations such as the local authorities come under the 
aegis of the Whitley Council for purposes of pay and conditions.
In the larger local authorities employees can be members of the 
National and Local Government Officers Association (NALGO) 
since this union negotiates on behalf of their equivalents in the 
UK. Once again rates of pay are linked, therefore, to UK scales. 
Similarly many hospital workers in the Island are members of the 
Confederation of Health Service Employees (COHSE) which is one of 
the fastest growing unions in the Island.
In the case of the commercial Boards, the Whitley Council also 
operates and maintains links with the appropriate UK unions.
Some Boards have very low unionisation levels and pay and 
conditions of service have not generally required a complex 
structure or lengthy processes of negotiation.
Public organisations often benefit very much from UK links and a
particularly obvious example of this is the IOM Postal Authority.
The majority of post office workers are members of the Transport
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and General Workers Union (TGWU) which is probably the most 
active of Manx unions, -with the possible exception of the Manx 
National Farmers Union which has more the characteristics of an 
employers1 association. The postal authority rarely suffers 
industrial action since its employees accept agreements made in 
England and they are implemented without disruption.
The major benefit of links to the UK machinery is that strike 
action is greatly reduced since many employees are prepared to 
wait for and accept agreements made in the UK. The IOM had, 
therefore, until very recently, a remarkably low strike record 
and even in recent years, activity has been relatively rare.
A response to the recent increase in union activity has been the 
creation of a Committee of the Board of Social Security to 
concern itself with matters of industrial relations. They have 
duties such as recognising trade disputes (in both public and 
private organisations) and appointing an arbitrator in the case of 
severe disputes.
The IOM National Transport dispute of 1980 displayed many of the 
features of the negotiating system and highlighted the problems 
with it. The low level of union activity has left the authorities 
unprepared when disputes do occur. Disruption to public services 
as witnessed in the National Transport dispute may in future 
result in the development of more complex negotiating machinery.
- 169 -
CONCLUSION
There are two major points which energe from this chapter which 
help to explain the whole process of negotiation and indeed the 
substance of pay and conditions both within and outside the Civil 
Service in the IOM. The first is that there is a very low level 
of interest and activity with relation to all these matters. Thus 
union membership is low outside the Civil Service and the majority 
of employees are prepared to accept the pay and conditions 
negotiated in the UK on their behalf. This is associated* in the 
Civil Service case with the idea that the British Civil Service 
is !the best in the world* and therefore imitation will ensure 
the best for Mann too.
This leads generally to an unquestioning attitude and explains 
why possible anomalies such as whether grades in the UK are 
equivalent in terms of responsibilities and duties, are not 
investigated. Another example is the matter of secrecy.
Certainly the more 'successful* civil servants accept the 
Official Secrets requirements as almost second nature. They do 
not see them as a consitraint upon their wo rk or upon their lives.
There is one aspect of personnel policy which is not a result of 
this imitation of the UK and that is the particularism of recruit­
ment and promotion policy. This is far more to do with the
influence of smallness as discussed in Chapter 2.
Second, both of the above features; unquestioning imitation of 
British practice and unquestioning reliance on particularism, 
are a result of a low level of education in politics, public
- 170 -
administration and the social sciences generally and the particular 
absence of any study of the Manx system of Government in the light 
of those disciplines. It could be suggested that this is a 
deliberate policy which prevents the questioning of decisions 
since a lack of understanding makes criticism difficult. This 
would be reinforced by the virtual absence of graduates from the 
Service or of people educated in political concepts or practices 
through any other means. These people may disturb long-held 
beliefs and damage the easy stability of the Service. They may, 
in other words, *rock the boat* or at least be dissatisfied;with : 
their own position in it.
The extent to which policies are a result of either motive is 
immeasurable but both elements certainly exist in different 
degrees of importance amongst senior civil servants and politicians.
This and the previous chapter have tried to prepare the ground 
for a careful analysis of whether and why the Manx administrative 
system is a hybrid of British central and local administration 
which will form the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
HYBRIDITY
INTRODUCTION
Prior to discussing both the concept of hybridity, and the 
manifestations, it is necessary to develop the logic which 
preceeds the concept. The progressinn of thought which leads 
to this idea has its roots in the writing on comparative adminis­
tration and development administration (to the extent that these
can be seen as separate disciplines). These grew in their1turn
1 2out of discussions of political development by Pye , Huntington ,
3 4Almond and Coleman , Apter and many more.
The first point in the argument is that it is very difficult to 
impose administrative structures without taking account of pre­
existing conditions. The social, economic, demographic and 
cultural characteristics of "developing", "transitional11 or
"prismatic" societies are adopted and incorporated within new
5 ,structures. Riggs (who uses the term "prismatic") writes;
"It is easier to adopt by fiat or law a formal organisational structure with manifest adminis- trative function than it is to ^Institute corresponding social behaviour"
1. Lucien Pye. "Aspects of Political Development" Little, Brown Series in Comparative Politics 1966
2. Samuel Huntington. "Political Order in Changing Societies"Yale University Press 1968.
3. Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (eds) "The Politics of Developing Areas" Princeton University Press 1970.
4. David Apter "The Politics of Modernization" Phoenic Books Chicago University Press, 1967.
5. Fred Riggs "Administration in Developing Countries: The Theoryof the Prismatic Society1*. Houghton Mifflin Co. Boston 1964.
6 . Ibid. P.34. - 173 -
Though the terms "under-developed", "non-Western" and "third world" 
cannot correspond to the economic or even the political situation 
in the Isle of Man, certain features of what have been termed 
"transitional" societies are not inappropriate in the Manx context. 
A major feature of transitional societies is the mixture of old 
and new practices, of modern ideas superimposed upon traditional 
ones and the evidence of preceeding chapters substantially proves 
this to be the case in Mann. These show traditional traits of 
particularism, parochialism and resistance to change, overlaid by 
modern ideas of progression by merit, democratic accountability, 
universality in the treatment of clients etc. Hence the following 
comments pertaining to transitional societies can be seen as 
relevant in Mann and must not be ignored simply because they were 
intended to relate to societies of a far less complex economic 
order.
"there can be no reason for supposing .......that aprinciple of public administration has equal validity in every nation-state, or that successful public administration practices in one country will necessarily prove successful in a different social, economic and political environment. A particular nation-state embodies the results of many historical episodes, traumas, failures and successes which have in turn created peculiar habits, mores, institutionalised patterns of behaviour, Weltanchaungen and even 
1national'psychologies1. One cannot assume that public administration can escape the effects of this conditioning; or that it is somehow independent of and isolated fjom the culture or social setting in which it develops".
Thus it is pointless to assume that principles which have come to 
be accepted in British public administration, either at local or 
central level, are either 'right1 or universally appropriate and 
hence appropriate to the Isle of Man.
1. Robert A. Dahl. "The Science of Public Administration" Public Administration Review, Winter, 1947 PP. 7-8.
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Since this premise is so relevant, the subsequent discussion by 
the comparative administration authors formerly cited is also 
relevant; that is that as a result of the significance of the 
environment of an administrative system, the study of public 
administration must be interdisciplinary. It must either learn 
from the works of economists, historians, anthropologists and 
sociologists or seek to have a less institution oriented and 
more ecological approach^" to the understanding of public adminis­
tration. Thus chapters 2,3 and 4 of this work have aimed to 
provide a broad profile of the bureaucracy covering as they do the 
administrative institutions themselves, effective patterns of 
personnel management, value systems of administrators, decision­
making processes, and communications. This, combined with other
2work on the Manx political culture in general serves to give a more 
complete understanding of this particular administrative structure 
in its environmental context.
Thus our understanding of the totality of the Manx system enables 
us to explain why it is not a mirror image of the British one.
It is, in practice, a hybrid form of administration, the term being 
borrowed from the biological discipline of genetics and meaning 
"the offspring of parents of two different species". Thus a 
hybrid form of administration could be said to be a new form 
having characteristics of both of two other forms and therefore 
displaying a combination of features unique to that system.
1. Since ecology is the study of life in its environment, an ecological approach to public administration examines the environmental influences upon the bureaucracy.
2. Dr. J. Richards "Politics in Small Independent Communities;Isle of Man, Malta and Faroe". Unpublished PhD thesis. 1979.
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The characteristics of hybridity then could be said to be the 
existence of features seen in two other systems; conscious or 
unconscious imitation of the two other systems; and a constantly 
altering combination of features from the two systems and from 
internal responses to problems. It may be a descriptive or 
prescriptive concept though in the Manx sense since selective ~ .
imitation is usually considered to be of central .government, then 
it is more likely to be descriptive. The model is certainly not 
propounded as a way to tackle new problems. In other words both 
central and local government in Britain are not rationally c.pn-_ 
sidered to see which is the most relevant to a particular problem.
The Manx system displays a unique combination of features from 
central and local government in Britain and its own response to 
need. So it is not simply that features of both systems are 
present that is important but that the way they are combined 
within a different sccdo-cultural environment has produced a 
divergent and unique expression of the principles existing in the 
two parent systems.
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HOW IS HYBRIDITY DISPLAYED IN MANN?
Hybridity is displayed in numerous ways throughout the Manx system 
and always it is affected by the conflict between traditional and 
modern values in the society. ‘ Many examples of this can be seen 
in the preceeding chapters and there are more that have not been 
covered there. It is, however, possible to identify three major 
headings-under which illustrations can be placed. These are 
firstly, the allocation of functions in the system; secondly, the 
attitudes of the actors in the processes of making and implementing 
policy; and thirdly the procedure adopted for the making and 
implementing of policy.
Allocation of Functions
The present allocation of functions has developed on a piecemeal
basis and has features of both central and local systems in Britain1 .
Looking at the local authority similarities first, we can see that
there is much more similarity between the Manx Board system and a
local authority committee system than to the central ministerial 
2pattern . The traditional vertical, pattern of an elected body 
heading an appointed department is seen in both systems though 
there is the difference that a Tynwald Board has considerably more 
autonomy.
1. For detailed descriptions of these features in the IOM please see references to Chapters 3 and 4.
2. See Chapter 3 P.90.
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Secondly as in British local authorities the supreme body, in the
Manx case Tynwald, does not confine itself to the rule-making
function. It in fact makes executive decisions though it is
primarily a legislature and is responsible for the overall
1financial control and direction of government policy.
Thirdly, all members of Tynwald are members of at least one Board
2(therefore every member forms part of the government) . Simi­
larly all members of local authorities are members of one or more 
Committee. As a result, when they are not speaking on behalf of 
their Board or Committee, both Tynwald members and Councillors 
perform a similar 'backbench* role. They act as a form of 
opposition to the Board/Committee under scrutiny and this is • 
similar to some UK authorities where parties are not present.
The development of political parties in British local government 
has inevitably changed the basis of voting allegiance from 
issue-by-issue decisions to party loyalty. On the whole, however, 
the similarity of the Manx system is greater with local authorities 
than with Westminster where most members hold no government office 
at all.
Fourthly the role of the Chairman of a local authority committee
3is similar to that of a Board Chairman. He is a focus for the 
questions to full body through which process the Board or 
Committee he represents is made accountable. He has similar 
powers relating to his control over the subordinate body itself 
and a similar degree of latitude for individual action between
1. See Chapter 3. P. 8 6 .
2. See Chapter 3.P. 84.
3. See Chapter 3 P. 85. - 178 -
meetings. In some senses though, the role is different. The 
Boards of Tynwald, as has been mentioned, have greater autonomy 
from the parent body than do local authority committees. Thus 
the Chairman's power is to a degree correspondingly greater also.
In addition as the number of Boards grows, and yet the body of 
Members of Tynwald does not, it has become necessary for most 
members to sit on several Boards and to share their time between 
them. As a result the Chairman tends to acquire greater power 
since he is most au fait with all the matters facing the Board.
His role, therefore, is becoming somewhat more ministerial.
At the officer level, that is in the Manx Civil Service, 
similarities exist to the officer hierarchy of a British local 
authority. For example, the degree of specialism and differentia­
tion of functions in a small local authority is likely to be very 
similar to that in the Manx Civil Service. In other words, it is
unlikely that an officer in either place would be responsible for 
a very specific area of policy implementation. He is more likely 
to have a wide range of responsibilities governed by several 
different pieces of legislation and policy direction depending 
largely upon the particular field in which he works.
A second similarity at officer level is that the allocation of 
functions to newly introduced professional personnel in the IOM 
is following patterns set up in British local government.1 
Though these have been introduced later and in a somewhat different 
order, their functions are now similar and becoming increasingly so.
1. See Chapter 4. P.136.
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On the other hand, there are many functions performed through 
Tynwald and the Boards, i.e. at the central level of Manx public 
administration, which are also performed at the central level in 
Britain.1 In this sense Tynwald constitutes a central government. 
The most obvious examples of overtly central functions performed 
by Tynwald are the collection and distribution of taxes and the 
monitoring and control of the economy. In addition, external 
relations, plainly a central government role, is performed by 
Tynwald.
There is a further way in which the two central governments are
similar and that is in the names and titles given to various
offices in the IOM which are thought to perform a similar function.
In many cases, the actual functions have been gradually changed in
2either country, e.g. the Speaker of the House of Keys. Other 
examples are to be found amongst the names of the Boards which are 
often the same as those of former ministries in the British govern­
ment e.g. Social Security, Health and Local Government. At the 
Civil Service level the grades also bear similar titles i.e. 
Clerical, Executive, Administrative and Principal grades and are
3divided similarly into General Service and Departmental Classes.
So., there is a unique combination of features; a hybrid combina­
tion, which results in such divergent factors as the performance 
of functions associated with local government in Britain by 
central government whilst an inefficient and antiquated system of
1. See Chapter 3 . P. 77.
2. See Chapter 3. P. 88
3. See Chapter 4. P. 134.
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local government persists by its Side. In addition, the small 
size of the Island and its population results in functions 
performed by quangos in Britain being a part of Tynwald's 
responsibilities. On the whole this unique hybrid form bears 
more resemblance to local authorities than to central government 
in the UK but as will be seen in the second aspect of hybridity, 
the attitudes of the actors in the process, there are other ways 
in which the Manx system bears a greater resemblance to central 
government.
Attitudes of the actors in the process
In Chapter 2 much was said of the 'civil service mentality'1
prevailing amongst Manx officials but this central government
emphasis is not a feature only of the Civil Service. Both
politicians and officials involved in Manx public administration
through Tynwald, its Boards and the Civil Service, are very
conscious of the importance of presenting to the 'outside world*
the image of a 'national' government. Some admitedly, are more
aware of this than others, in particular those calling themselves
nationalists, but if any Manx politician or official is asked to
compare Mann with Britain he will always look straight to
Westminster and Whitehall before he speaks of similarities at the 
2local level. In recent years this has resulted in active 
membership of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association which is 
concerned with the promotion of understanding between members of 
the national legislatures of commonwealth countries. Overtly, at
1. See Chapter 2. P. 46.
2. Evidence from interviews with Manx politicians and. senior civil servants.
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least, there is a much greater affinity with central than with 
local government in Britain.
This desire to protray the image of a.national government conflicts 
with the inferiority complex explained in Chapter 2,^ which leads 
to an acceptance of low level contact with the UK government on 
matters affecting both or affecting the relationship between them 
and, perhaps more importantly, an imitation of central government 
methods.
On more specific items, however, certain attitudes prevalent in 
British local government are present in Mann and with the changes 
that are gradually being made to bring the Manx system more up-to- 
date these are increasing. The first concerns the attitudes of 
members. As in local government, the elected members in Tynwald 
are often concerned with the detail of administration rather than 
with the broad issues of policy. This is a result of the same 
underestimation of elected members by both officers and the society 
at large. In addition it is a result of the members* perception 
of themselves as managers rather than politicians.
Secondly, it is noticeable that with the growth of the professions
in the IOM Civil Service attitudes are gradually being absorbed
2from British local government. Inevitably as recruitment to 
professional posts is from UK local government due to the local 
authority-like nature of the functions to be performed, the 
personnel will bring professional loyalties and conditioning with 
them. They will begin to influence Manx affairs along the lines
1. See Chapter 2. P .  47.
2. See Chapter 4. P. 138 _ 132 _
they have learnt in local government in the UK and their attitudes 
to their own function, to their place in the organisation and to 
the organisation in general will have been imported from their 
former place of employment.
Apart from this small (though increasing) number of personnel, 
however, the attitudes of civil servants and politicians to their 
work have their roots in their understanding of the way the British 
central government system works. This explains their attitude to 
the anonymity of the Civil Service (though they accept its ■= 
inpracticality in a small community), secrecy in government, the 
relationship between appointed officials and elected members and 
many more attitudes they hold.
It is an over-simplification to say that all participants in the 
policy process have the above attitudes but there is a remarkable 
degree of homogeneity as discussed in the Chapter on the Manx 
administrative culture.^
Procedure
It is in this area that wholesale imitation of British practice 
is likely to be difficult since the procedure adopted will depend 
upon the principles by which the system operates. These 
principles conflict greatly in Mann due to the persistence of 
traditional values whilst modern ones become accepted. Thus the 
general methods of operation of the Manx system are a miscellany 
of old and new. There is still some reliance on the treatment of
1. See Chapter 2. P.5S ^
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the individual according to who he is rather than treating every 
case according to a set of strictly defined rules from which the 
official rarely deviates. This is, of course, a generalisation 
and allegations are often made of partiality in both British 
central and local government. The point to be made here is that 
in a small community the degree of interlinking between people 
is greater and hence impartiality is more difficult to maintain.
Due to the small number of clients handled cases are not always 
determined by precedent. For example in discretionary social 
services benefits, there may be very few applicants and each 
case is then decided on its merits. Similarly the Local Govern­
ment Board’s system of allocation, of housing is based upion a 
fairly irrational set of criteria whereas in a large British 
local authority handling many properties and applicants, points 
systems have been developed to cope with the data and ensure 
fairer treatment.
Thus,each case must be considered individually. Even in the 
administration of government policies which affect virtually the 
whole population, there is a prevalence of personalised value 
premises. Even today after large scale immigration, there is a 
considerable inter-linking of the population through family and 
business ties. This will influence the civil servants (since 
they are members of that network of linkages), in the treatment of, 
for example, tax repayment cases. This is also the case in the 
personnel methods of the Civil Service as was explained in Chapter
4.^ Precedent alone will not ensure universalism, nor does 
individual consideration necessarily imply particularism but it is
1. See Chapter 4 sections on recruitment and promotion.
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likely that these factors are linked. Without citing particular 
cases and naming names (a job for an ombudsman, perhaps) it is 
impossible to substantiate the allegations anyway.
Due to the absence of procedural safeguards, the role of the 
individual participant in the administrative process becomes 
significantly greater. Individual civil servants' attitudes at 
even the lowest levels become very important, especially for the 
member of public on the receiving end of their decisions. Where 
procedural complexity does exist it can be a device for increasing 
the autonomy of officers. Those who know the system can work it 
to their advantage whilst those who don’t must accept the verdict of 
those who do. It has been said that those who implement policy 
are the real policy-makers since through their interpretation of 
directions from further up the hierarchy, they determine the effect­
iveness of policies in achieving their original intentions."*" In 
a small hierarchy such as that of the IOM Civil Service, the degree 
of delegation to the lowest possible levels is maximised and thus 
lower ranking officials have even greater influence on policy 
through their interpretation and implementation of it.
It is easier for a society to adopt a formal law or structure than
it is to institutionalise corresponding social behaviour. In the
IOM where change has been gradual and voluntary, institutions have
often been accepted but without the associated commitment to their
effectiveness. This could be said, for example, of the Executive 
2Council. The Manx have had time to absorb the new structure and
1. M.J. Hill ’’Front-Line Administrators: Policy Implementors orthe Real Policy Makers?” Paper given to the Royal Institute of Public Administration Conference, Brighton, April, 1981.
2. See Chapter 3. P. 8 6 . - 185 -
to be selective in their adoption of them. Thus they have been 
able to retain their former value systems relatively unchallenged. 
As a result, though formally the structure has progressed, the 
procedure for its operation remains personalised, rule-free, and
particularistic in its implementation.£
Hybridity is, therefore displayed most in the allocation of 
functions (where there are strong similarities with British local 
government) and in the attitudes of politicians and senior civil 
servants (where the similarities to and affinity with central 
government is stronger than with local). Hybridity is somewhat 
less relevant to the aspect of procedure although methods have 
been adopted from both systems. It has more to do with the con­
sequence of small size and the consequent particularism of the 
treatment of members of the public.
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WHY HYBRIDITY?
Given that the Manx administrative system is not an exact mirror 
image of either local or central government in the UK, it is 
important to ask why? Why has it developed this unique hybrid 
combination? It is possible to identify three major influences 
on the development of the hybrid system: firstly size; secondly,
British practice; and thirdly the historical development of 
Tynwald.
The size of the Island and its population has many ramifications 
which have led to the development of a hybrid form of administra­
tion. The most obvious is that inefficiency would result were 
many of the traditionally local government functions performed 
through local units. At the central level smallness is also 
important as one Board will deal with a wide range of functions 
and the specialisation of personnel's roles is of a low order.^ 
Thus there develops a hybrid situation where many functions both 
central and local are performed by the same organisation but with 
a unique solution to the problems of efficiency that are posed by 
size.
The second influence, that of British practice is all pervading 
but can be summarised in the phrase selective-imitation. Thus 
features are borrowed from both levels in the UK. The reasons 
for this have been explained in full in Chapter 2.
They can, however, be summarised by the following. Due to the 
regard in which the British Civil Service is held, there, has
1. See Chapter 1, P . " a n d  Chapter 2, P.5&>.
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developed both a psychology of dependence and a habit, as a result, 
of selective imitation of their structure and practices. Due, 
however, to the inevitable similarities in size and function with 
British local government, the Service has been forced to borrow 
aspects of their behaviour especially through the importation of 
professionals from the local authorities.
This is, however, tempered by the need to meet specific require­
ments which may arise at a different time, on a smaller scale and 
in a different form than they do in Britain. The Manx system 
must then develop entirely distinctive solutions suited to the 
capabilities of its personnel and the resources available to 
solve the problems. Thus as Tynwald’s historical development 
progressed, new Boards and Departments and new associated procedures 
were developed to meet those local needs. One example of such an 
autonomous attempt to solve problem facing the system is the 
growth of the Treasury in the Island as the tax haven policy came 
into operation and grew in significance. This had impacts all 
throughout the economy which produced an immediate response by the 
creation of the Treasury, the establishment of new units within it, 
such as a Policy Unit, Economics and Statistics Department, and a 
Computer Unit to handle the increased income and administration of 
that income in the newly prosperous climate. This in its turn led 
to the creation of an Industries Board capable of offering very 
desirable incentives for investment in the Island. Thus the 
Island could, as a result of entirely internal factors, create new 
structures and policies without imitation of British practice.
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It seems pertinent to discuss the comments made by F.W. Riggs in 
this context in relation to what he calls ‘prismatic societies 
He distinguishes between the processes of innovation and adoption® 
Those societies which transform themselves largely through innova­
tion motivated from within or through endogenous forces could be 
said to be endo-prismatic and those changing in response to 
external pressure'as exo-prismatic. Riggs argues that most 
prismatic societies are exo-prismatic though there is here a 
certain question of degree. Between these two extremes is a 
continuum upon which each society lies. In the case of the IOM, 
an adoptive society, this place would be towards the exo-prismatic 
extreme. However, since the imitation has been selective, one 
could argue that the endogenous forces are strong. Thus the IOM 
has been able to respond to the challenges of the British example 
by transforming its own structures enough to enable it to main­
tain its political independence, that is, to permit its own elite 
to guide the processes of change. Thus there has been the selec­
tion of some local and central features which have been internalised 
to the existing structure of relatively traditional beliefs.
That the system as a whole appears hybrid is very evident and 
explicable as a combination of the three factors of size, selective 
imitation of British practice, and autonomous responses to needs.
On a more specific level, however, different aspects of the system 
are hybrid in themselves (as shown in Part 2 of this Chapter) 
and this may be for a different reason in each case. To take
1. F.W. Riggs. Op Cit. P.38.
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three examples; first the Board system began as an entirely 
autonomous response to a desire to share power in Tynwald but as 
time went on and pressure grew a. more ministerial pattern began 
to emerge. This was not a conscious choice but sub-consciously, 
Tynwald members and the public now identify the Chairman of a 
Board as the person responsible for that function in the same way 
as British ministers personify their department.'1' Hence this 
aspect of the allocation of functions can be seen as having simi­
larities with both the central and 3ocal levels in the UK, but it 
is an entirely autonomous response to needs which has produced 
this feature.
A second example of certain aspects of the system being hybrid 
in themselves is that of the use of specialists in the service.
The Manx Civil Service imitated the British one in this respect 
and generalists dominated senior posts. However, as functions 
increased and services became increasingly complex and technical, 
it was found necessary to import professionals from British 
local government. Hence the system now appears to have elements 
of both British central and local government but here it is the 
result of conscious selective imitation.
Finally a third aspect which displays hybridity is in the distribu­
tion of functions. In this case the obvious reason is size but 
it is combined with the inefficiency of the small local authorities 
so that central government has' had to take on many of the functions 
simply by default. So this hybrid feature has developed as a
1. (a) “Square peg in a round hole” IOM Times 22/1/80.
(b) ,rWhoys the Manx King Solomon? IOM Examiner. 7/8/81.
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combination of the size factor and an autonomous response to need.
So, from these three examples it is evident that not only is the 
system as a whole a hybrid but also specific aspects of it are 
hybrid and for any of the three reasons identified. It is 
important to note, however, that this reading of the situation 
from a social scientist * s point of view looking in on the system 
from outside, differs entirely from the participants1 own percep­
tions. Even the selective-imitation itself is not an entirely 
conscious act and the way the Manx system has developed has been 
as a delicate and complex balancing of competing influences over 
a long period. Though many are aware that Manx public administra­
tion is a bit like local government and a bit like central govern­
ment and each person places a different emphasis on one or the 
other, they do not see the process as a deliberate attempt to 
acquire the best from both systems. They have simply, through 
piecemeal, incremental development, produced a system best suited 
to the needs of the moment within the limitations of political 
possibility. Similarly, like all systems, it displays many of the 
characteristics of the Weberian ideal-type bureaucracy but is not 
consciously aiming to achieve it. Its actors may well be unaware 
that it is the more traditional beliefs still existant there which 
are resulting in departures from the model and in the development 
of a hybrid pattern.
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HYBRIDITY: A TRANSFERABLE CONCEPT?
The concept o f hybridity as described in relation to the IOM would 
be a useful one to bear in mind in the study of the administrative 
and political systems of other societies. For it to have any real 
relevance, however, there must be at least some conditions prevail­
ing which have a similarity to those in Mann.
The first of these characteristics must be smallness. Since this
will almost inevitably produce a situation where what are normally 
considered (at least in Britain) to be local functions tend in 
practice to be performed by central institutions. It is possible, 
however, that a larger central government could be a hybrid of two 
other systems whilst local government existed alongside it. In 
other words, hybridity could be displayed in other ways than by the 
allocation of functions to central institutions. It could, there­
fore, apply to both large and small states.
There is, however, a further condition which is vital to the 
relevance of the concept of hybridity to the- administrative 
systems of other countries and that is the existence of two other 
systems having a close association with the society in question. 
This need not necessarily be a local and a central system as is the 
case in the IOM but may be the central systems of two entirely 
separate countries. This could, for example, be the case in 
Andorra (having also the small size factor) with its dual co-lords 
of France and Spain.’1'
1. “Opening Pandorra1s Box in ~the Pyrennees” Eve-Ann Prentice, The Guardian. 21/4/81. P.9.
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Hybridity may be a feature not only of whole administrative systems 
but of elements of systems. For example a society could adopt a 
combination of the features of two other systems in the way it 
decentralises power. It is conceivable that attitudes are a 
combination of several influences, blended in a unique form to 
accord with the particular cultural environment of that society.
Therefore, although certain conditions must prevail in order for 
hybridity to be a transferable concept, it is evident that its 
applications could be numerous. On the whole, however, hybridity 
has emerged in the Manx case in unusual circumstances and the 
likelihood of these being repeated in other systems in all their 
complexity is remote or even impossible.
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ECLECTICISM: A UNIVERSAL CONCEPT?
To make the idea of hybridity a lot broader may make its application
to other systems more relevant. The pertinence of the suggestion
that system builders are eclectic in their approach is at first
sight greatest in the developing or transitional societies and
there has been much written on this applying to various different
countries. Many third world countries have borrowed freely from
countries in the West to build up a unique blend of characteristics
suited to their own political system. James Mosel on Thai
administrative behaviour provides one example:
“Its administrative system is an unusual blend of self-selected adaptations from the West and a long­standing indigenous tradition, which in turn contains numerous adaptations fjom ancient Indian and Khmer (Cambodian) sources*'.
This concept has its relevance also for the more advanced adminis­
trative systems of the Western world. A most obvious example 
is Britain's imitation of the Scandinavian ombudsman. Another is 
the USA's development of freedom of information legislation from 
the same source. Even these two major Western imperial nations 
are open to influences from other countries.
Not only is this concept universally relevant in a descriptive 
sense but it could also be presented as a prescription for adminis­
trative development in all nations. When problems in the imple­
mentation of government policy, or in its formation, became evident, 
structure builders could benefit from the example of other 
countries where solutions to similar problems have been success­
fully implemented. Lepawsky recommended this most strongly in
1. James N. Mosel “Thai Administrative Behaviour" in “Towardthe Comparative Study of Public Administration" Ed. W.J. Siffin Indiana University Press. 1957.
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his work on Bolivia:
"International and foreign administrative models may be of the greatest service to Bolivian reconstruction. Although administrative institutions for the achieve­ment of public responsibility and accountability must be rooted in the native capacities of a country’s own culture, careful grafting of suitable strains from abroad can work small wonders."
Thus eclecticism cam be recommended to both developing and
developed nations as a means of learning the greatest possible
amount from the experiences of others. The methods considered
must of course be rationally chosen and implemented to ensure
that they are compatible with their new environment but they
are more likely to be successful than a blind acceptance of the
institutions of one particular system as has been the case in
societies subject to colonial rule.
For the IOM, the concept of eclecticism should also be considered
in its prescriptive sense since their selective imitation to date
has been entirely from Britain. This is true at the moment with
their consideration of the ombudsman idea which they intend, if it
is adopted at all, to be implemented on the same system of access
2through elected members as occurs in the UK. The IOM would 
perhaps do better to look more widely and even follow examples set 
in other countries. It would be appropriate for them to consider, 
for example, the modes of operation existing in other small 
independent communities where similar problems of inefficiency 
relating to size have be-devilled administrative developers for 
centuries.
1. Albert Lepawsky "Revolution and Reform in Bolivia: A Study in the Root and Branch of Public Administration in a Developing Nation" in Siffin (ed) Ibid. P.244.
2. See Chapter 2. P.106.
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Secondly, they could learn much from other places -where tax haven 
status has been established. Imitation of Jersey’s financial 
policies (or at least regular comparison with them) and lately with 
their energy policy1 already takes place and this ought perhaps to 
be extended to the administrative practices adopted to implement 
their similar financial policies. There is a vast number of 
small independent states all of which bear some similarity in terms 
of public administration to the Manx system simply as a result of 
their size. Comparative work not only with small states nearby such 
as the Channel Islands but with the Carribean Islands, Falkland 
Islands and small European states such as Lichenstein and Monaco 
may produce beneficial results.
Thirdly, the IOM could learn much from other nations who have 
experienced specifically British influence in a similar close 
geographical proximity, for example Ireland. Ireland and more 
distant countries have learned since their independence to 
establish separate and more appropriate structures suited to 
their needs.
1. ’’Jersey link-upon energy problems” IOM Examiner. 7/8/81.
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CONCLUSION
This Chapter has sought to explain the relevance of the concept 
of hybridity to both the IOM (giving examples) and to other 
countries. Summarily, this is that the IOM displays features 
of both central and local administrative systems in Britain.
In terms of the allocation of functions there appears to be a 
stronger resemblence to local government though the attitudes of 
the participants - /in public administration are derived mainly 
from their perceptions of the central government ethos. In 
terms of procedure, though they pay lip service to well- 
established principles of both central and local government in 
the IBC, the IOM has retained much of the traditional personlised, 
rule-free procedure through into the present day performance of 
functions.
The reasons for this development of a hybrid system axe its small 
size and the intermixing of the imitation of British practice with 
entirely autonomous attempts at problem solving.
This Chapter ended with some discussion of the relevance of hybrid­
ity and the much broader concepts of eclecticism in the development 
of administrative systems. It was suggested that the latter 
concept is more appropriate to be used in comparative administra­
tion since it does not require the presence of certain conditions 
such as size, or two very dominant systems to be imitated. It 
was also proposed that eclecticism is not only a descriptive but 
a prescriptive concept of relevance universally in the development 
of administrative structures.
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C O N C L U S I O N
On a final view, this thesis has attempted a comprehensive analysis 
of the structure, .values and behaviour in an entire administrative 
system of an almost completely independent nature, all be it in 
miniature. In this sense it provides a useful case study and 
contributes comment of relevance to other systems of public 
administration both large and small through the concept of 
hybridity and its concomitant, eclecticism.
To summarise, this work has attempted to describe the Manx 1 
administrative machine(Chapters 3 and 4) in the light of both the 
structures and values of local and central government in Britain 
(Chapter 1) and the administrative values inherent in the Manx 
system itself.
The major conclusion of Chapter One is that though the 
bureaucracies of both British central and local government adhere 
quite closely to Weber's ideal type bureaucracy, each level does 
have characteristics peculiar to it. This is illustrated by the 
stress on the values of impartiality and anonymity in the British 
Civil Service; the relatively great importance of professionalism 
at the local level.; the difference of response to the calls for 
efficiency especially in relation to size of functional units.
Chapter Two discovers the Manx administrative culture to be a 
product of the quasi-qolonial relationship with Britain; the 
unwillingness to examine administrative behaviour in any rational 
manner; the inferiority complex of the Island as a whole and of 
many members of its government which is a consequence of the final
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factor; the political nature of a small community. The major 
implication of all these things for the thesis is that it results 
in an imitation of British practice which is selective and which 
sub-consciously has produced a hybrid system of public admin­
istration.
The Chapter on the machinery of government makes many descriptive 
points but overall it identifies the following features. The 
system is the product of a gradual evolution over a period of 
centuries and this has resulted in a fragmented, poorly 
co-ordinated system which has both the advantages and disadvantages 
of being small. A further weakness of the system is that it does 
not present itself to the outside world as a viable, national 
system of government. Despite this the system has succeeded in 
its own terms as it has retained its stability which a highly 
valued aspect of Manx government.
Two principle conclusions come from Chapter Four. The first is 
that there is a very low level of interest and activity with 
relation to personnel and public service issues which results in 
a low degree of union activity and a generally unquestioning 
approach to organisational behaviour. This does nothing to 
change the particulaxistic nature of recruitment and promotion 
policy. The second point is that this unquestioning attitude 
is a result of a low level of education in politics, public 
administration and the social sciences and a particular absence 
of the study of Manx government in the light of these disciplines.
Chapter Five describes both the concept of hybridity and its
relevance in Mann and elsewhere. The concept revolves around
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the idea that a system which displays hybridity is one which has 
aspects of two other systems either as a result of conscious or 
unconscious imitation. This is illustrated in Mann in many ways 
which can be summarised under the headings the Allocation of 
Functions, the Attitudes of the Actors in the Process and finally 
the Procedure used in the Organisation. In terms of the first 
the IOM displays many features which bear a great similarity to 
British local government. In terms of the second, the attitudes 
of the actors derive from and are often similar to those in the 
British Civil Service. On the final aspect of procedure, 
although there is a superficial resemblance to both central and 
local government, the behaviour is most influenced by the 
traditionalism inherent in Manx society resulting in highly persona- 
lised application and development of rules*
The reasons for the development of the hybrid system as Chapter 
Five goes on to explain are the small size of the Island and of 
the Manx government in particular; the selective imitation of 
British practices and finally the entirely autonomous responses 
that are made to many problems without reference to any other 
pattern elsewhere.
Chapter Five also concluded that the concepts of hybridity and 
wider, eclecticism were relevant outside Mann and could provide 
useful tools of analysis in comparative administration.
It is to be hoped that this thesis has challenged some of the
popular assumptions of Manx political actors and commentators.
In particular the suggestion that the IOM adopts British central
government structures and practices without question is analysed
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and found to be false. The process of imitation is far more 
subtle and complex than this bland statement suggests. Its many 
facets include imitation of not only central but of local 
government practice (hence the term hybridity); a degree of 
unconsciousness about the act; a considerable reliance on tradi­
tional beliefs and values on the Island community itself; and an 
unwillingness to consider the administrative methods of other 
political systems.
As a result of this long and deep look at the Manx system and an 
equally close connection with it through working in the Manx Civil 
Service itself, it is possible for the author to draw some 
conclusions as to its overall value as a system. Any social 
scientist studying a political phenomenon . must bring a series of 
value judgements which may cloud the analysis. However, if we 
look at a system on its own terms, that is according to the value 
system pertaining to it, it is possible to consider to what 
extent it measures up to its own standards.
Above all the Island values its independence and with this its 
small size. Though it is debateable whether smallness is conco­
mitant with greater democracy or efficiency it is certainly highly 
regarded in the Isle of Main as a means of keeping in check 
corruption and the dysfunctions of excessively large bureaucracies. 
Is smallness, however, incompatible with the Island’s other aim 
(which we can only assume) of efficiency in service provision?
This too is debateable though most commentators would agree that the 
local government system forfeits its efficiency through its 
excessive parochialism. At the central level there are ways of
rationalising services whilst still retaining the relatively small
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size of the body as a whole. Since the amalgamation of Boards 
is fiercely resisted, the smallness of individual units is some­
what dysfunctional and this could be combatted through the combina­
tion of certain functions in larger Boards.
Another overall point to make about the Manx administrative . 
system is that .it relies heavily on past practices and is very 
reluctant to consider change. This is associated with the Island’s 
much vaunted stability but there is a danger that where resistance 
to new ideas is vehement, on the grounds that *we have always done 
it this way so why should we change now’, so both good and bad, 
relevant and irrelevant will be discarded together. This 
unwillingness to consider new approaches to problems is closely 
associated with a general unwillingness to examine and analyse 
methods.
In short the actors in Manx government must decide, after due 
consideration and analysis, what they are aiming for in the admin­
istrative system and the best ways in which to achieve these goals. 
In doing so it would be of great benefit to them to be eclectic 
in their approach and to consider the examples set by other small, 
independent communities or larger countries of a similar political 
make-up. By this means, the Island could make the most of its 
considerable advantages, such as, growing economic prosperity, 
a stable and peaceful society, and a supportive, integrated 
community.
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APPENDIX 1
Demographic Statistics taken from IOM Digest of Economics and 
Social Statistics.
POPULATION 1821-1976 WITH INTERCENSAL VARIATIONS
DATE OF CENSUS POPULATION
INTERCENSAL INCREASE OR DECREASE (-)
Persons Males Females Amount %  per year
1821 - May 27/28 (i) 40,081 19,158 20,923
1831 - May 29/30 (i) 41,000 19,560 21,440 919 0.23
1841 - June 6/7 (ii) 47,975 23,011 24,964 6 ,975 1.60
1851 - March 30/31 (iii) 52,387 24,915 27,472 4,412 0.91
1861 - April 7/8 52,469 24,727 27,742 82 0.02
1871-April 2/3 (iv) ' 54,042 25,914 28,128 1,573 0.30
1881-April 3/4 53,558 25,760 27,798 -484 -0.09
1891 - April 5/6 55,608 26,329 29,279 2,050 0.38
1901 - March 31/April 1 54,752 25,496 29,256 -856 -0.15
1911 - April 2/3 52,016 23,937 28,079 -2,736 -0.48
1921 - June 19/20 60,284 27,329 32,955 8,268 1.20
1931 - April 26/27 (v) 49,308 22,443 26,865 -10,976 -1.70
1939 - Mid-year.estimate 52,029 23,675 28,354 2,721 0.69
1951 - April 8/9 55,253 25,774 29,479 3,224 0.50
1961 - April 23/24 48,133 22,034 26,099 -7,120 -1.2 0
1966 - April 24/25 50,423 23,226 27,197 2,290 0.95
1971 - April 25/26 54,581 25,528 29,053 4,158 1.60
1976 - April 4/5 61,723 29,343 32,380 7,142 2.50
(i) Excluding armed forces and seamen.
(ii) Including armed forces and seamen ashore (from 1841 to 1976).
(iii) Including persons on vessels in port on Census night andarriving the following day (from 1851 to 1921).
(iv) Including fishermen absent at sea engaged in the Irish Mackerel Fishery (from 1871 to 1911); their numbers were: (1871) 1,151, (1881) 2,022, (1891) 1,264, (1901) 577,(1911) 160.
(v) Including persons on board vessels in island waters, or on acoastwise or fishing voyage, at census mid-night (from 1931 to 1976).
Source: Isle of Man Census 1976 Report.
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Appendix 1 Continued
NEW RESIDENTS BY QUINARY AGE AND AREA OF ORIGIN
TOTALS
UnitedKingdom
British common- -wealth
Othercoun­triesPersons Males Females
0 4 570 284 286 528 18 24
5. ,- 9 796 422 374 742 30 24
10 - 14 701 363 338 638 45 18
15 - 19 677 305 372 590 43 44
20 - 24 955 445 510 863 28 64
25 - 29 1,017 520 497 933 33 51
30 - 34 717 393 324 662 29 26
35 - 39 613 314 299 567 29 .17
40 - 44 514 259 255 454 33 27
45 - 49 554 258 296 488 44 22
50 - 54 656 299 357 563 57 36
55 - 59 644 280 364 552 49 43
60 - 64 790 407 383 690 57 43
65 - 69 703 396 307 600 69 34
70 - 74 365 177 188 306 39 20
75 - 79 166 81 85 143 11 12
80 - 84 78 24 54 73 2 3
85 - 89 38 12 26 36 2 -
90 - 94 9 5 4 8 - 1
All ages 10,563 5,244 1 5,319 9,436 618 509
Source: Isle of Man Census 1976 Report
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SECTOR DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYEES IN EMPLOYMENT:
UNITED KINGDOM AND ISLE OF MAN
on o'TA'n
United Kd.ngdom^^ Isle of M
SECTOR No. Employees % of No. Employee^ ^ %  Of(0 0 0 *s) Total Total
1 395 1.8 702 3.5
2 714 3.2 538 2.7
3 3,269 14.5 1,255 6.2
4 934 4.1 385 1.9
5 2,681 11.9 678 3.3
6 1,308 5.8 2,679 13.2
7 353 1.6 529 2.6
8 1,475 6.5 1,988 9.8
9 840 3.7 864 4.3
10 1,883 8.4 2,167 10.7
11 1,103 4.9 1,097 5.4
12 3,654 16.2 3,202 15'. 8
13 266 1.2 765 3.8
14 879 3.9 763 3.8
15 1,154 5.1 1,589 7.8
16 1,627 1^11^ 7.2 1,067 5.3
n.e.c. 4 - (9) -
, Total 22,539 100.0 20,259 100.0
For definition of sector numbers, see page vi .
(i) June 1976
(ii) April 1976
(iii) Excluding Armed Forces
(iv) Figures obtained by deducting self-employed persons from the total economically active population (see later tables) 5 there are nine self-employed persons not classified by industrial sector.
Source: Isle of Man Census 1976 Further Report,,Treasury.
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Appendix 1 Continued
PASSENGER ARRIVALS BY AIR AND SEA 1974-79: MONTHLY TOTALS
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
January 10,065 11,027 11,023 10,920 11,354 11,352
February 9,689 9,964 9,795 10,481 10,101 10,654
March 12,925 20,0 0 0 12,760 13,555 21,671 15,323
April 27,524 18,317 26,356 24,288 17,989 32,479
May 56,945 73,917 52,668 35,563 62,623 105,673
June 95,705 99,233 111,517 110,349 112 ,894 122,147
July 138,206 156,923 157,084 150,784 145,278 164,310
August 141,378 162,196 142,541 123,361 136 ,427 157,408
September 65,997 72,342 69,201 65,371 73,674 85,078
October 19,778 22,529 17,677 19,109 20,832 27,296
November 12,138 11,584 11,849 11,462 13 ,882 14,980
December 13,791 13,538 13,183 13,658 15,445 16,445
Annual Total604,141 671,570 635,654 588,901 642,170 763,145
Source: Isle of Man Steam Packet Co. Ltd., Airports Board,Tourist Board, Harbour Board, Treasury.
AREA OF ORIGIN OF STAYING TOURISTS 
% OF TOURISTS BY SEA AND AIR
Sea Air
United Kingdom 86 85
Eire 10 5
Europe, U.S.A., other Canada, 3 9
Source: Manx Tourism ’77 report
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Isle of Man Industrial' Sectors
1 . Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing.
2 . Manufacturing: food and drink.
3. Manufacturing: engineering.
4. Manufacturing: textiles, clothing and footwear.
5. Manufacturing: other; mining and quarrying.
6 . Cons truction.
7. Gas, electricity and water.
8 . Transport and communication.
9. Wholesale distribution.
1 0 . Retail distribution.
1 1 . Insurance, banking, finance and business services.
1 2 . Professional, educational, medical and scientific services.
13. Tourist accommodation.
14. Other catering and entertainment.
15. Miscellaneous services.
16. Public administration and defence.
APPENDIX 2
COMMITTEES OF THE LEGISLATURE
which functioned during the life of the 1976-1981 House of Keys, 
a total of 41.
A. Committees of Tynwald (25)
Type No
(1) Standing 9
(2) Select 13
(3) JointCommittees
Titles
a. Constitutional Issues Ctte.b. Ecclesiastical Ctte.c. Members Pension Scheme Management Ctte.d. Population Growth and Control of Immigration Committee.e. Printing Ctte.f. Declaration of Members* Interests Ctte.g. Selection Committeeh. Standing Orders Committeei. Tynwald Ceremony Arrangements Committee
a.b.
c.d.
Member­ship
775
Advocates * Fees Committee Committee on the Chronically Sick and Disabled Common Market Committee Common Purse Committee e. Constitution of the Board of Education Committee Energy Committeef.
g-h.i.
k.
1 .
Governor’s Powers & Duties CtteMillennium CommitteePetition of Redress ofG.F. Crowe and others(Betting Shop Hours) CommitteePetition of Redress ofM.J. Irving & Others(European Convention on HumanRights) CommitteeRating CommitteeSt. Mary’s Castletown Committeem. Steering Committee on Transport
Administration of Justice Bill Joint Committee.Joint Committee on the Remune­ration of Crown Officers etc. Management Committee of the Clerk of Tynwald’s Department.
35
93 5
55
455
465 5
10
Position of Speaker
Chmn.
Member
Chmn.
MemberChmn.Member
Chmn.
Chmn.
Chmn.Chmn.Member
Chmn.
Member
Member
Chmn.
B. Committees of the Legislative Council
(1) Standing
(2) Select
1 a. Standing Orders Ctte.
1 a. Administration of Justice Committee
C, Committees of the House of Keys
(1) Standing 2
(2) Select
a. Consultative Committeeb. Standing Orders Committee
12 a. Administration of Justice . Bill Committeeb. Control of .Employment (Arndt) Bill Committeec. Criminal Law Bill Committeed. Income Tax Bill Committeee. Jury Bill Committeef . Licencing Law Committeeg. Manx Citizenship and Nationalityh. Misrepresentation and Unfair Contract Terms Bill Committeei.. .Pre-Revestment Written Laws(Ascertainment) Bill Ctte. j. Statute Law Revision Bill Committee. k.'Unemployment Ctte.
4
4
5545 5
Chmn.Chmn.
Chmn.
N.B. Though all these committees had functioned during the1976-1981 House of Keys, 16 of the Select Committees were Functus Officio at the time of completion of this table.
Source: The Tynwald Companion. 1980.
APPENDIX 3
Government Office Organisation of Duties
Government Secretary
Policy - Executive Council Co-ordination of business Statutory Functions Communication with H.M. Government Complaints
*AT Division—• Internal Affairs
Constitutional matters Legislative matters - TynwaldLegislative Council Progress of Legislation Royal and State Occasions Church AffairsDefence and Civil Emergencies - Emergency Powers Armed Forces Official Secrets Terrorism Administration of Justice - PoliceMagistrates and High BailiffProbation ServicePrisonCoronersInquests of Death 
Jury Acts Rules of CourtCommunity Home (Remand Home) Children Acts Advocates Maintenance Orders Fires and Punishments Tribunals Public Safety -Firearms Dangerous Goods Explosives Rifle Ranges Fire Precautions Security
’B* Division - Economic and Social Affairs 
Transport - AviationShippingHighwaysRailways
- i -
Communications -Posts, telephones and telegraphsEducation Finance - - - Exchange Control Currency and CoinageHealth ---  - Hospitals and Nursing Homes Drink and Drugs Poisons Burial Acts Cremations Gaming, Betting and Lotteries Tourism Environment - Local Government Cruelty to Animals Game ActsWild Life Protection Lands, Mines and Quarries FootpathsGovernment Property HousingLandlord and Tenant Refuse Disposal Control of Advertisements Coast Erosion Allotments National Trust Sporting and Cultural Affairs - Arts Council Sports Council Museum Consumer Affairs -Consumer Council Weights and Measures Public Analyst Gas WaterElectricity Shop Hours Bank Holidays Summer Time Postcard Censorship Charities, Blind Welfare and Disabled Persons Population - - Register General Census Marriage Printing and Stationary Trade, Industry and Commerce Social Security Employment and Unemployment
* C* Division - External Affairs
European Economic Community Customs and Excise Agriculture - Marketing Price Controls Diseases of Animals Meat GradingAgricultural Holdings ActsFisheries Horticulture International Affairs - Treaties Conventions Diplomatic Privileges United Nations Aliens and Immigration Passports and ' Emigration Nationality and Naturalisation Domicile
Public RelationsSecretarial and clerical support to numerous miscellaneous commit tees and trusts.
Taken from Government Circular No. 7/76Government Office Reference No. cl205/l/2/7.
APPENDIX 4
1.
2 .
3.
4.
5.
6 .
7.
8. 
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Summary of Marshall Report Recommendations
There should be a Finance Board
A Chief Financial Officer should be responsible for the whole of the financial administration.
Financial administration should be con­centrated in a single finance department
The form of annual estimates should be standardised.
The process of examination and approval of estimates should be revised.
Boards should be authorised to incur expenditure up to a limit of the budget provision under each head of account. Savings should not be at the disposal of Boards to meet expenditure on unapproved purposes. The hypothecation of specific revenues should cease.
All payments should be made by the finance department. The Boards should not maintain separate funds.
The finance department should be equipped with accounting machinery.
The form of public accounts should be recast.
The Finance Department should include a section specialising in the collection of income. The collection of rates should be concentrated. The number of collecting authorities should be reduced.
An internal audit section should be formed
Consideration should be given to the consolidation of public loans.
A code of financial regulations should be adopted.
The salary of the Chief Financial Officer should be not less than £2,500 p.a.
A plan should be made for the centralisa­tion of officers in one building. A single body should become responsible for the provision and administration of all public buildings and offices.
Implemented 
Yes.
Yes. Treasurer appointed.
Yes. The Treasury formed from the Finance Division of Government Office.
Yes.
Yes.
Yes.
Yes,(on the whole).
Yes. Computer.
Yes.
Only partially due to opposition from local authorities.
Yies.
Yes.
No.
Most definitely.
Yes, to first.Second questionable.
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16. All officers of Government and Boards should be civil servants. A Chief . Secretary should be appointed to be head of the civil service and principal adviser of all departments and Boards.
Yes to first. Government Secretary duties extended
17. There should be an organisation and methods investigation of the adminis­tration other than financial administra­tion .
Small 0 & M unit set up in the CSC to do this but as yet no comprehen­sive investigation.
18. There should be a review of the pay of senior officers.
Yes.
19. Consideration should be given to the drafting of a training scheme for civil servants.
Very rudimentary.
2 0 . The establishment problem cannot be solved until the future form of adminis­tration has been decided.
No.
2 1 . Consideration should be given to some rearrangement of the functions of the Boards.
No.
2 2 . The system of local government should be reviewed with the object of reducing the number of authorities.
Review 1967. No changes.
23. Insurances against fine and other risks should be consolidated. Yes.
24. Efforts should be made to economise in the use of stationary. Purchasing section should be set up.
First question­able. Second yes.
25. The Income Tax Assessment Division should be strengthened. Yes.
26. A rearrangement of the responsibilities of the external auditors would be advantageous.
Yes.
Taken from the Report on Administrative Organisation of the IOM 
Government, 16th October, 1959.
APPENDIX 5
Isle of Man Local Government Board - General List of Duties
1. Public Health and the Environment including Refuse Disposal 
and Sewage Disposal.
2. Public Authority Housing - supervision, building and 
encouragement to build.
3. Private Sector building control and Improvement and Energy 
Conservation.
4. Fire Services including Fire Prevention.
5. Safety, Health and Welfare in Factories and other places of 
work.
6 . Child Life Protection, Adoptions, Day Nurseries and Child- 
Minders.
7. Planning control, Building and Advertisement Byelaws.
8 . General local authority supervisory powers.
9. Registration of Council Builders and Workmen.
10 . Development Schemes.
Source: Information document produced by the I.O.M. Local
Government Boared on its functions, members, officers 
and finance. 1980/1981.
APPENDIX 6
Local Government Ratinq Statistics
Figs. for 1978/79
Town Districts. Population GeneralRate RateableValues Total Rates collected Averaqe Rate of Head of Population
Douglas 19,987 88 1,517,012 1,576,934 £*s78.90
Castletown 2,788 61 158,583 124,726 44.74
Peel 3,295 42 182,299 114,210 43.66
Ramsey 5,372 58 430,969 327,776 61.02
VillaqeDistricts
Laxey 1,242 34 66,933 36,914 29.72
Michael 437 6 24,251 10,908 24.96
Onchan 6,395 28 448,945 211,229 33.03
Port Erin 2,356 50 180,682 122,773 52.11
Port St.Mary 1,525 44 90,263 55,918 36.67
ParishDistricts
Andreas 949 7.5 41,012 17,273 18.20
Arbory 1,414 13 83,247 33,835 23.93
Ballaugh 655 4 35,922 12,982 19.82
Braddan 2,095 5 151,438 57,253 27.33
Bride 428 10 17,438 5,663 13.23
German 866 5 43,981 17,633 20.36
Jurby 640 6 30,524 11,784 18.41
Lezayre 1,339 4.75 79,876 27,199 20.31
Lonan 1,129 3 59> 547 20,092 17.80
Malew 2,116 5 147,419 54,538 25.77
Marown 1,230 3.5 72,094 22,055 20.37
Maughold 763 8 52,866 16,140 21*15
Michael Parish 402 8.5 20,305 6,851 17,. 04
Onchan Parish 414 6 24,157 6,233 15.06
Patrick 1,078 6 34,354 14,626 13.57
Rushen 1,274 13 70,000 28,445 22.33
Santon 397 5 20,013 5,440 13.7060,586 2,939,430
APPENDIX 7
Summary of the Recommendations of the Committee on Ratinq and 
Taxation 1967 - those pertaining to local government only.
Para. 72
The present duality of rating should cease.
Para 95
An immediate revaluation of all properties should be made and 
revaluations should take place every five years.
Para. 96 (1)
Agricultural properties should be de-rated.
Para. 96 (2)
Where a property becomes vacant after full rates have been paid, 
a proportion of the rates should be refunded.
Para. 96 (3)
The system of rate discounts should be abolished.
Para. 96 (4)
Consideration should be given to the partial de-rating of proper­
ties vacant for more than six months.
Para. 97
A simplified system of rate rebates to be operated in conjunction 
with the Board of Social Services should be considered.
Para. 98
The payment of rates by instalments should be allowed.
Para. 99
Differential rating as between domestic property and all other 
types of property should be examined.
Para. 100 ,
The exemption from rating of ^Crown1* properties should be abolished. 
Para.156
A new single local authority for the whole of the Island should 
be created with the responsibility for carrying out the full 
functions of a normal local authority and with financial resources 
to match.
Para. 159
The Assessment Board should relinquish all its functions to the 
new Local Authority and cease to exist.
Para. 159 (b)
The Education Authority should cease to ecist and its functions 
be transferred to the new Local Authority.
Para. 159 (c)
The Highways Board should relinquish and transfer:-
1 ) its functions relating to highways and land drainage to the 
new Local Authority;
2) the collection of motor vehicle taxation to the Government 
Treasurer.
Para. 159 (d)
The responsibility for the provision and maintenance of public 
glens should be transferred from the Forestry, Mines and Lands 
Board- to the new Local Authority.
Para. 159 (e)
The Health Services Board should transfer to the new Local 
Authority functions relating to: (1 ) ambulance services,
(2) handicapped children, (3) home help services, (4) infant 
welfare and nursery service, and (5) vaccination and immunisation. 
Para. 159 (f)
The Board of Social Services should relinquish and transfer to 
the new Local Authority responsibility for services in respect of 
the welfare of old people and handicapped persons.
Para. 159 (g)
The Local Government Board should be reorganised.
Para. 159 (h)
The Medical Officer of Health should be an officer of the new 
Local Authority.
Para. 159 (i)
The Water Board should cease to exist and its functions be trans­
ferred to the new Local Authority.
Para. 160
The new Local Authority should have 50 elected members.
Paras. 161 & 162
Five district committees should be set up to act as channels of 
communication between the new Local Authority and the local 
communities.
Para. 164
Concerning the new Local Authority
(a) Members should serve for three years and retire simultaneously;
-  i i  -
(b) There should be no Aldermen and no Mayor;
(c) There should be 'a Chairman elected annually, being eligible
for re-election;
(d) A minimum number of standing committees should be formed\
(e) Sessional payments, should be made to members >
(f) Provision should be made for compensation for loss of office.
Para.184
A proportion of income tax should be assigned to the new Local 
Authority.
Para.200
There should be no systems of differential rating as between 
areas when the hew Local Authority is formed.
Para. 201
The Passenger Transport Undertaking in the Island should be 
operated by the new Local Authority.
APPENDIX 8
OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS 
Declaration
Declaration to be signed by civil servants on appointment and, when desirable, by non-civil servants on first being given access to Government information.
My attention has been drawn to the provisions of the Official Secrets Acts, which are set out on the back of this document, and I am fully aware of the serious consequences which may follow any breach of these provisions.
I understand that the sections of the Official Secrets Acts, set out on the back of this document, cover material published in a speech, lecture, or radio or television broadcast, or in the Press or in book form. I am aware that I should not divulge any information gained by me as a result of my appointment to any unauthorised person, either orally or in writing, without the previous official sanction in writing of the Department appointing me, to which written application should be made and two copies of the proposed publication be forwarded. I understand also that I am liable to be prosecuted if I publish without official sanction any information I may acquire in the course of my tenure of an official appointment (unless it has already officially been made public) or retain without official sanction any sketch, plan, model, article, note or official documents which are no longer needed for my official duties, and that these provisions apply not only during the period of my appointment but also after my appointment has ceased.
Signed
Date
- i -
APPENDIX 8 Continued
EXTRACTS FROM THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS, 1911 and 1920
Section 1 of the Official Secrets Act, 1911, as amended by the Official Secrets Act, 1920, provides as follows
u2. (1) If any person having in his possession or control any secret official code word, or password, or any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information which relates to or issued in a prohibited place or anything in such a place, or which has been'made or obtained in contravention of this Act, or which has been entrusted in confidence to him by any person holding office under Her Majesty, or which he has obtained or to which he has had access owing to his position as a person who holds or has held office under Her Majesty, or as a person who holds or has held a contract made on behalf of Her Majesty, or as a person who is or has been employed under a person who holds or has held such an office or contract -
(a) communicates the code word, pass word, sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information to any person, other than a person to whom he is authorised to communicate it, or a person to whom it is in the interests of the State his duty to communicate it or
(aa) uses the information in his possession for the benefit of any foreign power or in any other manner prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State:
(b) retains the sketch, plan, model, article, note, or document in his possession or control when he has no right to retain it or when it is contrary to his duty to retain it or fails to comply with all directions issued by lawful authority with regard to the return or disposal thereof: or
(c) fails to take reasonable care of, or so conducts himself as to endanger the safety of the sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, secret official code or pass word or information
that person shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.
(la)If any person having in his possession or
control any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information which relates to munitions of war, communicates it directly or indirectly to any foreign power, or in any other manner prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, that person shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.
(2) If any person receives any secret official code word, or pass word, or sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information, knowing, or having reasonable ground to believe, at the time when he receives it, that the code word, pass word, sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information is communicated to him in contravention of this Act, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, unless he proves that the communication to him of the code word, pass word, sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information was contrary to his desire.,r
Section 1 (2) of the Official Secrets Act, 1920, provides as follows»t(2 ) If any person -
(a) retains for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State any official document, whether or not completed or issued for use,when he has no right to retain it, or when it is contrary to his duty to retain it, or fails to comply with any directions issued by a Govern­ment Department or any person authorised by such department with regard to the return or disposal thereof: or
(b) allows any other person to have possession of any official document issued for his use alone, or communicate any secret official code word or pass word so issued, or, without lawful authority or excuse, has in his possession any official document or secret official code word or pass word issued for the use of some person other than himself, or on obtaining possession of any official document by finding or otherwise, neglects or fails to restore it to the person or authorityby whom or for whose use it was issued, or to a police constable; or
(c) without lawful authority or excuse, manufactures or sells, or has in his possession for sale any such die, seal or stamp as aforesaid
he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour alt
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APPENDIX 9
General Conduct of Civil Servants
The following general principles apply to all members of the
Civil Service:-
(a) The first duty of a civil servant is to give his undivided 
allegiance to the State at all times and on all occasions 
when the State has a claim on his services.
(b) A civil servant must not subordinate his duty to his private 
interests, neither is he to put himself in a position where 
his duty and his private interests conflict and he must not 
make use of his official position to further those interests.
(c) Though the State is in general not concerned with its servants1 
private activities, they must not be such as might bring 
discredit on the Service - for example, heavy gambling and 
speculation are to be avoided, particularly in departments 
which have access to information which could be turned to 
private gain.
(d) It is grossly improper for a civil servant to attempt to 
procure the intervention of Members of the Legislature or 
a member of the Civil Service Commission who is not a 
Member of the Legislature, in the matter of promotion or 
otherwise with reference to his position in the Civil Service.
Source: I.O.M. Civil Service Regulations.
APPENDIX 10
Limitations on Political Activity
(a) id-general civil servants are completely barred from engaging 
in the activities defined as national political activities 
at (b) below but may with the approval of the Board or 
Department concernedand the Government Secretary, engage in 
the activities defined at (c) below as local political 
activities.
Approval when granted is subject to the condition that the 
civil servants to whom it is granted will act with moderation 
and discretion and will not involve themselves in matters of 
political controversy which are of national, rather than 
local significance.
(b) National political activities include
i) holding, in a party political organisation, an office 
impinging wholly or mainly on party politics in the 
national field;
ii) speaking in public on matters of national political, 
controversy;
iii) expressing views on such matters in letters to the 
press, in radio and television broadcasts and in 
books, articles, pamphlets or leaflets;
iv) canvassing on behalf of a parliamentary candidate or 
political party; 
v) membership of the IOM Board of Education.
(c) Local political activities include
i) candidature for, or co-option to, local authorities;
ii) holding, in a party political or other organisation,
an office impinging wholly or mainly on party politics 
in the local field.
iii) speaking in public on matters of local political 
controversy;
iv) expressing views on such matters in letters to the
press, in radio and television broadcasts, and in
books, articles ,pamphlets or leaflets;
v) canvassing on behalf of candidates for election to 
local political or other organisation;
A civil servant seeking a seat in the House of Keys must 
resign his post as soon as he issues his address to the 
electors or in any other manner publicly announces himself, 
or allows himself to be publicly announced as a candidate.
An officer who resigns his post for such reason has no right 
of re-instatement in the Civil Service but he may be 
re-instated with the approval of the CSC.
Source: I.O.M. Civil Service Regulations.
